Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., 97-0493

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: GLICKSTEIN
• Citation: Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., 703 So.2d 1093 (Fla. App. 1997)
• Decision Date: 22 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. 97-0493,97-0493
• Parties: 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2455 Jessica Gertner MILANO, Appellant, v. MOLDMASTER, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

Page 1093

703 So.2d 1093

22 Fla. L. Weekly D2455

Jessica Gertner MILANO, Appellant, v. MOLDMASTER, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 97-0493.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

Oct. 22, 1997.

Rehearing En Banc, Rehearing,

Clarification and Certification

Denied Jan. 21, 1998.

Richard H. Levenstein of Richard H. Levenstein, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellant.

Dawn Siler-Nixon and Meenu T. Sasser of Gunster, Yoakley, Valdes-Fauli & Stewart, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

GLICKSTEIN, Judge.

Having considered appellant's arguments, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of her action.

Following termination of appellant's employment, she filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on April 8, 1994, alleging that appellee wrongfully terminated her employment based upon her disability.

The commission failed to issue a reasonable cause determination within 180 days. More than one year after the expiration of the 180 day period, appellant filed a civil action against appellee. The commission then sent appellant a notice of dismissal advising her that the commission's jurisdiction was divested by appellant filing the civil action. The trial court dismissed the action based on its interpretation that the statute of limitations had run.

Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes, 1995, provides in part:

Within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, the commission shall determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.

Subsection (4) provides:

In the event that the commission determines that there is a reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, the aggrieved person may either:

(a) Bring a civil action against the person named in the complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction; or

(b) Request an administrative hearing under s. 120.57.

Subsection (5) requires that any civil action brought under section 760.11 must be commenced no later than 1 year after the determination of reasonable cause by the commission.

Finally, subsection (8) says:

In the event that the commission fails to conciliate or determine whether there is reasonable cause on any complaint under this section within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, an aggrieved person may proceed under subsection (4), as if the commission determined that there was reasonable cause.

The trial court determined that the one year limitation on filing a civil action began to run at the expiration of the 180 day period in which the commission was to make a reasonable cause determination. We agree, as any other interpretation of the foregoing subsections, read together, would not be reasonable.

While the corresponding federal statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (West Supp.1997), has different wrinkles than Florida's legislation, ¹ one observation under the former is worth noting. The Eleventh Circuit observed in a related, but not identical context:

There is no reason why a plaintiff should enjoy a manipulable open-ended time extension which could render the statutory limitation meaningless. Plaintiff should be required to assume some minimum...