Milanowicz v. Raymond Corp.

• Decision Date: 12 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 99-3102 (JEI).,CIV. A. 99-3102 (JEI).
• Citation: 148 F.Supp.2d 525
• Parties: Michael MILANOWICZ and Lynne Milanowicz, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. THE RAYMOND CORPORATION and John Does A-Z, jointly, severally, and in the alternative, Defendants.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 525

148 F.Supp.2d 525

Michael MILANOWICZ and Lynne Milanowicz, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. THE RAYMOND CORPORATION and John Does A-Z, jointly, severally, and in the alternative, Defendants.

No. CIV. A. 99-3102 (JEI).

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

July 12, 2001.

Law Offices of Gary D. Ginsberg by Gary D. Ginsberg, Mount Laurel, NJ, for Plaintiffs.

Lavin, Coleman, O'Neil, Ricci, Finarelli & Gray by Richard B. Wickersham, Jr., Dennis P. Ziemba, Mount Laurel, NJ, for Defendant.

OPINION

IRENAS, District Judge:

Presently before the court is Defendant The Raymond Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiffs Michael and Lynne Milanowicz's products liability and consortium claims. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 20, 1997, Plaintiff Michael Milanowicz ("Plaintiff"), an employee at the General Motors Service Parts Distribution Facility in Bensalem, Pennsylvania, injured his hand while laterally adjusting the forks on a lift truck manufactured by Defendant Raymond Corporation ("Defendant" or "Raymond").

The "L"-shaped forks were mounted on pivots on the front of the lift truck. To prevent lateral movement, each fork was secured in place by a pin on the back of the vertical portion of the fork which fit into one of several holes on the front of the carriage. In order to laterally adjust each fork — to accommodate a wider or narrower load — the operator would pivot each fork upward toward the carriage to disengage the pin, shift the fork to a position in front of the desired hole, and then swing the fork down until the pin re-engaged in the new hole.

In this case, Plaintiff lowered the lift carriage onto a guardrail so as to rotate the forks up and disengage the pins, thus allowing him then to manually shift the forks into the desired position. However, when Plaintiff raised the carriage in order to re-level the forks, one fork did not re-engage in the desired hole. Plaintiff then tried to manually manipulate the fork into the hole by shaking the end of the fork in the hope that the pin would engage. When that was not successful, Plaintiff stepped closer in towards the carriage to determine how much further the pin needed to move. Plaintiff then tried lifting and shifting the fork into place with his hands. However, in Plaintiff's words, "as I was lifting, my hand — my right hand slipped behind the fork on grease. And at the same time my hand slipped behind, [the pin] found the hold and came down and severed my finger." (Pls.' Opp. Br. Ex. A at 119-20).

On or about July 1, 1999, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging products liability claims of defective design, failure to warn, and inadequate instructions for use. Plaintiff Lynne Milanowicz also sought recovery for loss of consortium, society, and services.

During discovery, it was learned that the original 48" forks on the lift truck had, at some point prior to the accident, been replaced by 60" forks manufactured by Dyson Corp. and distributed by Andersen & Associates. The original forks, which were manufactured by Kenhar Corp. for Defendant Raymond, featured chamfered pins designed to facilitate proper pin alignment. In other words, each pin was ½" narrower at its end, thus increasing the alignment tolerance and reducing fork "hang-up." (Def.'s Supp. Br. Ex. D at 2).

In contrast, the 60" Dyson replacement forks were designed with square shoulders and no chamfer, and thus did not conform to Raymond's design specifications. (Id.; Ex. G at 3). Evidently, however, repeated re-indexing of the forks had worn down the shoulders of the pins so that they were slightly rounded and chamfered. (Pls.' Opp. Br. Ex. C at 64-66).

Defendant's two experts, Robert N. Rogers and Michael W. Rogers, both concluded that the absence of the chamfer on the replacement Dyson forks was a significant factor in the accident. (Def.'s Supp. Br. Ex. D at 2; Ex. G at 3). Specifically, the use of nonconforming forks increased the risk of fork hang-up, and thus the risk of injury. (Id.)

