Miles v. Bell
| Decision Date | 16 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3:07-1098,3:07-1098 |
| Parties | JOSEPH MILES, Petitioner, v. RICKY BELL, WARDEN Riverbend Maximum Security Prison, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, Joseph Miles, filed this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking the writ of habeas corpus to set aside his state court conviction of second degree murder for which he received a sentence of forty (40) years. After a review of the petition, the Court appointed the Federal Public Defender to represent Petitioner and granted leave to file an amended petition. In his amended petition, Petitioner asserts the following claims:
1. The State's evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law for a second degree murder conviction.
2. Petitioner's sentence was excessive and contrary to law.
3. Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses; to offer proof on Petitioner's theory of self defense; to object to the all white jury; and to present medical proof of Petitioner's mental state at the time of the shooting.
4. In violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the state withheld material and exculpatory evidence.
5. The state knowingly presented false testimony in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
6. The prosecutor's closing argument remarked on Petitioner's decision not to testify in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
7. Petitioner, an African-American, was tried and convicted by an all-white jury in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
8. The trial court instruction on the knowing element of second-degree murder violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
9. By a preponderance of the evidence, the court enhanced Petitioner's sentence in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
10. An appellate Judge improperly participated in the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals ruling on Petitioner's state habeas petition.
11. The cumulative errors at Petitioner's trial render his conviction a violation of due process.
In response, Respondent contends that most of Petitioner's claims were not presented to the state court and those claims are procedurally defaulted. (Docket Entry No. 21 at 11-13). As to Petitioner's exhausted claims, Respondent argues that the state courts' rulings on those claims were reasonable under applicable federal precedents.
Petitioner seeks discovery about the jury selection process at his trial and asserts that an evidentiary hearing is necessary on his ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence claims. Respondent argues that Petitioner could have, but did not pursue discovery on his jury selection claim in the state courts and that an evidentiary hearing was held in the state courts on Petitioner's ineffective assistance claims. Further, Respondent asserts that most of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are procedurally defaulted.
Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Actions provides a good cause standard for discovery.
A party shall be entitled to invoke the processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if, and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise.
In Bracv v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-909 (1997), the Supreme Court described the standard for good cause under Rule 6(a) as "where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is... entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry." (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)). Accord Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 974 (6th Cir. 2004).
Petitioner argues that as an initial petition involving a death sentence, he is entitled to discovery to discern any constitutional violations in his conviction and sentence. If this were the initial proceeding, the Court is inclined to agree, but Petitioner has had two extensive proceedings in the state courts with opportunities for discovery. In addition, the law in this Circuit as stated in Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2001) is that there is not an automatic right to discovery.
Habeas petitioners have no right to automatic discovery. A district court has discretion to grant discovery in a habeas case upon a fact specific showing of good cause under Rule 6. See Bracv v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997); Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2000)... The burden of demonstrating the materiality of information requested is on the moving party. See Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 813-15 (5th Cir. 2000).
The district court applied the correct legal standard in light of the evidence and the state court proceedings. The discovery sought by Stanford would not resolve any factual disputes that could entitle him to relief, even if the facts were found in his favor. To the contrary, Stanford's requested discovery, when reviewed in light of the recently examined record, falls more in the category of a fishing expedition. We will not find that a district court erred by denying a fishing expedition masquerading as discovery.
"Conclusory allegations are not enough to warrant discovery under Rule 6 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Petitions; the petitioner must set forth specific allegations of fact." Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355, 1367 (5th Cir. 1994). In addition, discovery is unavailable "where undisclosed evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on which to challenge a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable or who is subject to extensive attack by reason of other evidence, the undisclosed evidence may be cumulative, and hence not material." Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 976-77 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 518 (6th Cir. 2000). In this regard, the state courts' determinations of the facts are entitled to a statutory presumption of correctness, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) and with certain exceptions, this Court's review is limited to "the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Discovery requests must also be considered in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) on the presumptive correctness of state court finding.
Because Petitioner failed to rebut the statutory presumption of correctness that the federal habeas court must award to the factual findings of the state courts, the district court properly concluded that it was required to defer to those factual findings. Furthermore, given this conclusion, we would be hard-pressed to say that the district court abused its discretion in denying further discovery on these issues.
Byrd, 209 F.3d at 516. See also Moen v. Czerniak, No. Civ.02-10-JE, 2004 WL 1293920 at *1 (D. Or. June 10, 2004) ().
Also relevant is consideration of the habeas petitioner's failure to utilize any available state discovery procedures. In Byrd, the Sixth Circuit stated:
We find nothing in the record to indicate that Petitioner's counsel otherwise utilized the August 5th order or Ohio Rev.Code § 149.43 to pursue further discovery. Counsel claims that, on an undisclosed date, he met with an employee of the Ohio Auditor of State to discuss a "Furtherance of Justice Account" and was informed that the Hamilton County Auditor's Office would have audit oversight responsibility for the prosecutor's disbursements from such an account. There is no indication whatsoever that, after receiving such information, counsel either attempted to obtain these records from Hamilton County or pursue a public records action.
209 F.3d at 507. As discussed infra, Tennessee law on post-conviction proceedings provide ample overview for discovery.
For Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing, in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, ("AEDPA"), Congress redefined the standards for conducting an evidentiary hearing in a habeas action:
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that-(A) the claims relies on-(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C.§ 2254(e)(2).
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000), the Supreme Court explained that if the petitioner demonstrated diligence, then the inquiry ends, but if there is an issue of diligence the focus is on whether the petitioner or his counsel knew of the matters at issue and failed to pursue the matter:
The question is not whether the facts could have been discovered but instead whether the prisoner was diligent in his efforts... Diligence for purposes of theopening clause [of Section 2254(e)(2)] depends upon whether the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court; it does not depend, as the Commonwealth would have it, upon whether those efforts could have been...
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