Mikhailova v. Andrei

• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 02 March 2018
• Docket Number: SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2017-325
• Citation: Mikhailova v. Babyuk, SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2017-325 (Vt. Mar 02, 2018)
• Parties: Vera P. Mikhailova v. Andrei V. Babyuk*

Vera P. Mikhailova v. Andrei V. Babyuk*

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2017-325

Supreme Court of Vermont

FEBRUARY TERM, 2018

March 2, 2018

Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.

ENTRY ORDER

APPEALED FROM:

Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Family Division

DOCKET NO. 891-11-14 Cndm

Trial Judge: James R. Crucitti

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

In this post-divorce enforcement proceeding, husband appeals the superior court's imposition of post-judgment interest at the 12% statutory rate. We affirm.

The parties divorced in October 2015 following a fifteen-year marriage. In the final divorce order, the superior court ordered husband to pay wife, among other things, $200,000 as her share of a stock buyout that husband had received from a former employer during the marriage. The October 12, 2015 final order required husband to make that payment within thirty days of the order. Husband filed a notice of appeal, but the appeal was dismissed by mutual agreement of the parties in February 2016. Later that month, wife filed a motion to enforce the final order. In March 2016, per order of the court, husband paid wife $112,000 of the $200,000 award. At the same time, he filed a motion asking the court to reduce his obligation to wife based on certain payments he had made and to interpret the applicable provision of the final order to require a payment of $175,000 rather than $200,000. In a June 28, 2016 order, the court rejected husband's interpretation of the provision and required him to pay the remainder of the $200,000, less permitted deductions, within ten days of the date of the order. A three-justice panel of this Court affirmed that order. Mikhailova v. Babyuk, No. 2016-272, 2017 WL 253582 (Vt. Jan. 12, 2017) (unpub. mem.), https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/LC/unpublishedeo.aspx [https://perma.cc/FV96-CJVV].

In April 2017, wife filed a renewed motion to enforce and for contempt. In May 2017, a month before the scheduled hearing on the motion, husband paid wife an additional $38,204 of the original $200,000 award. In a June 21, 2017 order, the court concluded that husband still owed wife $13,550. The court further concluded that wife was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $10,060 and that, considering the delay in payment, interest at the statutory rate was appropriate. The court also scheduled a later hearing on wife's contempt motion. At that hearing, husband paid the full amount due, but moved to reduce the amount of attorney's fees and the rate of post-judgment interest. The court denied the motion, stating that, considering its findings in prior enforcement proceedings in this case, the order issued was appropriate.

On appeal, husband argues that the superior court abused its discretion by awarding wife post-judgment interest at the statutory rate. According to husband, because wife did not present any evidence that the delay in her receiving the award denied her an opportunity for financial gain, imposing the statutory interest rate in this case amounted to a punitive measure against him and a windfall for her. He argues that

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the court abused its discretion by failing to examine the actual impact of the delay in wife receiving the award. He acknowledges that this Court has recently rejected a constitutional challenge to the statutory rate, see Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gritman, 2016 VT 45, 202 Vt. 155 ("[A]though we acknowledge that the statutory rate is incongruous in the context of today's market conditions, we conclude that the 12% rate is reasonably related to the purpose of the statute."), but asserts that Gritman is not applicable here because wife sought relief under a judicial rule rather than the statute construed in Gritman.

We find no basis to overturn the superior court's imposition of post-judgment interest at the statutory rate. In Gritman, we rejected the defendant's constitutional challenge to the 12% rate for prejudgment interest set forth in 9 V.S.A. § 41a(a) and for post-judgment interest set forth in 12 V.S.A. § 2903(c), concluding that "the 12% rate is reasonably related to making plaintiffs whole, and as a result, passes rational-basis review." Id. ¶ 35. Husband argues that the deferential review we applied in Gritman should not apply here because in this case wife sought relief under Rule 16 of the Vermont Rules for Family Proceedings, which governs contempt proceedings and was promulgated by judicial, rather than legislative, process.

This argument is unavailing. Husband is appealing a civil judgment in a post-divorce enforcement proceeding in which "[e]ither party may file any post-trial motions under the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure." 15 V.S.A. § 554(b) (stating that "decree of divorce...