Milford Copper Co. of Utah v. Industrial Commission

• Decision Date: 24 November 1922
• Docket Number: 3825
• Citation: 61 Utah 37,210 P. 993
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: MILFORD COPPER CO. OF UTAH et al. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al

210 P. 993

61 Utah 37

MILFORD COPPER CO. OF UTAH et al. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al

No. 3825

Supreme Court of Utah

November 24, 1922

Proceeding by the Milford Copper Company of Utah and another to review an award of compensation by the Industrial Commission to Mrs. Henry White for the death of Henry White.

AWARD AFFIRMED.

George H. Smith and R. B. Porter, both of Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.

Harvey H. Cluff, Atty. Gen., and J. Robert Robinson, Asst. Atty Gen., for defendants.

CORFMAN C. J. WEBER, GIDEON, THURMAN, and FRICK, JJ., concur.

OPINION

CORFMAN, C. J.

This matter is brought on for review before this court by the plaintiffs under the provisions of our Industrial Commission Act (Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 3061-3165).

It appears that on January 18, 1922, between 2:30 and 3 o'clock p. m., one Henry White was working as a miner in the mine of the plaintiff Milford Copper Company at Minersville, Utah, and while lowering a stoping machine weighing about 65 pounds from a raise to a level in said plaintiff's mine became entangled in a rope and was jerked down the stope or raise a distance of six or eight feet and injured. Immediately thereafter he became ill, was raised to the surface of the mine, where he remained for an hour or two in the engine room, and was afterwards taken in an automobile to his home some four miles distant, where a physician was summoned, who, after a diagnosis at 5:00 o'clock p. m. of the same day, pronounced his condition as "the beginning of pneumonia." From the time of the accident he suffered great pain, and progressively grew worse until January 22d, at 7 o'clock p. m., when he died. An autopsy was held, and the cause of his death pronounced by the physicians to be "lobar pneumonia." His widow, the defendant Mrs. White, after making application for compensation in due form in behalf of herself and her minor children, was by the Commission granted an award of $ 4,982.86.

It is claimed by plaintiffs that there was no substantial evidence produced before the Commission to justify the award. It is argued in their brief, quoting their exact language, that--

"The most that can be said of the record in this case is that the deceased suffered a slight accident on January 18th, and that he died on January 22d of lobar pneumonia. There is absolutely no evidence that the injury had anything at all to do with the pneumonia. The burden is upon the claimant not alone to show an injury and death, but that the injury caused or in some manner contributed to the death."

It may well be conceded that in all cases of this kind where there has been an accidental injury, whether slight or otherwise there must be some substantial proof of a causal connection between the injury and the disability or death. If, then, it is shown by the record here for review that there is some substantial evidence to support the award made by the Commission, it becomes our bounden duty under the statute to confirm the award.

As to just what may be regarded by this court as substantial evidence for the purpose of sustaining an award made by the Commission is not always a matter of easy determination. Reasonable minds may, in the consideration of the evidence in a given case, differ as to the ultimate findings of fact and the conclusions reached. Our conclusions as a court may, in a particular case, materially differ with those of the Commission, but nevertheless we must confirm the award made by the Commission if it be found that there is any substantial evidence to support the Commission's ruling.

As to what may or may not be regarded as "substantial evidence" within the meaning of our Industrial Commission Act, and the procedure under it, we think the meaning of that expression is aptly defined in 4 Words and Phrases, Second Series, p. 751, which reads:

"By 'substantial evidence' is not meant that which goes beyond a mere 'scintilla of evidence,' since evidence may go beyond a mere scintilla, and yet not be substantial evidence. Substantial evidence must possess something of substance and relevant consequence and not consist of vague, uncertain, or irrelevant matter, not carrying the quality of proof or having fitness to induce conviction. Substantial evidence is such that reasonable men may fairly differ as to whether it establishes plaintiff's case, and, if all reasonable men must conclude that it does not establish such case, then it is not substantial evidence. Jenkins & Reynolds Co. v. Alpena Portland Cement Co., 147 F. 641, 643, 77 C. C. A. 625, citing Minahan v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., 138 F. 37, 70 C. C. A. 463; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 12 S.Ct. 679, 144 U.S. 408, 36 L.Ed. 485."

The plaintiffs have in their brief quoted in part from the foregoing excerpt taken from Jenkins & Reynolds Co v. Alphena Portland Cement Co., supra, and also...