Plaintiff's expert, Paul R. Stephens ("Stephens"), came to a different conclusion, finding that Raymond's fork mounting and adjustment mechanism was defective because it necessitated an "inherently hazardous procedure" to manually adjust the forks. (Pls.' Opp. Br. Ex. B at 7). As a result, it was immaterial whether the original forks or the replacement forks were used. Rather, Stephens concluded, Raymond should have designed and manufactured its lift trucks with power-operated fork-positioning mechanisms. (Id.). Stephens also determined that Raymond had failed to provide adequate instructions regarding a safe adjustment procedure and adequate warnings on the lift truck regarding the risks involved. (Id. at 8).

On or about April 23, 2001, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant claims that: 1) the replacement nonconforming forks marked a substantial modification; 2) Plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case as to the design defect claim because their expert's report is inadmissible; and 3) Plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case as to the failure to warn claim because the danger was open and obvious and there was no proximate cause.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"[S]ummary judgment is proper `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pollock v. American Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir.1986). The role of the court is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

In New Jersey, to sustain a products liability claim, a plaintiff must establish "that the product was defective, that the defect existed when the product left the defendant's control, and that the defect caused injury to a reasonably foreseeable user."¹ Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 144 N.J. 34, 675 A.2d 620, 627 (1996) (quoting Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374, 384-85 (1984)). "Plaintiffs may show either a design defect, a manufacturing defect, or an inadequate warning defect rendering defendant's product not reasonably fit, suitable, or safe for its intended or foreseeable purposes." Reiff v. Convergent Techs., 957 F.Supp. 573, 578 (D.N.J.1997) (Irenas, J.) (citing Zaza, 675 A.2d at 627). "Liability should be imposed only when the manufacturer is responsible for the defective condition." Id.; see also O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298, 303 (1983) (articulating the rationale to "prevent[] the manufacturer from also becoming the insurer of a product"), superseded in part by N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3, as recognized inDewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990). The meaning of "defective condition," though, is not self-evident, and courts have looked to negligence principles for assistance. See Zaza, 675 A.2d at 628 ("[T]he ultimate question to be resolved in design-defect and failure-to-warn cases is whether the manufacturer acted in a reasonably prudent manner in designing and fabricating a product."); Feldman, 479 A.2d at 385 (noting that "strict liability analysis becomes almost identical to negligence analysis in its focus on the reasonableness of defendant's conduct").

"Even if a product is properly designed and manufactured, it may still be unsafe for its intended or foreseeable uses if it is not accompanied by adequate warnings or instructions." Reiff, 957 F.Supp. at 581 (citing Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979)). Therefore, under New Jersey law, "[a] manufacturer has a duty to warn such foreseeable users of all hidden or latent dangers that would arise out of a reasonably anticipated use of its product." Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 485 A.2d 305, 309 (1984). To bolster this duty, New Jersey law incorporates a "heeding presumption" — "a presumption that plaintiff would have `heeded' or followed a warning has defendant given one." Coffman v. Keene Corp., 133 N.J. 581, 628 A.2d 710, 716-20 (1993) (adopting presumption).

A. Substantial Modification

New Jersey courts have held manufacturers strictly liable for products, despite another's subsequent substantial alterations, when those alterations were objectively foreseeable and likely to cause injury. See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiring a product to be "suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered"); Soler v. Castmaster, 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225, 1232 (1984); McDermott v. TENDUN Constructors, 211 N.J.Super. 196, 511 A.2d 690, 698-99 (1986); cf. Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982) (imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries).

As this Court stated in Oquendo v. Bettcher Industries, 939 F.Supp. 357 (D.N.J.1996) (Irenas, J.), aff'd without opinion, 118 F.3d 1577 (3d Cir.1997), "objective foreseeability means reasonable foreseeability." Id. at 362. The standard "does not affix responsibility for future events that are only theoretically, remotely, or just possibly foreseeable, or even simply subjectively foreseen by a particular manufacturer." Brown, 484 A.2d at 1241. Rather, it "applies to those...