Miles v. Weingrad

Decision Date21 May 2015
Docket NumberNo. SC13–54.,SC13–54.
Citation164 So.3d 1208
PartiesKimberly Ann MILES, et al., Petitioners, v. Daniel WEINGRAD, M.D., Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

164 So.3d 1208

Kimberly Ann MILES, et al., Petitioners
v.
Daniel WEINGRAD, M.D., Respondent.

No. SC13–54.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 21, 2015.


164 So.3d 1209

Robert Steven Glazier of the Law Office of Robert S. Glazier, Miami, FL; Alejandro Alvarez of the Alvarez Law Firm, Coral Gables, FL; and Philip Mead Burlington of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioners.

Mark Hicks, Dinah Stein, and Shannon Kain of Hicks, Porter, Ebenfeld & Stein, P.A., Miami, FL; and Bruce McLaren Stanley of Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A., Fort Myers, FL, for Respondent.

Thomas Stoneham Edwards, Jr. of Edwards & Ragatz, P.A., Jacksonville, FL, for Amicus Curiae Florida Justice Association.

Opinion

PERRY, J.

Kimberly Ann Miles seeks review of Miles v. Weingrad (Miles II ), 103 So.3d 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), on the basis that it expressly and directly conflicts with Raphael v. Shecter, 18 So.3d 1152 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we quash the decision on review.

BACKGROUND

In 2002, Miles was diagnosed with melanoma. She received medical care, and a cancerous tumor was removed from her leg in an outpatient procedure on December 2, 2002. While she was told that the tumor had been completely removed and no melanoma remained, she sought a second medical opinion from Dr. Daniel Weingrad, a surgical oncologist. Dr. Weingrad informed Miles that further surgery was warranted to ensure that the entire melanoma had been excised, and on January 31, 2003, Dr. Weingrad performed the surgical procedure. Postoperative test results showed that there had been no residual melanoma following Miles' December 2, 2002, surgical procedure. Furthermore, there were complications following the January 2003 surgery. First, Miles had to be hospitalized for four days to treat an infection, which did not completely resolve until April 2003. Additionally, Miles suffered from permanent swelling and excruciating pain and now has limited mobility—she can neither walk long distances nor stand for long periods of time.

In 2006, Miles, joined by her husband Jody Haynes, filed a lawsuit in which she alleged that due to Dr. Weingrad's surgical malpractice, Miles has suffered permanent injuries. Following the presentation of evidence, the jury returned a verdict for Miles and awarded her economic damages amounting to $16,104 and noneconomic damages for pain and suffering amounting to $1.45 million, and awarded her husband noneconomic damages for loss of consortium amounting to $50,000.

Dr. Weingrad moved to reduce the award of noneconomic damages to $500,000 pursuant to section 766.118(2), Florida Statutes (2003).1 The trial court denied Dr. Weingrad's motion, ruling that “retroactive application of section 766.118(2)(a) is constitutionally impermissible.” Dr. Weingrad appealed.

164 So.3d 1210

In 2010, the Third District entered an opinion reversing the trial court's judgment and the jury award of noneconomic damages. Weingrad v. Miles (Miles I ), 29 So.3d 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). In Miles I, the Third District held that it was constitutionally permissible to retroactively apply section 766.118 in Miles' case because she “had no vested right to a particular damage award and thus suffer[ed] no due process violation.” Id. at 416. In doing so, the Third District rejected Miles' reliance on the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Raphael, which had reached a contrary result. See id. at 410–11.

On remand, the trial court entered a judgment for Miles based on the $500,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages. Miles appealed the trial court's judgment, seeking relief based on the assertion that Miles I conflicted with American Optical Corp. v. Spiewak, 73 So.3d 120 (Fla.2011). Affirming the trial court's judgment, the Third District rejected Miles' claim that its earlier decision conflicted with this Court's Spiewak decision. Miles II, 103 So.3d at 259–60 (“Finding no conflict between our prior opinion in [Miles I ], and the Supreme Court's opinion in [Spiewak ], we affirm.”).

Miles filed a notice to invoke the discretionary review of this Court in which she asserted that Miles II expressly and directly conflicts with both Spiewak and Raphael.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

The issue here concerns the retroactivity of a statutory amendment that limits noneconomic damages in a medical malpractice cause of action. Because the question here is a pure question of law, we review de novo. See Basulto v. Hialeah Auto., 141 So.3d 1145, 1152 (Fla.2014) (citing Aravena v. Miami–Dade Cnty., 928 So.2d 1163, 1166 (Fla.2006) ).

Jurisdiction

Dr. Weingrad argues that there is nothing in the Third District's one-sentence affirmance that provides this Court with jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. We disagree.

