Miles v. Werle

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: LAURA DENVIR STITH; HANNA, P.J., and EDWIN H. SMITH
• Citation: Miles v. Werle, 977 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. App. 1998)
• Decision Date: 13 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Parties: Linda J. MILES, Appellant, v. Charles B. WERLE, Respondent. 54921.

Page 297

977 S.W.2d 297

Linda J. MILES, Appellant, v. Charles B. WERLE, Respondent.

No. WD 54921.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Oct. 13, 1998.

Howard D. Lay, Kansas City, for appellant.

Thomas C. McGiffen, Liberty, for respondent.

Before HANNA, P.J., LAURA DENVIR STITH and EDWIN H. SMITH, JJ.

LAURA DENVIR STITH, Judge.

Appellant Linda Miles appeals the trial court's refusal to enforce an antenuptial agreement and its division of marital property. She argues that the trial court erred in holding that the antenuptial agreement was insufficiently definite to allow the court to give the terms an exact meaning, and was therefore unenforceable. She also asserts that the trial court erred in making an unequal division of marital property and debt which favored the Respondent, Charles Werle, and in refusing her requests to off-set the amounts to which he is entitled from her profit-sharing plan by the amounts he is ordered to pay to her, or to secure the amounts he is ordered to pay to her. We find that the antenuptial agreement was enforceable on the particular facts of this case and we reverse and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Linda Miles and John Werle entered into an antenuptial agreement on September 9, 1992, and were married three days later. The agreement provided that neither spouse would acquire an interest in property owned or possessed by the other prior to the marriage, or in any increase in the value of that property. It is undisputed that Mr. Werle had no assets at the time of the marriage. Ms. Miles did have some assets, a list of which was attached to the antenuptial agreement. The most valuable of these was (1) her residence, which the list valued at $60,000. In addition, she listed: (2) a 1992 Grand Am automobile, (3) bank accounts at Commerce Bank of Kansas City, (4) 940 shares of Yarco Second Mortgage Company Stock, (5) an HR10 profit-sharing plan at her employer, Van Osdol, Magruder, Erickson & Redmond, P.C., I.D. # 43-1565398, (6) life insurance in her name through her employer, (7) any lawsuits pending at the date of the agreement, (8) a General Motors pension plan at the date Don G. Miles retires or any accrued benefits, and (9) depression glass collected prior to the marriage. Ms. Miles asserts that her motivation for the antenuptial agreement was a desire to preserve her interest in her profit-sharing plan for her two children born of a previous marriage. There is no claim that this list of assets attached was not accurate, and everything included on the list was Ms. Miles' separate property at the time of the marriage. It is also conceded that the agreement provided that, if the marriage were dissolved, "such property as may be accumulated by the parties during the term of the marriage and by the joint efforts of the parties shall be divided equally between them." In other words, the antenuptial agreement did not waive either spouse's interest in marital property except as to any increase in the value of assets owned prior to the marriage.

Shortly after the marriage, the parties executed an ERISA waiver of Mr. Werle's rights to Ms. Miles' pension, as an addition to their antenuptial agreement. There is no claim that this waiver was not made in accordance with relevant federal law.

During their marriage, Ms. Miles continued her employment at a law firm, earning around $30,000 per year. By contrast, Mr. Werle worked only occasionally, with varied levels of income. Although Mr. Werle reported little income, at trial he testified that he had made $60,000.00 of unreported income in a six-month period. At one point, Ms. Miles was required to bail Mr. Werle out of jail for his failure to pay child support for his children from a previous marriage. Mr. Werle also exhibited violent behavior during their marriage, including physical and verbal abuse.

The parties separated on October 7, 1996, but the violence continued. On November 27, 1996, Ms. Miles obtained a Full Order of Protection against Mr. Werle. The evidence shows that on at least two occasions Mr. Werle violated this order. As a result, on January 30, 1997, Mr. Werle pleaded guilty to criminal aggravated stalking charges and third-degree assault charges against Ms. Miles. Ms. Miles further testified that Mr. Werle continued to assault her, follow her, and harass her with threatening phone calls and notes. As a result of Mr. Werle's behavior, Ms. Miles testified that, at the suggestion of the court, she agreed to move away from her home for a few months. This caused Ms. Miles to incur substantial expenses, which she estimated to be approximately $7,955.00, in order to relocate her life for the period of time during which she was threatened by Mr. Werle's behavior. In addition, Mr. Werle used her credit cards during this period without her permission, forging her signature and ringing up a total debt of $6,700.00 which she was forced to pay.

