Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S.
Decision Date | 04 September 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 07-2405.,07-2405. |
Citation | 541 F.3d 785 |
Parties | MILAVETZ, GALLOP & MILAVETZ, P.A.; Robert J. Milavetz; Barbara N. Nevin; John Doe; Mary Doe, Appellees, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, Commercial Law League of America, Amicus on Behalf of Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Mark R. Freeman, argued, Mark B. Stern, USDOJ, on the brief, Washington, DC, for appellant.
Chad Schulze, argued, Edina, MN, Alan S. Milavetz, Edina, MN, and Thomas F. Miller, Wayzata, MN, on the brief, for appellees.
Commercial Law League of America, amici curiae, William H. Schorling and DeWitt Brown, submitted, Philadelphia, PA, for appellees.
Before BYE, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., a law firm that practices bankruptcy law, the firm's president, a bankruptcy attorney within the firm, and two clients1 who sought bankruptcy advice from the firm brought suit against the United States seeking a declaratory judgment that certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA)—11 U.S.C. §§ 526(a)(4) and 528(a)(4) and (b)(2)—did not apply to attorneys and law firms and are unconstitutional as applied to attorneys. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and issued an order declaring that: (1) attorneys in the District of Minnesota were excluded from the definition of a "debt relief agency" as defined by BAPCPA; and (2) the challenged provisions were unconstitutional as applied to attorneys in the District of Minnesota. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On April 20, 2005, BAPCPA was signed into law, amending and adding multiple sections of the Bankruptcy Code ("the Code"). While some of these amendments became effective immediately, the vast majority became effective on October 17, 2005. See Pub.L. No. 109-8, § 1501(a), 119 Stat. 23 (2005) ().
One BAPCPA amendment added a new term, "debt relief agency," which is defined in § 101(12A) of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A).2 The amended Code restricts some actions of debt relief agencies, while requiring them to do others. See 11 U.S.C. § 526 (); 11 U.S.C. § 528 (). For example, § 526(a)(4) bars a debt relief agency from advising a client "to incur more debt in contemplation" of a bankruptcy filing, 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4), while §§ 528(a)(4) and (b)(2) require debt relief agencies to include a disclosure in their bankruptcy-related advertisements directed to the general public declaring: " 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(4), (b)(2). The plaintiffs sought alternative remedies. First, plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that attorneys did not fall within the definition of "debt relief agency." If the court determined that attorneys fell within the definition of debt relief agency, they challenged the constitutionality of § § 526(a)(4) and 528(a)(4) and (b)(2), as applied to attorneys.
Initially, we address whether attorneys fall within the Code's definition of debt relief agencies. If they do not, we will have no need to address the constitutionality of §§ 526(a)(4) and 528(a)(4) and (b)(2), which only apply to debt relief agencies. See Holtan v. Black, 838 F.2d 984, 986 n. 3 (8th Cir.1988) () (citing Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138, 157, 104 S.Ct. 2267, 81 L.Ed.2d 113 (1984) ()).
The term "debt relief agency" means any person who provides any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration, or who is a bankruptcy petition preparer under section 110, but does not include—
(A) any person who is an officer, director, employee, or agent of a person who provides such assistance or of the bankruptcy petition preparer;
(B) a nonprofit organization that is exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
(C) a creditor of such assisted person, to the extent that the creditor is assisting such assisted person to restructure any debt owed by such assisted person to the creditor;
(D) a depository institution (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) or any Federal credit union or State credit union (as those terms are defined in section 101 of the Federal Credit Union Act), or any affiliate or subsidiary of such depository institution or credit union; or
(E) an author, publisher, distributor, or seller of works subject to copyright protection under title 17, when acting in such capacity.
11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (emphasis added).
Further, the Code defines the term "bankruptcy assistance" to mean:
any goods or services sold or otherwise provided to an assisted person with the express or implied purpose of providing information, advice, counsel, document preparation, or filing, or attendance at a creditors' meeting or appearing in a case or proceeding on behalf of another or providing legal representation with respect to a case or proceeding under this title.
Id. at § 101(4A) (emphasis added).
Additionally, the Code defines the term "assisted person" as "any person whose debts consist primarily of consumer debts and the value of whose nonexempt property is less than $164,250."3 Id. at § 101(3).
The plaintiffs argue that attorneys are not "debt relief agencies" because the definition of debt relief agencies makes no direct reference to attorneys, even though "attorney" is a defined term in the Code, id. at § 101(4),4 but does include the term "bankruptcy petition preparer" which, by definition, excludes debtor's attorneys and their staff. See 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(1).5 Plaintiffs contend that the omission of any reference to attorneys or lawyers while specifically including bankruptcy petition preparers shows Congress's intent to exclude attorneys from the definition of debt relief agencies. Because the plaintiffs contend that constitutionality issues arise in §§ 526(a)(4) and 528(a)(4) and (b)(2) if attorneys are debt relief agencies, they assert that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance should be used to interpret "debt relief agency" to exclude attorneys and thus avoid the potential constitutional issues.
Conversely, the government argues that attorneys are debt relief agencies because the broadly worded definition of the term plainly includes attorneys, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) ( ), and providing legal representation is included in definition of bankruptcy assistance. See id. at 101(4A) ().
Whether attorneys fall within the Code's definition of debt relief agencies is an issue of first impression among the Courts of Appeals. Although the plain language of the definition appears to include bankruptcy attorneys and does not appear to be ambiguous, lower "[c]ourts that have addressed the issue of whether attorneys are debt relief agencies have not been unanimous." In re Irons, 379 B.R. 680, 685 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2007) (citing cases). Nevertheless, the majority of courts have held that compensated bankruptcy attorneys are debt relief agencies as that term is defined in the Code. Id. ( ); Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906 (D.Or.2006) (same); In re Robinson, 368 B.R. 492 (Bankr. E.D.Va.2007) ( ); Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19 (N.D.Tex.2006) ( ); In re Norman, No. 06-70859, 2006 WL 3053309 (Bankr.E.D.Va.2006) ( ); but see In re Attorneys at Law and Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. 66 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2005) ( ); In re Reyes, 361 B.R. 276 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 2007) ( ).
In this case, the district court acknowledged that the definition of debt relief agency, "at first glance," appeared to include attorneys, but it ultimately relied on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to conclude that attorneys did not fall within the definition because if they did portions of §§ 526 and 528 would be unconstitutional as applied to attorneys. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance dictates that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988). Thus, if interpreting "debt relief agency" to include attorneys "would raise serious constitutional problems," then ...
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