Under article V, section 3(b)(3), of the Florida Constitution, this Court has jurisdiction to review a decision of a district court of appeal that “expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or of [this Court] on the same question of law.” Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The decision on review is not merely an unelaborated affirmance, but specifically relies on, and cites to, the decision in Miles I. Miles II, 103 So.3d at 260 (“Finding no conflict between our prior opinion in [Miles I ], and the Supreme Court's opinion in [Spiewak ], we affirm.”).

In Miles I, the Third District held that:

Although the injury in the present case occurred in 2003, prior to the effective date of the amendment of section 766.118, because Appellees did not file their notice of intent to initiate litigation, file their complaint, or obtain a judgment prior to the enactment of the statute, they had at most a “mere expectation” or a prospect that they might recover damages of an indeterminate amount at an unspecified date in the future. The Appellees had no vested right to a particular damage award and thus suffer no due process violation with the application of the caps statute to their cause of action.

Miles I, 29 So.3d at 416. Thus, Miles I and Miles II require that, in order to establish that a right vested before the

164 So.3d 1211

statute became effective, a claimant bringing a personal injury action must have previously noticed his or her intent to bring such an action.

Contrarily, in Raphael, the Fourth District held that a “cause of action in a medical malpractice case accrues at the time the malpractice incident occurs.” Raphael, 18 So.3d at 1157. Because a plaintiff has a vested right to this cause of action, and retroactive application of the noneconomic damages cap would impair this vested right, the Fourth District held that retroactive application was impermissible. Id. at 1158. This conflict was recognized by the Third District. See Miles I, 29 So.3d at 415.

Because the Third and Fourth Districts have reached different conclusions on the same question of law, this Court has jurisdiction to resolve this important legal conflict regarding the requirements for bringing personal injury actions stemming from medical malpractice under Florida's negligence law.

Merits

To resolve the issue before us, we necessarily address the conflict that exists between the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal on this issue. In Raphael, the Fourth District concluded that the Legislature enacted section 766.118 with a clear intent to allow “the retroactive application of a new statute for ‘bad faith actions against insurers.’ ” Raphael, 18 So.3d at 1156.2 Relying on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Laforet, 658 So.2d 55, 61 (Fla.1995), the district court posited that whether section 766.118(4) is “substantive or procedural in nature is [the] issue that [was] determinative of [the] case.” Raphael, 18 So.3d at 1156. Citing to Clausell v. Hobart Corp., 515 So.2d 1275 (Fla.1987), the Raphael court stated that when a cause of action has not accrued “no one has a vested right in the common law, which the Legislature may substantively change prospectively.” Raphael, 18 So.3d at 1157. However, the Raphael court noted that the cause before it was reminiscent of the circumstances in Alamo Rent–A–Car v. Mancusi, 632 So.2d 1352, 1358 (Fla.1994), in which this Court held that it is presumed that substantive statutes will not retrospectively apply to “impair or destroy existing rights.” Raphael, 18 So.3d at 1156.

Thus, the Raphael court concluded that section 766.118(4) may not be “retroactively enforced to impair the appellant's vested rights.” Id. at 1157. The court further concluded that “[t]he cause of action in a medical malpractice case accrues at the time the malpractice incident occurs.” Id. at 1157–58 (citing § 95.111(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002) ; Patient's Comp. Fund v. Scherer, 558 So.2d 411, 414 (Fla.1990) ). Accordingly, the Fourth District reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its holding that the...

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3 cases
  • Martinez v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 17-0039.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 16 June 2017
    ...of a statutory damages cap." Prince George's Cty. v. Longtin , 419 Md. 450, 487, 19 A.3d 859, 881 (2011).5 See Miles v. Weingrad , 164 So.3d 1208, 1213 (Fla. 2015) (determining that statutory cap on damages could not be applied retroactively as "precedent from this Court ‘has refused to app......
  • McCloskey v. Dep't of Fin. Servs.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 21 August 2015
    ...new statute “impairs vested rights, creates new obligations, or imposes new penalties” it will not apply retroactively. Miles v. Weingrad, 164 So.3d 1208, 1213 (Fla.2015) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So.2d 55, 61 (Fla.1995) ). When viaticals were redefined as secu......
  • Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Gelsomino
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 28 November 2018
    ...This type of right is different than a party's entitlement to damages, which is a vested substantive right. Miles v. Weingrad , 164 So.3d 1208, 1212-13 (Fla. 2015) ; cf. Raphael v. Shecter , 18 So.3d 1152, 1157 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (recognizing a money judgment as representing the vested rig......

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