Miles v. State

• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT
• Decision Date: 29 June 2021
• Docket Number: NO. 2019-KA-00895-COA,2019-KA-00895-COA
• Citation: Miles v. State, NO. 2019-KA-00895-COA (Miss. App. Jun 29, 2021)
• Parties: JELANI MILES A/K/A JELANI N. MILES APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

JELANI MILES A/K/A JELANI N. MILES APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

NO. 2019-KA-00895-COA

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

June 29, 2021

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/10/2019

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JANNIE M. LEWIS-BLACKMON

COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: YAZOO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: CHUCK McRAE DREW McLEMORE MARTIN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD

DISTRICT ATTORNEY: AKILLIE MALONE OLIVER

NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART - 06/29/2021

MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC.

SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. A Yazoo County jury convicted Jelani Miles of shooting into a vehicle; aggravated assault; and the second-degree murder of Cortez Tate. The Yazoo County Circuit Court sentenced Miles to five years to serve for shooting into a vehicle; twenty years in custody, with five years suspended and fifteen years to serve, for aggravated assault; and life in prison for second-degree murder. The court ordered all sentences to run consecutively, with Miles in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Aggrieved, Miles appeals and alleges the trial court erred by (1) declaring a mistrial without a manifest necessity; (2) failing to conduct a proper reverse-Batson¹ analysis; (3) admitting an unavailable witness's statement; and (4) denying his request to examine an adverse witness by asking leading questions. Finding an insufficient and unclear record of the trial court's application of Batson to Jurors 23, 32, and 35, we remand for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct a separate and complete analysis of Batson steps two and three. As for all of Miles's remaining assignments of error, we find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On October 6, 2011, Frederick Washington and his girlfriend, Jasmine Young, got into an argument in an area of Yazoo City known as "Brickyard Hill." Young's brother, Omari, intervened on her behalf, and the situation escalated. Young said that Washington accused her of having an affair with a person named Tate and threatened to kill her, Omari, and Tate. Washington said that Young got upset and loud because he broke up with her. Omari called some of his friends, including Miles. Washington also called his friends, one of whom alerted Tate about the altercation. Shortly after the phone calls, Miles arrived at Brickyard Hill and parked across the street from where Washington and Omari were standing. As Miles approached Washington and began talking to him, Terry Moore pulled up at Brickyard Hill and parked behind Washington. Seconds later, Tate followed Moore into Brickyard Hill and parked near Moore and Washington, with Perry Hollins in Tate's passenger seat.

¶3. Miles then ran behind his car, which was parked across the street from Washington, Moore, Tate, and Hollins. Washington was talking to Moore at Moore's car when he heard multiple gunshots ring out. At this point, Moore, Tate, and Hollins were still inside their cars. Washington ducked behind the cars when he heard the first shot. Washington and Moore stated they saw Miles holding a gun immediately after they heard the first round of shots. The gun apparently jammed, and a second round of shots followed. There were no witnesses to the actual shooting. After the shooting stopped, Washington drove Tate and Hollins to the hospital. Tate later died from his injuries.

¶4. Detectives Willie Hubbard, Tillman Clifton, and Larry Davis were the primary case investigators. Washington talked to the detectives at the hospital but did not name Miles. Washington later explained that he thought Miles would kill him if he identified Miles as the shooter. Washington also testified that he was sure Miles had been the shooter because Miles was the only one he saw holding a gun. Detective Hubbard talked to Hollins at the hospital, and Hollins identified Miles as the shooter. Hollins also gave a recorded interview to Detective Clifton on October 11, 2011. Four days after the shooting, Miles turned himself in to law enforcement. On March 15, 2013, a grand jury indicted Miles.

¶5. Miles's case proceeded to trial in August 2014. Hollins, a State witness, was murdered early on in the trial before his scheduled testimony occurred. Miles's home was then allegedly shot into as well. After Hollins was murdered and Miles's home was shot into, Miles unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial. The following day, sometime after Miles madea second motion for a mistrial, the trial court ordered a mistrial. The trial court later determined that venue should be transferred. Miles challenged the transfer of venue by filing a petition for interlocutory appeal with the Mississippi Supreme Court in March 2015. The supreme court allowed the appeal and reversed the trial court's decision, and the case was remanded for trial in Yazoo County.

