Miksa v. Stasi, 2008 NY Slip Op 30501(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2/6/2008)
| Decision Date | 06 February 2008 |
| Docket Number | 0020119/2006.,Motion Seq. No. 2.,Motion Cal. No. 24. |
| Citation | 2008 NY Slip Op 30501 |
| Parties | HENRYK MIKSA and ELIZABETH MIKSA, Plaintiffs, v. LUIGI STASI, FINANCIAL SERVICES VEHICLE TRUST, SAVERIO STASI, BLESSEN BABU, STASI BROTHERS ASPHALT CORP., and LUIGI DADDIO, Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Upon the foregoing papers, it is ordered that the motion is disposed of as follows:
This is a personal injury action in which plaintiffs Henryk Miksa and Elizabeth Miksa ("plaintiffs") seek to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff Henryk Miksa as a result of a multi-vehicle automobile accident that occurred on November 27, 2005, between the vehicles operated by defendants Blessen Babu (car number two), Saverio Stasi (car number three), Luigi Daddio(car number four) and that of plaintiffs (car number one). By order of this Court dated March 21, 2007, the motion by defendant Financial Services Vehicle Trust ("Financial Trust"), the title owner of the vehicle leased by it to defendant Luigi Stasis, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as to it was granted, and the complaint was dismissed on the ground that 49 USC § 30106 bars the action against the leasing company, defendant Financial Services.
At issue in this four (4) car chain collision is the negligence of each of the drivers of the vehicles. Plaintiff Henryk Miksa ("plaintiff') testified at his deposition that his vehicle was struck in the rear on two separate occasions. The Police report sets forth that Defendant Luigi Daddio ("Daddio") now moves for summary judgment in his favor, contending that the Stasi vehicle struck the Babu vehicle before Daddio struck the rear of the Stasi vehicle, and that his vehicle did not cause the Stasi vehicle to move.
It is well established that summary judgment should be granted when there is no doubt as to the absence of triable issues. See, Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v. Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223, 231 (1978); Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361, 364 (1974); Taft v. New York City Tr. Auth., 193 A.D.2d 503, 505 (1st Dept. 1993). As such, the function of the court on the instant motion is issue finding and not issue determination. See, D.B.D. Nominee, Inc., v. 814 10th Ave. Corp., 109 A.D.2d 668, 669 (2d Dept. 1985). The proponent of a summary judgment motion must tender evidentiary proof in admissible form eliminating any material issues of fact from the case. See, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562 (1980). If the proponent succeeds, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion, who then must show the existence of material issues of fact by producing evidentiary proof in admissible form, in support of his position. See, Zuckerman v. City of New York, supra.
Here, plaintiff, the driver of the first car in the chain, attributes the accident and resulting injuries to the negligence of all of the drivers, the vehicle driven by each of which struck another in the rear. As a general proposition, a rear-end collision establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rearmost vehicle and imposes a duty of explanation to excuse the collision either through a mechanical failure, a sudden stop of the vehicle ahead, an unavoidable skidding on a wet pavement, or any other reasonable cause. See, Milskiy v Solanky, 8 A.D.3d 353 (2nd Dept. 2004); Barile v. Lazzarini, 222 A.D.2d 635 (2nd Dept. 1995); see also, McGregor v Manzo, 295 A.D.2d 487 (2nd Dept. 2002); Gambino v City of New York, 205 A.D.2d 583 (2nd Dept. 1994); Power v. Hupart, 260 A.D.2d 458 (2nd Dept. 1999); see, also, Caputo v. Schaumeyer, 252 A.D.2d 512 (2nd Dept. 1998); Danza v. Longieliere, 256 A.D.2d 434 (2nd Dept. 1998). In short, the driver of the offending vehicle is required to rebut the inference of negligence, and if he or she cannot do so, the driver of the lead vehicle may properly be awarded judgment as a matter of law. [See, McGregor v Manzo, supra; see also Leal v Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392 (2nd Dept. 1996); Barile v Lazzarini, 222 A.D.2d 635 (2nd 1995)]. This is because he or she is in the best position to explain whether the collision was due to a reasonable, non-negligent cause. Carter v. Castle Elec. Contr. Co., 26 A.D.2d 83, 85 (2nd 1966). If the operator cannot come forward with any evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, the moving party may properly be awarded judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. Lopez v. Minot, 258 A.D.2d 564 (2nd Dept. 1999).
Defendant Daddio made the requisite prima facie showing of his entitlement to summary judgment through reference to the deposition testimonies of all drivers that support his contention that the movement of his vehicle into the rear of the Stasi vehicle occurred after plaintiff's vehicle had struck twice in the rear. Plaintiff Miksa testified that there were only two impacts to the rear of his vehicle. Defendant Babu, whose vehicle was the second in the chain directly behind plaintiff's vehicle testified that his vehicle sustained two impacts, only one of which was to the rear of his vehicle. Defendant Stasi, the driver of the third vehicle in the chain directly behind the Babu vehicle, testified that his vehicle struck the Babu vehicle only once in the rear, and then his vehicle was struck by defendant Daddio's vehicle. Based upon the deposition testimony, defendant Daddio makes two arguments. First, he argues that the subsequent contact between his vehicle and the Stasi vehicle "is irrelevant to the claim of negligence by the plaintiff because it was not the proximate cause of the subject accident or resulting alleged injury of plaintiff." Secondly, he argues that because the "testimony clearly demonstrates that the subsequent contact between the DADDIO vehicle and the STASI vehicle did not result in any impact to the plaintiff's vehicle," the "only question of fact for a jury to determine in this matter is between the contacts/impacts involving the plaintiff, BABU and STASI vehicles and not the DADDIO vehicle." The burden thus shifts to plaintiffs and the co-defendants to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. See, Zuckerman v City of New York, supra.
Without reference to any deposition testimony to support...
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