Miles v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 03 August 1846
• Citation: 3 Pa. 21
• Parties: MILES <I>v.</I> STEVENS.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

3 Pa. 21

MILES v. STEVENS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 15 and June 26, 1846.

August 3, 1846.

May 15 and June 26.

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Ford and Penrose, for the plaintiff in error.

Frazer and Jenkins, contrà.

August 3. ROGERS, J.

This is an action of debt on an article of agreement, between James Miles and Thaddeus Stevens, who survived Charles Ogle, to recover the sum of five thousand dollars with interest, payable the 1st of August, 1837. The execution of the instrument is admitted by the defendant, who contends that he ought not to be compelled to pay the money; first, because there was fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff; second, that the contract was entered into under an entire misapprehension and mistake of material facts; and, third, that the plaintiff has no title to the property he undertook to sell. It is believed that these grounds embrace the whole case.

The first point, viz., that there was fraud and misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff, is a question of fact, which was properly left, and has been passed upon by the jury. It is based on the construction of that part of the agreement in the following words. — "The said Miles agrees to sell to the said Stevens and Ogle, their heirs and assigns, the undivided half part of two hundred acres of land situate on Elk Creek in the county of Erie, including the mouth of said creek; said two hundred acres to be cut off the lands of said Miles, by lines hereafter to be designated by said Miles, Stevens, and Ogle, or a majority of them, so as to embrace within said two hundred acres the lands at the harbour of said Elk Creek, best suited to the site of a city, intended to be located on the same, &c." The defendant contends that the expressions, "the lands at the harbour of Elk Creek," contain, and was so intended, a representation that there was a harbour there; whereas, the plaintiff insists that it is a mere description of the plan for the site of a city, which the parties intended to locate there. That it may be considered a part of the description of the premises sold and designed for a particular and declared purpose, may be true; but I do not consider this view of the case as inconsistent with the allegation, that it also contains the assertion of a material fact, which, if untrue, will affect the contract, and attaint it with fraud. It is unquestionably the natural interpretation of the language used, that the vendor, who alone, as appears by the evidence, was acquainted with the premises, intended to assert that there was an existing harbour, communicating with the lake, and accessible to it, so as to be used by vessels of some description navigating those waters, and whether of the larger or smaller class, perhaps, would be immaterial. Indeed, the point now assumed appears to have escaped the notice of the parties on the trial; for it does not seem that they requested a specific direction, that the article contained nothing more than a description of the locus in quo, although it is incidentally mentioned in the plaintiff's second point. Neither plaintiff nor defendant desired the court to construe the article in this aspect; but they have thrown themselves upon the jury to determine from a view of all the testimony, whether there was a false representation, and if so, whether the defendant was deceived by it; the situation and condition of the premises being well understood and known, as the plaintiff contends, to all the parties to the contract. In the answer to the plaintiff's second point, that the letter of Charles Ogle, of the 12th February, 1843, in which he says, "In regard to the harbour, I have great confidence that we will succeed in obtaining an appropriation of $35,000," it is conclusively shown that the parties understood, that the erection of works at the mouth of Elk Creek by the general government, was required, in order to make a harbour at that place a perfect one; and in that case putting into the agreement on which suit is brought the words, "so as to embrace within said two hundred acres the lands at the harbour of Elk Creek," as the mere description of the plan for the site of a city, which the parties intended to locate; and these words, thus used, furnish no evidence of fraud on the part of James Miles, although it is now proved, that without such works, there is no access to the harbour at the mouth of Elk Creek. The court very properly say, "that the letter mentioned in this point appears by its date to have been written nearly twelve months after the agreement in question. It speaks its purpose plainly; and the jury must determine as to what it tends to prove. In relation to the words quoted from the agreement, it is for the jury, weighing them with all the facts in evidence, to say, whether they tend to prove that James Miles, the plaintiff, misrepresented the condition of the mouth of Elk Creek, relative to a harbour, or not." A harbour in Elk Creek, but inaccessible from the lake, never entered into the contemplation of the parties; for such a harbour, if harbour it may be called, would be useless for the purposes of the contracting parties. There is no doubt they looked to the lake trade, which, it was supposed, would render the intended location valuable as a mart for commerce. So in answer to the defendant's sixth point. "If such misrepresentation, as is here stated, has been proved to the satisfaction of the jury, the plaintiff cannot recover. The article is in evidence, and the jury will of course draw from it such inferences, with respect to the representations of the fact of the harbour, by James Miles, as its language, and especially the words of the stipulation, which constituted his part of the contract, may seem to them to warrant." And in the charge, "that if there was fraud or imposition practised upon the defendants by the plaintiff, inducing the former to enter into the agreement, such fraud entirely vitiated the contract. It was for the jury to say, whether there was, or was not, such a misrepresentation in regard to the facts of an existing harbour." In the charge of the court, and in the answer to the points, which I have carefully examined, I have failed to discover any error of which the plaintiff has any reason to complain. If injustice has been done, it is not by the court, but the jury; a mistake, which, if made, we cannot correct. The plaintiff complains that the court referred the construction of the article to the jury, and in telling them that they might infer from it misrepresentation by the plaintiff. This is not dealing fairly, for the court did not say that the jury might infer misrepresentation from the article itself, which would be a blunder, but they leave the fact of fraud and misrepresentation to be decided on all the evidence. If the court should have instructed them, and we think they might with propriety have done so, that the articles contained an allegation by the plaintiff, which was proved to be untrue, that there was a harbour at that point, the wrong was to the defendant, and not the plaintiff.

Second Point. — That the contract was entered into under a mistaken apprehension of facts. It is a general rule, that when an act is done, or contract made under a mistake or ignorance of a material fact, it is voidable, and relievable in equity; and the rule applies not only to cases where there has been studied suppression or concealment of facts, by the one side, which would amount to fraud, but also to many cases of innocent ignorance, and mistake on both sides. It is true, that it is not every mistake which will enable the party to avoid the contract; for, to have this effect, it must be of its essence, the sine qua non of the contract, or as it is expressed, the efficient cause of concoction. These principles pervade our equitable jurisprudence, and are supported by a train of authorities which it is useless to cite, as they are well illustrated and explained by Mr. Justice Story, in his Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 140, 141, &c. If, therefore, the agreement in question was made under a mistaken impression, that facts essential to the contract did exist, or, which is the same thing, would afterwards exist, and they were prevented, by causes over which the parties had no control, it is relievable against in equity. We perceive no distinction either in principle or authority, where the parties contract, either with a view to existing facts, or facts merely in contemplation between the parties defendant, on future events or contingencies. In either case, when the basis of the contract fails without the assent of the parties, to attempt to enforce the agreement is inequitable.

Thus, in ____ 2 Paige, 84, it is ruled, that where, from a defect of the common law, want of foresight of the parties, or other mistake or accident, there would be a failure of justice, it is the duty of a court of equity to supply the defects, or furnish the remedy. And therefore it was ruled, that where one person conveyed land to another for the purpose of opening a street in the city of New York, and there was no other consideration for the conveyance, but the benefit which the grantor was to derive from the opening of the street, and by subsequent events, beyond the control of both parties, the street could not be opened, a reconveyance of the land was decreed. This case, although not directly in point, bears a strong analogy here, and the reasoning of the chancellor is based on principles applicable to this case. If, therefore, the contract in question, as the jury have found, was made under the mistaken idea that the legislatures of Pennsylvania and the United States would pass...