Miguel v. Cochran

• Decision Date: 18 February 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 5:20-CV-041-C
• Parties: SAMUEL SAN MIGUEL, Plaintiff, v. JOHN COCHRAN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

SAMUEL SAN MIGUEL, Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN COCHRAN, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:20-CV-041-C

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Lubbock Division

February 18, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

D. GORDON BRYANT, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants Marsha McLane, Michael Searcy, Rachael Kingston, Chris Salinas, Joanne Castro, and Debra Keesee's^[1] (collectively, Defendants) Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and brief in support. ECF No. 62. For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge recommends that the United States District Judge GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Samuel San Miguel initially filed this action in state court alleging violations of his constitutional rights by Defendants Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center (Texas Tech), Marsha McLane, Michael Searcy, Rachael Kingston, Chris Salinas, John Cochran, Cynthia Jumper, Taylor Caldwell, Joanne Castro, Courtney Bearden, and Debra Keesee. Compl. 13-15, ECF No. 1-3.^[2] Defendant John Cochran removed this case, with the consent of Defendants McLane, Searcy, Kingston, Salinas, Castro, and Keesee, from the 154th Judicial District Court of

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Lamb County, Texas, to this Court on February 21, 2020.^[3] ECF No. 1, at 2-3. The undersigned recommended that the United States District Judge grant motions to dismiss filed by Defendants John Cochran, Taylor Caldwell, Texas Tech, Cynthia Jumper, and Courtney Bearden, and the Court adopted the undersigned's recommendations. ECF Nos. 29-31, 35-37, 42-43, 46-47. San Miguel then filed an Amended Complaint on April 20, 2021 (ECF No. 60), to which Defendants filed the current Motion to Dismiss on May 4, 2021. ECF No. 62. San Miguel filed a belated response on July 15, 2021. ECF No. 71. Defendants' Motion is now ripe for review, and the district judge has referred it to the undersigned for recommendation. ECF No. 63.

II. Standard of Review

A. Rule 12(b)(1): Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The United States Constitution provides federal courts with original jurisdiction to hear a limited class of cases and controversies. See U.S. Const, art. Ill. § 2. "Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider," and that authority extends to determining "when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them." Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212-13 (2007). Federal courts "cannot act without authority from Congress or the Constitution." La. Real Est. Appraisers Bd. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 917 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2019) ("Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by the Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree." (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).

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The burden of establishing jurisdiction lies with the party seeking to invoke the federal forum, and a court "must presume" the suit lies outside its limited grant of jurisdiction. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). Indeed, "there is a presumption against subject matter jurisdiction that must be rebutted by the party bringing [the] action to federal court." Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996).

In determining whether jurisdiction exists, a court may consider: "(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Choice Inc. of Tex. v. Greenstein, 691 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. May 1981)). A court that accepts as true a plaintiffs allegations in evaluating its jurisdiction, and does not consider evidentiary materials outside the pleading, engages in a facial review for purposes of determining subject matter jurisdiction. See Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining that under facial, as opposed to factual, analysis, the court accepts as true the complaint's allegations to determine whether the plaintiff "has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction").

B. Rule 12(b)(6): Failure to State a Claim

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see Colony Ins. Co. v. Peachtree Constr., Ltd., 647 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 2011). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In considering 12(b)(6) motions, courts must accept well-pleaded facts (not mere conclusory allegations) as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Twombly,

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550 U.S. at 555 (explaining that a plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do"); Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., 833 F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating that courts accept all well-pleaded facts as true, but '"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements' cannot establish facial plausibility" (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).

A court need only determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim; it does not evaluate whether the plaintiff is ultimately likely to prevail. See United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2004).

III. Background

A. San Miguel's Claims

In his Amended Complaint, San Miguel asserts nine claims against the six remaining Defendants; however, his allegations lack clarity and consistency as to whether he asserts individual and official capacity claims against each. San Miguel sues Defendant Michael Searcy only in his individual capacity and only for monetary damages, and then generally names the five remaining parties as Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Am. Compl. 3-4, ECF No. 60. San Miguel specifies that he seeks monetary damages against Defendant McLane in her individual capacity, and injunctive relief in her official capacity. Id.; see Id. at 22-23. McLane, however, is the only remaining Defendant for whom he is this specific. Against the other Defendants, San Miguel seeks both monetary damages and injunctive relief, ^[4] but does not always

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specify in which capacity. Id. at 4, 22.^[5] Finally, San Miguel asks for declaratory relief in the form of a statement concerning what constitutional rights he possesses, as well as what type of treatment he should receive and the minimal acceptable levels that govern his conditions of confinement. Id. at 21.

San Miguel is a civilly committed sexually violent predator (SVP) housed at the Bill Clayton Detention Center, also known as the Texas Civil Commitment Center (TCCC), in Littlefield, Texas. Id. at 3, 5. He has been housed in the TCCC since September 2015. Id. at 5, The TCCC is operated by the Texas Civil Commitment Office (TCCO). Id. at 3.^[6]

Per San Miguel's Complaint, Defendant McLane is the "TCCO Executive Director," and "is legally responsible for the Constitutional Standard of Professional Care, Conduct and Judgement, as applied to Clinical Treatment and Supervision, in its entire scope, of San Miguel and all those civilly committed" as SVPs. Id. at 6. He also alleges that "(s]he is responsible for the overall function, policy, and administration of the TCCC." Id.

San Miguel asserts that Defendant Searcy, as Operation Specialist of the TCCO, is "legally responsible for the overall policy and administration of the TCCO and TCCC, and the professional standard of treatment and care provided to and for the TCCC patients." Id. at 4, 6, San Miguel attributes to Defendant Searcy the duty of "ensuring that [San Miguel] receives the medical/psychiatric/dental care he is entitled to." Id. at 6.

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According to San Miguel, Defendant Kingston "is the Unit Administrator for TCCO." Id. at 4. He alleges that Kingston "is legally responsible for the overall policy and administration of the TCCO and TCCC, and the professional standard of treatment and medical/psychiatric/dental care provided to and for the TCCC patients.'' Id. at 6.

Defendant Keesee, according to San Miguel, is "a[n] RN, who was placed in the Psych [department] at the TCCC [and] is legally responsible for the accepted professional judgement standard of Psychiatric care provided to the TCCC patients as well as ensuring that plaintiff receives the psychiatric medication he has been proscribed [sic] and needs." Id.

San Miguel states that Defendant Castro is the "TIU [sic] Primary Care Provider over the TCCC Medical Dpt. [sic]." Id. at 4. He alleges that Castro is "legally responsible for the constitutional standard of medical care provided to the TCCC patients, as well as ensuring that plaintiff receives the medical/psychiatric/dental care he needs and is entitled to." Id. at 6.

San Miguel identifies Defendant Salinas as his "TCCO Case Manager," and contends that Salinas "is legally responsible for ensuring that San Miguel receives the medical/psychiatric/dental care he needs and is entitled to." Id.

San Miguel's first two claims allege that "[t]he defendants do not provide enough nourishment for Plaintiff at the TCCC, he is left with hunger pains during the day and [when he] goes to sleep ... at night," and that the TCCC denies him access to care packages from his family because he has not taken a polygraph examination. Id. at 6-8. Specifically, San Miguel asserts that the "TCCC has a custom of denying the TCCC patients and San...