Miles v. The Nat'l Football League
| Decision Date | 21 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:19-cv-18327(JXN)(JSA) |
| Parties | RONTEZ MILES, Plaintiff, v. THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, et al Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [ECF No. 26] filed by Defendant the National Football League (the “NFL”), to which Plaintiff Rontez Miles (“Plaintiff”) filed opposition [ECF No. 30], to which the NFL replied [ECF No. 32]. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The Court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and decides the matter without oral argument under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons stated herein, the NFL's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 26] is GRANTED.
This matter involves a dispute between Plaintiff and the NFL. Plaintiff is a professional football player signed to the New York Jets (“NY Jets”). Am. Compl. ¶ 1. The NFL is a professional sports league consisting of thirty-two football teams, including the NY Jets. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. Plaintiff is a member of the National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”) which is the exclusive bargaining representative of all NFL players, including Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 7; Def.'s Br. at 2, ECF No. 26-1.
Plaintiff's employment with the NY Jets was in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the NFL and the NFLPA. Id. ¶ 8.[1]
According to the NFL, the CBA governs the respective rights and responsibilities of the NFL, the Clubs, the NFLPA, and the players with respect to, among other subjects, player health and safety, player attire and equipment, and the remedies and benefits available to players in the event of an injury sustained while performing services under an NFL Player Contract, including during the course of an NFL game. Def.'s Br. at 2-3 (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9; see, e.g., CBA, Art. 41, § 1, Art. 51, § 2). The CBA requires NFL players and Clubs to follow the rules promulgated by the NFL concerning the operation of the game. Id. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 9 (). The NFL Rules set forth detailed standards for player equipment and uniforms. Id. (citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a medical condition known as alopecia areata, which he claims causes him to experience ocular photosensitivity and photophobia and limits his ability to see well in sunlight or artificial light. Am Compl. ¶¶ 13-15, 41. For at least three football seasons, Plaintiff used a protective shield on his helmet while practicing or playing football. Id. ¶¶ 28, 30.
On August 19, 2017, Plaintiff claims that an NFL equipment judge demanded that he remove the protective shield from his helmet or he would not be permitted to play in the game. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. Plaintiff played in the game without the shield and alleges that, “due to the lack of protection from the stadium lights, [he] did not see an opposing player approach, and hence, was unable to take defensive maneuvers.” Id. ¶¶ 45-46. As a result, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he opposing player [made contact with his] face causing severe and significant injury,” including a “broken orbital bone of the right eye.” Id. ¶¶ 47-48
Two years after his injury, Plaintiff filed this action in the Superior Court of New Jersey asserting claims for (1) disability discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”); (2) failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under the LAD and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and (3) negligence. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1. The NFL timely removed the case to this Court and Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following claims: (1) Defendants violated the LAD by discriminating based on Plaintiff's disability; (2) Defendants violated the LAD and Section 12101 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by failing to provide reasonable accommodation to Plaintiff; (3) Defendants were negligent; (4) Defendants waived any provision or requirement in the CBA when they allowed Plaintiff to play in the NFL for at least three seasons utilizing a protective shield without specific approval from the NFL; (5) Plaintiff's claims do not depend on an interpretation of the CBA, and (6) John Does 1-5 and John Does 1-6 are liable to Plaintiff for previously stated LAD and ADA violations. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56-62, 6368, 69-78, 79-81, 82-84, 85-90.
The NFL now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that Plaintiff's claims are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), because the allegations are inextricably intertwined with the CBA and incorporated Official Playing Rules. Def.'s Br. at 8.
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading is sufficient so long as it includes “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and provides the defendant with “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (internal quotations omitted). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all the facts in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). Moreover, dismissal is inappropriate even where “it appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits.” Id.
While this standard places a considerable burden on the defendant seeking dismissal, the facts alleged must be “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. That is, the allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. Accordingly, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it provides a sufficient factual basis such that it states a facially plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). In order to determine whether a complaint is sufficient under these standards, the Third Circuit requires a three-part inquiry: (1) the court must first recite the elements that must be pled in order to state a claim; (2) the court must then determine which allegations in the complaint are merely conclusory and therefore need not be given an assumption of truth; and (3) the court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations and ascertain whether they plausibly give rise to a right to relief. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In Count One of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a violation of New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56-62. Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against because of his disability and that he suffered “severe personal injury, severe emotional distress and economic/pecuniary injuries.” Id. 58-62. In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges violations of the LAD and ADA. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the NFL failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disability in order to perform the duties of his employment. Am. Compl. ¶ 67. In Count Six, Plaintiff alleges that employees or agents aided and abetted the NFL in violating the LAD and ADA. Id. ¶ 88. The NFL moves to dismiss these counts, arguing that Plaintiff's claims cannot be resolved without interpreting the CBA and the incorporated Official Playing Rules. Def.'s Br. at 20, ECF No. 26-1.
Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides for federal jurisdiction over disputes regarding collective bargaining agreements. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). More importantly, § 301 “mandate[s] resort to federal rules of law in order to ensure uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements, and thus to promote the peaceable, consistent resolution of labor-management disputes.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 (1988). “Because § 301 requires the creation of uniform federal labor law to ensure uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreements, and because state laws might produce differing interpretations of the obligations imposed by such agreements, the Supreme Court has held that ‘a suit in state court alleging a violation of a provision of a labor contract must be brought under § 301 and be resolved by reference to federal law.'” Snyder v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 837 F.Supp.2d 428, 437-38 (D.N.J. 2011) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985)).
Therefore “if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law . . . is preempted” by federal labor law. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 406. And this preemption is not limited to contracts claims. Instead, the Supreme Court has held that “when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract,” even in the context of tort claims, the claim is preempted by § 301 and must be decided pursuant to federal labor...
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