Mildred L.M. v. John O.F.

Decision Date08 December 1994
Docket NumberNo. 22037,22037
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesMILDRED L.M., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. JOHN O.F., Defendant Below, Appellee.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it is not the task of the appellate court reviewing facts to determine how it would have ruled on the evidence presented. Its task is to determine whether the evidence was such that a reasonable trier of fact might have reached the decision below. Thus, in ruling on a motion for a judgment not withstanding the verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If on review, the evidence is shown to be legally insufficient to sustain the verdict, it is the obligation of this Court to reverse the circuit court and to order judgment for the appellant.

2. " 'In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict the court should: (1) consider the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party; (2) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved by the jury in favor of the prevailing party; (3) assume as proved all facts which the prevailing party's evidence tends to prove; and (4) give to the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences which reasonably may be drawn from the facts proved.' Syl. pt. 5, Orr v. Crowder, 173 W.Va. 335, 315 S.E.2d 593 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 981, 105 S.Ct. 384, 83 L.Ed.2d 319 (1984)." Syllabus Point 6, McClung v. Marion County Comm'n, 178 W.Va. 444, 360 S.E.2d 221 (1987).

3. Although a jury is not bound to accept expert testimony and should evaluate an expert witness as it would any other witness, the jury is not free to reject uncontradicted scientific testimony and to substitute its own speculation in its place. In cases where expert testimony is uncontradicted and the jury rejects it, there must be ample other testimony reasonably supporting the jury's verdict.

4. Where the foundation is sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence the proper testing procedures were employed and the expert witness who interpreted the test results was qualified, courts may take judicial notice of the accuracy and reliability of HLA blood-tissue test results introduced in paternity cases pursuant to W.Va.Code, 48A-6-3 (1992).

5. Under W.Va.Code, 48A-6-3 (1992), undisputed blood or tissue test results indicating a statistical probability of paternity of more than ninety-eight percent are conclusive on the issue of paternity, and the circuit court should enter judgment accordingly.

6. " 'When, upon the trial of a case, the evidence decidedly preponderates against the verdict of a jury or the finding of a trial court upon the evidence, this Court will, upon review, reverse the judgment; and, if the case was tried by the court in lieu of a jury, this Court will make such finding and render such judgment on the evidence as the trial court should have made and rendered.' Syllabus Point 9, Bluefield Supply Co. v. Frankel's Appliances, Inc., 149 W.Va. 622, 142 S.E.2d 898 (1965)." Syllabus Point 5, Estate of Bayliss by Bowles v. Lee, 173 W.Va. 299, 315 S.E.2d 406 (1984).

Ellen A. Archibald, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, Matthew E. Bieniek, Child Advocate Office, Martinsburg, for appellant.

Robert R. Skinner, Charles Town, for appellee.

CLECKLEY, Justice:

Mildred L.M., 1 the appellant and plaintiff below, appeals an order of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, which denied her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. In this paternity action, the jury returned a verdict for the appellee and defendant below, John O.F. The plaintiff contends that the evidence at trial preponderated against the verdict. We agree with the plaintiff's argument, and we reverse the order of the circuit court.

I.

The plaintiff was unmarried when she gave birth to her son, Daniel E.M., on July 28, 1988. As a recipient of public assistance, she was required to file information that could be used to pursue the absent father of her child. Accordingly, a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) petition was filed against the defendant. He denied paternity.

The first trial held on June 22, 1992, resulted in a hung jury. A second trial was held on December 22, 1992. The sole issue was the paternity of Daniel.

At the second trial, the plaintiff testified and called Dr. Norman Kramer 2 who explained the paternity blood testing results. The evidence showed that the plaintiff became pregnant while taking birth control pills, but her prescription had been recently changed. She testified that she engaged in sexual relations with Robert C. in July of 1987. She abstained from having sex until she had sexual relations with the defendant in November of 1987. Their relationship lasted approximately three weeks. On or about December 7, 1987, she resumed sexual relations with Robert C.