¶6. Prior to the second trial, Miles moved to dismiss the charges against him. Miles argued that no manifest necessity existed to support the trial court's ordering a mistrial and that double jeopardy therefore attached. The trial court denied his motion. Miles filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal, but the Mississippi Supreme Court denied his petition specifically with respect to Miles's double jeopardy claim. Also before the second trial, Miles objected to the State's proposal to present the jury with Detective Clifton's October 11, 2011 recording of Hollins's statement. After the trial court allowed the statement, Miles sought to appeal, but the supreme court denied his subsequent petition for an interlocutory appeal. Over Miles's objection, the jury heard Hollins's statement during the second trial in April 2019.

¶7. During jury selection for the second trial, the State made reverse-Batson challenges to seven of Miles's peremptory strikes, alleging that all of Miles's strikes were against jurors of the same race. After finding that the State had made a prima facie case of a reverse-Batson violation with regard to all seven strikes, the trial court required Miles to proffer race-neutral reasons for each strike. The trial court ruled against Miles as to three of the strikes and empaneled those three jurors. Near the end of the trial, Miles called Detective Davis as awitness, and the trial court ultimately ruled that Miles could treat Detective Davis as a hostile witness. When Miles examined Detective Davis, the trial court sustained the State's objections to certain leading questions. After considering all the testimony and evidence, the jury found Miles guilty of all three counts, and the trial court entered his sentence.

¶8. Miles now appeals and alleges that the trial court erred by (1) ordering a mistrial because there was no manifest necessity for doing so and, as a result, subjecting him to double jeopardy; (2) rejecting his race-neutral reasons for striking three jurors; (3) admitting Hollins's pre-trial statement in violation of the Confrontation Clause and Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5); and (4) denying his request to ask Detective Davis leading questions.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the mistrial ordered in August 2014 was proper.

A. Double Jeopardy Claims and Requests for Mistrial

¶9. Miles claims that the trial court's decision to declare a mistrial in August 2014 was not based on manifest necessity, and as such, the April 2019 trial violated his right against double jeopardy. Without including any evidentiary support, Miles argues the mistrial was "due mainly to the death of [Hollins,] one of the State's witnesses," and the issue here is whether Hollins's unavailability warranted a mistrial. He further alleges that the witness's unavailability did not constitute a manifest necessity warranting a mistrial since the witness was not a key witness, and the trial court failed to consider other alternatives to mistrial.

¶10. "The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal defendantfrom repeated prosecutions for the same offense." Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671 (1982). Our state supreme court has repeatedly held that protection against double jeopardy attaches in this State when a jury is sworn. Deeds v. State, 27 So. 3d 1135, 1139 (¶10) (Miss. 2009). In this case, the trial court declared a mistrial after "having . . . sworn and seated a [j]ury and having accepted testimony in this cause." Thus, double jeopardy attached at that point in Miles's first trial. But on appeal, the specific issue is whether the trial court's ordering of a mistrial barred Miles's second trial.

¶11. "[W]hether to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . [Thus, we] review a motion for mistrial [for] abuse of discretion." Dora v. State, 986 So. 2d 917, 921 (¶8) (Miss. 2008). Determining whether double jeopardy bars a defendant from being retried after a mistrial depends on which party moved for a mistrial. Oregon, 456 U.S. at 672. Where a "mistrial is granted upon the court's motion[,] . . . a second trial is barred because of double jeopardy, unless taking into consideration all the circumstances[,] there was a 'manifest necessity' for the mistrial." Jenkins v. State, 759 So. 2d 1229, 1234 (¶18) (Miss. 2000) (citing Watts v. State, 492 So. 2d 1281, 1284 (Miss. 1986)).

¶12. On the other hand, if a "mistrial [was] declared at the behest of the defendant, quite different principles come into play." Oregon, 456 U.S. at 672. Because a mistrial may be granted based on a multitude of circumstances,

and because those circumstances do not invariably create unfairness to the accused, [the defendant's] valued right to have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal is sometimes subordinate to the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to animpartial jury.

Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). When the defendant moves for a mistrial, it "constitutes 'a deliberate election on...