Miles v. Bell, Civ. A. No. B-79-137 (TFGD)
| Citation | 621 F. Supp. 51 |
| Decision Date | 28 August 1985 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. B-79-137 (TFGD),B-82-626 (TFGD). |
| Parties | Clyde MILES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Griffin BELL, et al., Defendants. Michael HEYMANN, Plaintiff, v. BUREAU OF PRISONS, Defendant. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Connecticut) |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Richard A. Silver, Leora Herrmann, Stanley Twardy, Ernest F. Teitell, Silver, Golub & Sandak, Stamford, Conn., for plaintiffs.
Thomas G. Dennis, Federal Public Defender, Brien J. Wholey, Hartford, Conn., for petitioner Michael Heymann.
Alan H. Nevas, U.S. Atty., Thomas J. Riley, Asst. U.S. Atty., New Haven, Conn., Barry K. Stevens, Asst. U.S. Atty., Bridgeport, Conn., for defendants.
Donald Lareau, pro se.
Ruling On Defendants' Motion To Dismiss August 28, 1985.
The instant case arises out of the overcrowding at the Federal Correctional Institution at Danbury, Connecticut. The plaintiff class alleges that the overcrowding has created conditions of confinement violative of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also assert claims pursuant to the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. The Court trifurcated the trial as follows: the first phase of trial would address liability on the injunctive claim, determining whether the conditions at F.C.I. Danbury constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; the second phase of trial would determine plaintiffs' claims for damages under the FTCA; and if liability was established at either or both of the first two phases of trial, the third stage would address the question of remedy.
In its ruling of February 26, 1985, the Court found moot the pretrial detainees' claim for injunctive relief from the allegedly unconstitutional conditions at Danbury. Thus, this Memorandum of Decision, which follows the first phase of the trial, addresses only whether the conditions of confinement of sentenced inmates at Danbury are violative of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that those challenged conditions which are not moot, considered individually and in combination, do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
F.C.I. Danbury was built in 1939 and was designed to house approximately 500 sentenced inmates. (Gunnell). At the time of trial, the main compound held approximately 730 inmates. (Craddock, Gunnell). According to the affidavit of William Ray Wood submitted in response to the Court Order of April 13, 1984 reopening the record, the population at Danbury continued to increase after the conclusion of trial. It is undisputed that Danbury is severely overcrowded and the Court so finds.
As plaintiffs state in their Proposed Findings of Fact Concerning Sentenced Inmates,2 the focus of plaintiffs' case is the overcrowding in particular housing units at Danbury. The units specifically at issue are 5/O, 6/I,3 10/D (the prison's three open dormitories), 7/O, 11/A (the open bay portions of two partially cubicled dormitories), 9/D and 12/A (the "flats" or rows of nine to twelve beds placed in the corridors of the preferred housing cell blocks in 9/D and 12/A). Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact at 1-2. These units are hereinafter referred to as open dormitories.4 Plaintiffs claim that this particular housing method has created or led to many of the conditions which they challenge.
The affidavit of William Ray Wood submitted July 12, 1984, indicates that significant modifications have been made at Danbury since the time of trial. The five open dormitories at issue, units 5/G, 6/I, 7/G, 10/D, and 11/A,5 are now almost entirely made up of cubicles.6
The installation of these cubicles has, in the Court's view, a substantial effect upon many of the conditions in the living units challenged by plaintiffs. The cubicles have effectively replaced dormitory housing.7 Based on the installation of cubicles, the Court finds that to the extent plaintiffs' claims are directly related to a housing method no longer used, the claims are moot.8
For the sake of clarity, the Court discusses those challenged conditions which are directly related to the dormitory housing method and which are now moot.
Specifically, plaintiffs challenge the dormitory units based on the increased illness rates among inmates housed in dorms. Plaintiffs also contend that dormitory living is psychologically harmful to the inmates because of increased stress, lack of control over their own environments and lack of privacy. Further, plaintiffs assert that the number of inmates in one room affects the air quality in the dormitories and the ventilation in the dorms is so inadequate as to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Plaintiffs' claim of increased illness rates among inmates was specifically limited to inmates housed in open dorms. In fact, much of plaintiffs' proof on this issue consisted of comparisons of illness rates in dormitories with illness rates for other housing methods such as cubicles or single or double cells. The testimony at trial did establish a higher illness complaint rate and, in the Court's view, a higher level of illness among inmates housed in the open dorms. Dr. Paul B. Paulus testified that the close proximity of inmates led to an increased incidence of contagious diseases and the breakdown of the immune system, increased stress, a lack of privacy, and increased conflict.9 Dr. Paulus testified that these living conditions presented an obvious health hazard and he concluded that they did not provide the minimum requirements for a healthful environment.
