Mikota v. Mercy

• Decision Date: 27 June 1918
• Docket Number: No. 31695.,31695.
• Citation: 183 Iowa 1378,168 N.W. 219
• Parties: MIKOTA v. SISTERS OF MERCY ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

183 Iowa 1378

168 N.W. 219

MIKOTA

v.SISTERS OF MERCY ET AL.

No. 31695.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 27, 1918.

Appeal from District Court, Linn County; John T. Moffit, Judge.

Action to recover damages from a charitable institution for injuries received through the negligence of defendant's employés. Petition dismissed. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.R. S. Milner, of Belle Plaine, and Chas. L. Benesh, of Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Hughes, Sutherland & Taylor, of Cedar Rapids, for appellees.

GAYNOR, J.

This action is brought to recover damages for personal injury resulting in death. The petition alleges: That the defendants are incorporated under the laws of Iowa relating to corporations other than for pecuniary profits; that their principal place of business is at Cedar Rapids, Iowa; that they are engaged in operating a hospital; that the building is a large four-story building, with a number of rooms furnished for the accommodation of the sick and disabled; that in the building the sick and disabled are received and cared for and medical aid and treatment furnished; that the building was erected and the hospital equipped by donations and voluntary contributions made by persons interested in hospital work; that, though a corporation, they issued no stock and received no funds from the sale of capital stock, and are without provision for paying dividends; that in their business of conducting a hospital they receive and care for persons who are able and persons who are unable to make payment for the care and services rendered; that they receive and care for charitable cases, and do not turn any persons away who require care, treatment, and nursing; that they receive some patients at a stated, fixed, or agreed compensation, and have a regular schedule of prices for such persons; that a number of their patrons are of that class; that they agree in advance to pay for hospital service; that the sums so received are used in paying the expenses and cost of running the hospital; that the defendants are supported by and pay all their expenses and the costs of running the hospital from money so received, together with such benevolent gifts and donations as it is able to obtain by solicitation or from voluntary donations; that this is the only means they have of support.

On the 9th day of August, 1913, plaintiff's intestate, Clarence R. Mikota, was ill with typhoid fever, and was conveyed to this hospital for care and treatment. He was taken to the fourth floor and placed in a room in the care of nurses. While suffering from delirium, resulting from the disease, he jumped from the window and was killed. The plaintiff, as administrator, brings this action to recover for his death.

The action is brought in three counts. The first count alleges the facts above, and says that there was an express oral agreement that the intestate should pay $15 a week, and should therefore receive proper and efficient care, attention, and treatment; that it was under this contract that the deceased entered this hospital as a patient; that the defendant violated its contract in this, that it failed to give the intestate faithful, proper, efficient care and attention, but, on the contrary, left him alone in a room on the fourth floor without attendants, and failed properly to care and guard him; that while in a delirious condition and while left alone and unguarded, he jumped from the window of the room, fell to the ground, and was killed; that the windows in the room were improperly, inefficiently and carelessly left unguarded, without bars or obstructions.

The second count, after alleging all the facts above except the express agreement, says that there was an implied agreement and this was violated.

The third count is based on tort. After alleging the facts above set out, it says that the officers, agents, and attendants of the hospital, knowing that deceased was likely to be seized with delusions and delirium, received and placed him in a room on the fourth floor without bars on the windows, and left him there alone, or in charge of incompetent attendants and nurses, and that his death was due to their negligence.

The fourth count we need not consider at this time.

The defendant demurred to all the counts of the petition on the ground that the defendant is not liable for the acts of their agents and servants and employés, though negligently done. This demurrer was sustained, and plaintiff's petition dismissed. From this plaintiff appeals.

In argument appellant claims that count 1 charges a breach of a duty arising out of an express oral contract; that count 2 charges a breach of an implied duty to give the deceased proper care and treatment; that count 3 rests in tort, and charges negligence based on a violation of an express or implied contractual duty. The only error assigned is that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer.

There is a great diversity of opinion among the courts on the question of the liability of a charitable institution to respond in damages for negligence. Some courts hold it is not liable at all for negligence. Other courts hold, though liable to others, it is not liable to a patient received for treatment, when the injury resulted from the negligence of employés and servants. Some courts hold that, though not liable at all for the negligence of its servants or employés, it is liable for injuries traceable to some negligence on the part of the corporation itself; a failure to discharge some duty that cannot be delegated to servants to perform. Thus an exception is made where the liability is traceable, not to the negligence of servants, but to the negligence of the defendant in employing incompetent servants. Even where liability has been found, the courts have based their holdings upon entirely different reasoning. Some say there is no liability because trust funds cannot be diverted from trust purposes to the satisfaction of claims for negligence. Other courts repudiate this doctrine that the funds are in the nature of trust funds and cannot be diverted from their purpose, and hold such an institution liable to a stranger or a servant for negligence, though not liable to a patient received in the institution for treatment, basing nonliability to a patient on the theory of an implied contract not to hold the institution liable for the manner of the treatment by its servants. In some cases they have been exempted from liability because they are considered agencies of the government. We think the great weight of authority is to the effect that an institution of this kind is exempted from liability to one who comes to it and accepts the benefits of its charity, to a patient received for treatment, so far as liability is predicated on the negligence of its servants in administering the charity.

In Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 141, it was said:

“A charitable institution, supported by private and public funds, is not liable for its servants' negligence.”

In this case the defendant was charged with negligence in that its servant carelessly allowed the plaintiff's decedent, while an inmate of the infirmary, to evade the supervision of her attendants and fall through a window to the sidewalk. The accident resulted in fatal injury. She was ill with a fever. In that case it was said:

“No principle of law seems to be better established both upon reason and authority than that which declares that a purely charitable institution, supported by funds furnished by private and public charity, cannot be made liable in damages for the negligent acts of its servants.”

It was further held that the fact that it charged a compensation for the use of its rooms to those who were able to pay did not cause it to lose any of the essential attributes of a charitable institution, and quoted with approval from McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529, as follows:

“The corporation has no capital stock, no provision for making dividends or profits, and whatever it may receive from any source it holds in trust to be devoted to the object of sustaining the hospital and increasing its benefit to the public, by extending or improving its accommodations and diminishing its expenses. Its funds are derived mainly from public and private charity; its affairs are conducted for a great public purpose, that of administering to the comfort of the sick, without any expectation, on the part of those immediately interested in the corporation, of receiving any compensation which will inure to their own benefit.”

The same doctrine is announced in Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087, 136 Am. St. Rep. 879. In this case the plaintiff, a young woman, was admitted as a pay patient into the hospital, and came there for the purpose of having a surgical operation performed by a surgeon of her own choice. While undergoing the operation, one of the hospital nurses prepared her bed, the bed to be occupied by her on her return from the operating room. For the purpose of warming the bed for the patient bottles containing hot water were placed in the bed. Upon the patient's return from the operating room another nurse, who had assisted in the patient's...