Ms. Miles filed a Petition For Dissolution Of Marriage in which she requested the court to enforce the antenuptial agreement. Mr. Werle submitted a Motion To Determine The Enforceability Of The Antenuptial Agreement in which he argued the antenuptial agreement was invalid and unenforceable because: (1) he was not represented by an attorney or afforded legal counsel prior to the execution of the agreement, (2) the property list did not fully disclose the value of the property it listed and Mr. Werle did not have personal knowledge of its value, and (3) the agreement was executed in the office where Ms. Miles worked and was notarized by a receptionist in that office.

The trial court noted that In Re Marriage of Lewis, 808 S.W.2d 919, 923 (Mo.App.1991), states that "a valid agreement requires full disclosure of both spouses' legal rights and the nature and extent of the property of the other." Id. at 923. The trial court concluded that, in the instant case, the antenuptial agreement was insufficiently definite as to the value of the property the parties were disclaiming, in that Mr. Werle's property list was left blank and Ms. Miles' list set forth a value for only one of the nine classes of property it listed, i.e., the residence. The court therefore refused to enforce the agreement.

Because most of the items on Ms. Miles' list were her separate property, and there was no evidence that these items had increased in value over the marriage, the court's refusal to enforce the antenuptial agreement had no effect on the distribution of these items--they were distributed to her as her separate property, just as they would have been absent the agreement. The same applies to the money Ms. Miles had accumulated in her profit-sharing plan up to the time of the marriage. Due to the court's refusal to enforce the antenuptial agreement, however, the additional amounts earned in Ms. Miles' profit-sharing plan during the four years of the marriage, totaling approximately $20,688.00, were distributed as marital property. The court awarded $10,344.00 of this increase to Mr. Werle and $10,344.00 to Ms. Miles. The court also ordered Mr. Werle to pay Ms. Miles $6,700.00 to reimburse her for his unauthorized use of her credit cards after their separation. It also divided the parties' other marital and non-marital property based on lists provided by each spouse.

Ms. Miles requested that the court off-set the value of this and other property which it awarded to Mr. Werle by the $6,700.00 awarded to Ms. Miles for the unauthorized credit card debt accumulated by Mr. Werle. Alternatively, she asked the court to secure the $6,700.00 debt, since otherwise she feared he would take bankruptcy and she would end up owing him part of her pension while he would never pay her his debt to her. The court refused this request. Ms. Miles also asked the court to award her the $7,955.00 expended when she had to obtain the protective order and live separately during the time her safety was threatened by Mr. Werle. The court recognized in its judgment that she claimed this amount in relocation and related expenses to avoid Mr. Werle during the times of harassment and physical attacks, but did not specifically rule on the distribution of this amount. The court merely crossed out the grid sections detailing these expenses in making its distribution of marital property. We presume the court thus determined not to award her these costs. Ms. Miles appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review is that applicable to court-tried cases: we affirm the trial court's decree unless there is no substantial evidence to support the decision, the decision is against the weight of the evidence, or the decision erroneously declares or misapplies the law. Crews v. Crews, 949 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Mo.App.1997), quoting, Allen v. Allen, 927 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Mo.App.1996). The party challenging the dissolution decree has the burden of demonstrating error. Id. The trial court's division of marital property will only be disturbed if the distribution of marital property is so " 'heavily and unduly weighted in favor of one party as to amount to an abuse of discretion.' " Id.,quoting, Dodson v. Dodson, 904 S.W.2d 3, 6 (Mo.App.1995).

III. THE ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE

Ms. Miles argues that the trial court erred in finding the antenuptial agreement insufficiently definite to be enforceable. In Missouri, to be valid and enforceable an antenuptial agreement must (1) be entered into freely, fairly, knowingly, understandingly, and in good faith with full disclosure, and (2) must not be unconscionable. Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 787 (Mo.App.1979). Ms. Miles asserts that the agreement met the disclosure requirements of Lewis in that Mr. Werle's property list was blank simply because he neither owned nor possessed any assets, and that she listed all of her property, and the values for the classes of property described on her list were readily attainable from...