Miles v. Starks, Civ. A. No. CA 4-77-190.

Decision Date17 October 1977
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. CA 4-77-190.
PartiesJohn MILES, Jr. v. Robert K. STARKS, d/b/a Western Cattle Co. and Saginaw Cattle Co. and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

Winifred Hooper, Jr., Fort Worth, Tex., for plaintiff.

Michael S. Baskerville, Abilene, Tex., Rufus S. Garrett, Jr., Fort Worth, Tex., for defendants.

ORDER

MAHON, District Judge.

There is now before the Court plaintiff's motion to remand.

This suit was originally filed in the 29th District Court, Hood County, Texas on March 14, 1977 by plaintiff Miles, a resident of Texas, against defendant Starks, a resident of Illinois. Defendant Starks received the complaint in this action on March 27, 1977. Defendant Starks subsequently filed in the state court a special appearance contesting jurisdiction, an answer, and other pleadings. Though the diversity of the parties was apparent, and the matter in controversy exceeded the sum of ten thousand dollars, defendant Starks did not seek removal from the state court to the district court of the United States within the thirty day period from his receipt of the complaint as provided for in civil actions in 28 U.S.C. § 1446.

An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff Miles on June 14, 1977 which added Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company as a defendant. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company is the surety on the bond of defendant Starks required under the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921. See 7 U.S.C. § 204. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company filed a petition for removal on July 14, 1977. This petition for removal was filed within thirty days of Hartford's receipt of process but over three and one-half months after Starks, the original defendant, had received a copy of the initial pleading.

This action was originally removable by defendant Starks but was not removed. An amended complaint and the addition of Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company will not make the case again removable as to the thirty day time limit requirement, unless the amendment to the complaint naming Hartford gives rise to another removal basis. See 1A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.163.-5, at 485-586.

It is defendant Hartford's contention that the amended complaint naming Hartford as a defendant based on the surety bond has created a separate claim independent of the cause of action based on the breach of contract to purchase cattle. This Court does not agree. Despite the addition of defendant Hartford, the case as it now stands is based on the same legal theory and the same factual transactions. Consequently the waiver by defendant Starks of his right to removal is procedurally binding on defendant Hartford. See Fugard v. Thierry, 265 F.Supp. 743 (N.D.Ill.1967). There is ample authority that the thirty day time limit for removal is mandatory, and absent a waiver by the party seeking to remand, may be insisted upon. Dow Corning Corp. v. Schpak, 65 F.R.D. 72 (D.C.1974) and cases cited therein.

It should be noted that defendant Hartford contends that plaintiff's original complaint intentionally failed to name Hartford as a defendant and that Hartford was so prejudiced by this purposeful omission that such conduct by plaintiff amounts to a waiver or estoppel, precluding an objection to a removal petition made after the thirty day time limit. It is correct that certain conduct may result in a waiver or estoppel precluding an objection to a removal request made after the thirty day time limit. However the case law concerning such estoppel is limited solely to post-removal conduct resulting in a waiver. See Transport Indemnity Co. v. Financial Trust Co., 339 F.Supp. 405, 407-408 (C.D.Cal.1972) and the cases...

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4 cases
  • Intercoastal Refining Co., Inc. v. Jalil
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • April 11, 1980
    ...Robertson v. Ball, 534 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1976): Staples v. Joseph Morton Co., Inc., 444 F.Supp. 1312 (E.D.N.Y.1978); Miles v. Starks, 440 F.Supp. 947 (N.D.Tex.1977). The type of post-removal conduct that constitutes a waiver of the right to remand has been described ". . . affirmative condu......
  • Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conference Athletic Ass'n
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • January 26, 1982
    ...he had been holding back. Cf. Powers v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 169 U.S. 92, 99, 18 S.Ct. 264, 266, 42 L.Ed. 673 (1898); Miles v. Stark, 440 F.Supp. 947 (N.D.Tex.1977). But this case presents the opposite pattern. Wilson tendered his fundamental federal claim, that defendants had violated his ......
  • Noble v. Bradford Marine, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • April 17, 1992
    ...thirty day time period is deemed a waiver of the right of removal which is binding on subsequently added Defendants. Miles v. Starks, 440 F.Supp. 947, 948 (N.D.Tex.1977). A Schwing and a Miss Because of the court's admiralty jurisdiction, Muir's original Complaint, like his Amended Complain......
  • In re Shaffer
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Fifth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Texas
    • August 31, 1984
    ...another removable basis, a party will not acquire an additional thirty days in which he or she can remove his or her case. Miles v. Starks, 440 F.Supp. 947 (1977), 1A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.168 3.-5-6 (1983). The courts have granted a thirty day extension for filing a petition for rem......

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