Mikale v. U.S. Dep't of Labor
| Decision Date | 01 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | 4:20CV3101 |
| Parties | EAN MIKALE and ALEDIA MIKALE, Plaintiffs, v. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, and CITY OF FREMONT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
Plaintiffs, who are not prisoners, have been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing 6.) The court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiffs' claims to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In four documents the court shall consider as one Complaint (Filings 1, 8, 9, 10), Plaintiffs Ean and Aledia Mikale seek money damages from the United States Department of Labor, the Nebraska Department of Education, the Nebraska Department of Labor, and the City of Fremont, Nebraska, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 3101 et seq. (Westlaw 2020) ("WIOA"). Plaintiffs allege that they "were members of the International Drone Federation, an association for the newly federally recognized occupations for Commercial Drone Pilots and Commercial Drone Software Developers." (Filing 10 at CM/ECF p. 2.) Plaintiffs then allege a flurry of highly detailed and confusing facts suggesting that, as part of their business, they paid and trained three apprentices; their training program ended due to financial hardship and state regulatory issues; and when Plaintiffs changed their business model, the Nebraska Department of Labor revoked its contract with Plaintiffs. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 2-3.)
Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants (1) conspired to deny them a "Federally recognized Apprenticeship" and to "oppress the business of the plaintiffs"; (2) infringed their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to "freely organize as an association" and to "peacefully assemble"; (3) engaged in negligent misrepresentation when the City of Fremontb indicated that Plaintiffs' "Apprenticeship" was approved, that the City would assist Plaintiffs in obtaining funding, that it would furnish a letter of support for the JPMorgan Chase Advancing Cities Competition, and it would "approve a Drone District around the Methodist Fremont Hospital," and the City's failure to do so negatively affected Plaintiffs' opportunity to pursue federal research dollars, attract investment, and deliver a contract as promised, as well as caused Plaintiffs to spend thousands of dollars purchasing equipment and staff, leasing property, and purchasing insurance; and (4) included unconscionable language in "the contractual agreement in question," the contents of which are unclear. (Filing 1 at CM/ECF pp. 4-5; Filing 10 at CM/ECF pp. 1-4.)
The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," or "their complaint must be dismissed." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ().
"The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, "[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Plaintiffs purport to "seek damages as redress as a class." (Filing 10 at CM/ECF p. 4.) Because "pro se litigants may not represent the interests of other parties," Miller By A.M. v. Dorsey, No. 4:18CV3031, 2018 WL 4854180, at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 5, 2018), this action cannot proceed as a class action. Nelson v. Hjorth, No. 8:18CV88, 2018 WL 2050571, at *4 (D. Neb. May 2, 2018) (); Deas v. Kenney, No. 8:15CV35, 2015 WL 1883614, at *2 (D. Neb. Apr. 24, 2015) (); Tyler v. Term Limit Statute of State of Neb., No. 8:08CV129, 2008 WL 2129828, at *1 (D. Neb. May 19, 2008) () (citing cases).
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges claims for money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to "freely organize as an association" and to "peacefully assemble." "To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
States and their agencies are not considered "persons" for purposes of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages by private parties against a state and itsagencies in federal court. Monroe v. Ark. State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2007) (); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1989) (). Accordingly, Defendants Nebraska Department of Education and Nebraska Department of Labor are not subject to suit under § 1983.
Plaintiffs' constitutional claims against the United States Department of Labor1 fail because constitutional tort claims may not be asserted against federal agencies. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473 (1994) (); Buford v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 1199, 1203 (8th Cir. 1998) ().
Plaintiffs also seek to bring section 1983 claims against the City of Fremont, Nebraska. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipality (or other local government unit) can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if an "action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." Id. at 691. "To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must first show that one of the municipality's officers violated her federal right." Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam); Sanders v. Cityof Minneapolis, 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2007)). "If that element is satisfied, then a plaintiff must establish the requisite degree of fault on the part of the municipality and a causal link between municipal policy and the alleged violation." Id. (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-92 (1989)).
To prevail on a claim alleged against the City of Fremont, Plaintiffs must show that the constitutional violation resulted from (1) an official "policy," (2) an unofficial "custom," or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. Corwin v. City of Independence, 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016). "Official policy involves 'a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various alternatives' by an official who has the final authority to establish governmental policy." Jane Doe A By & Through Jane Doe B v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis Cty., 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986)). "[A] plaintiff may establish municipal liability through an unofficial custom of the municipality by demonstrating '(1) the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity's employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity's policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and (3) that plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity's custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.'" Malone v. Hinman, 847 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Corwin, 829 F.3d at 699-700). A municipal liability claim based on a theory of inadequate training or supervision is simply an extension of a claim based on a "policy" or "custom" theory of municipal liability. Marsh v. Phelps Cty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2018).
Here, Plaintiffs make no allegations of "a policy, officially adopted and promulgated by the City of [Fremont], or a practice, so permanent and well-settled so as to constitute a custom, that existed and through which" the City acted to destroy Plaintiffs' business. Davison v. City of Minneapolis, Minn, 490 F.3d 648, 659 (8th Cir. 2007). Rather, Plaintiffs make factual allegations pertaining to their specific situation, which is insufficient to impose Monell liability. Id. (...
To continue reading
Request your trial