The plaintiff learned of her pregnancy in December of 1987. She originally believed that Robert C. was the father of the child. However, after she received the results of a sonogram performed on January 12, 1988, she realized that Robert C. could not be the father because they had not engaged in sexual relations during the estimated time of conception. She stated that the only other man that could be the father of her son was the defendant. Human Leucocyte Antigens (HLA blood-tissue) 3 group test results revealed a "99.14% statistical probability that the putative father, Mr. John O. [F.], is the biological father of the child, Daniel E. [M.]"

Robert C. voluntarily submitted to HLA blood-tissue testing. The results showed that he was biologically excluded from being the father of Daniel. 4

The defendant was the only witness in his behalf. He admitted to having sexual relations with the plaintiff in early November of 1987. He stated it was possible that he could be the father of the child.

Prior to submission of the case to the jury, plaintiff's counsel moved for a directed verdict. This motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The circuit court denied this motion on April 30, 1993. This appeal ensued.

II.

The Family Obligations Enforcement Act, contained in W.Va.Code 48A-1-1, et seq. (1986), is "a comprehensive measure to broaden the State's role in the enforcement of support obligations via the family law master and child advocate systems." Kathy L.B. v. Patrick J.B., 179 W.Va. 655, 657, 371 S.E.2d 583, 585 (1988). In paternity cases, the child advocate office is commissioned to represent the interest of the child, and "has a duty to assist parents and children in determining paternity and establishing support from the absent parent." Syllabus Point 4, in part, State ex rel. Div. of Human Servs. v. Benjamin P.B., 190 W.Va. 81, 436 S.E.2d 627 (1993).

It is in the State's interest to see that natural fathers, and not taxpayers, support their children. "The primary object of the [paternity] statute is to protect the public against the burden of supporting and maintaining illegitimate children." Shelby J.S. v. George L.H., 181 W.Va. 154, 156, 381 S.E.2d 269, 271 (1989), quoting Burr v. Phares, 81 W.Va. 160, 162, 94 S.E. 30, 31 (1917).

The plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in denying her post-trial motion because the overwhelming weight of the evidence favors her case. We review de novo the denial of a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See GSM Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir.1994) ("This court reviews de novo a district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law"). It is important, however, to emphasize that it is not the task of the appellate court reviewing facts to determine how it would have ruled on the evidence presented. Its task is to determine whether the evidence was such that a reasonable trier of fact might have reached the decision below. Thus, in ruling on a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If on review, the evidence is shown to be legally insufficient to sustain the verdict, it is the obligation of this Court to reverse the circuit court and to order judgment for the appellant. See Huffman v. Appalachian Power Co., 187 W.Va. 1, 415 S.E.2d 145 (1991); Mann v. Golub, 182 W.Va. 523, 389 S.E.2d 734 (1989).

We test the sufficiency of the evidence in a civil case by the standard set forth in Syllabus Point 6 of McClung v. Marion County Commission, 178 W.Va. 444, 360 S.E.2d 221 (1987):

" 'In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict the court should: (1) consider the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party; (2) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved by the jury in favor of the prevailing party; (3) assume as proved all facts which the prevailing party's evidence tends to prove; and (4) give to the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences which reasonably may be drawn from the facts proved.' Syl. pt. 5, Orr v. Crowder, 173 W.Va. 335, 315 S.E.2d 593 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 981, 105 S.Ct. 384, 83 L.Ed.2d 319 (1984)."

Concededly, in paternity actions, the legislature has placed upon the shoulders of the plaintiff a heavy burden of proof. 5 Even when the evidence is viewed in this light, we find insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict for the defendant.

To address the issue raised by the plaintiff, we must first examine and interpret the statutory scheme of W.Va.Code, 48A-6-1, et seq. This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See In re JKJ Chevrolet, Inc., 26 F.3d 481 (4th Cir.1994). Therefore, our review necessarily begins with an...

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