However, Dr. Paulus also testified that the situation could be corrected by either a reduction in population or the installation of cubicles to provide inmates with barriers from the contagious diseases of others and to decrease inmate stress. Paulus testified that he would recommend the installation of cubicles which would mitigate to a large extent, in at least 75% of the cases, the negative effects of open dormitory living. (Paulus). By regulating the interaction of inmates, Paulus stated that cubicles would eliminate some of the spread of illness, feelings of crowding, tension and stress.
Thus, plaintiffs' own witness testified that the installation of cubicles would correct many of the conditions plaintiffs challenge. Without finding that the cubicles have had that effect at Danbury (since that question is not before the Court), the Court finds that the plaintiffs claim regarding increased illness rates in the open dorms is moot since the open dorms no longer exist.
In addition to the increase in physical illness, plaintiffs also allege that dormitory housing is psychologically harmful to inmates in violation of the Eighth Amendment. As Dr. Paulus testified, however, cubicles would effect psychological well-being in addition to physical health because they afford inmates a much greater degree of privacy and control over their own environments. The decrease in stress would likely improve both the physical and mental states of the inmates. Plaintiffs' claims of unconstitutional psychological or mental harm due to the open dorms are, therefore, also moot in view of the installation of cubicles.
Plaintiffs' claim of inadequate ventilation was also limited to the ventilation in the dorms. See Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Nos. 25-38. Unlike the claims with regard to increased illness, there was no testimony at trial as to the effect of the installation of cubicles upon ventilation. As a practical matter, the barriers created by the cubicles would decrease the effects of smoking and body odor of other inmates. It would also seem to reduce drafts of which at least one inmate complained. In this context, the Court notes the inherent inconsistency in plaintiffs' challenge of the ventilation in the dorms. On one hand, plaintiffs object to the F.C.I. procedure which prohibits opening windows during the winter, complaining of stifling heat. On the other hand, plaintiffs are heard to complain of drafts due to windows that do not close properly. While these allegations indicate some problem with temperature control, they do not indicate inadequate ventilation.
In any event, the Court finds that the installation of cubicles provides an inmate with control over his own environment such that the conditions which make up plaintiffs' challenge to ventilation are substantially changed and, thus, plaintiffs' claim of inadequate ventilation in the dormitories is moot. In connection with plaintiffs' ventilation claim, the Court notes, however, that the ventilation in the dorms was tested and the figures for cubic feet per minute per person in the dorms proved to be within the standards set by the American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE).
The Court finds that there are no longer any open dormitory housing units at Danbury and thus, defendants have voluntarily ceased most of the allegedly unlawful conduct. In determining whether voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct renders a claim moot, the Court must consider the likelihood of recurrence. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974); U.S. v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1952).
The Court finds that there is no reasonable likelihood that the cubicles, having been installed, will be removed or that Danbury will resume open dormitory housing. Further, even if F.C.I. Danbury were to resume housing inmates in open dorms, and even if that open dorm housing were to lead to recurrence of the allegedly unconstitutional conditions, such an event would not evade review. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 403, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 2335, 45 L.Ed.2d 272...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Alexander S. v. Boyd
...that the trial court's order "far exceeded anything remotely required by the fourteenth amendment." Id.; see also Miles v. Bell, 621 F.Supp. 51, 60 (D.Conn. 1985) ("Although the ACA and APHA standards constitute appropriate goals formulated by experts in the field, and may provide guidance ......
-
Holland v. City of N.Y.
...("[T]he balance should be struck to allow incidental and obscured viewing but prohibit regular and close viewing."); Miles v. Bell, 621 F.Supp. 51, 67 (D.Conn.1985) (explaining that the Second Circuit's opinion in Forts v. Ward "merely emphasizes that in order for inmates to show a violatio......
-
Knop v. Johnson
...cells, would not violate the Constitution if it did not pose a serious risk of harm to the inmates' physical health. See Miles v. Bell, 621 F.Supp. 51, 61 (D.Conn.1985) (finding that forcing dormitory inmates to wait to use the bathroom does not cause "significant adverse health effects"; t......
-
Harnage v. Murphy
... ... degree of discretion must be accorded to the policies and ... practices of prison officials. As the court explained in ... Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 548-49, 99 S.Ct ... 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), " the problems that arise ... in the day-to-day operation of ... allow incidental and obscured viewing but prohibit regular ... and close viewing"); Miles v. Bell , 621 F.Supp ... 51, 67 (D.Conn. 1985) (" Those cases which have found a ... violation of inmates' rights to privacy have looked ... ...