Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 May 2003
• Docket Number: (SC 16841)
• Citation: 822 A.2d 196,263 Conn. 616
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MILFORD POWER COMPANY, LLC v. ALSTOM POWER, INC., ET AL.

263 Conn. 616

822 A.2d 196

MILFORD POWER COMPANY, LLC v. ALSTOM POWER, INC., ET AL.

(SC 16841)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 19, 2003.

officially released May 20, 2003

Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js. Louis R. Pepe, with whom were Richard F. Wareing and, on the brief, Ben A. Solnit, for the appellants (defendants).

Stuart D. Rosen, with whom, on the brief, was Ann M. Siczewicz, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

KATZ, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal¹ is whether the trial court, in denying a motion to dismiss, properly determined that the untimely notice of a force majeure event, issued pursuant to a provision in the commercial contract (contract) between the plaintiff, Milford Power Company, LLC, and the defendants, Alstom Power, Inc., and Black and Veatch Construction, Inc., gave rise to a justiciable controversy. We conclude that the trial court's determination was improper and, therefore, that the court did not have jurisdiction over the plaintiff's declaratory judgment action to consider whether the defendants properly had invoked the force majeure clause. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss was improper.

The record reflects the following facts and procedural history. In February, 1999, the plaintiff and defendants entered into the contract in which, for a sum certain in excess of $230,000,000, the defendants agreed to provide the plaintiff with certain engineering, procurement and construction services related to the construction of an electric power generating plant in Milford. Integral to the project were two forty foot high heat recovery steam generators, one of which collapsed on February 2, 2000, during the course of construction, killing two workers, injuring two others and causing severe property damage. As a result of the accident, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) commenced an investigation and closed the site, halting construction in the area of one of the generators until March 7, 2000, and denying access to a second area until March 2, 2000, when OSHA approved the defendants' demolition and removal plan. By letter dated March 21, 2000, pursuant to § 9.5 of the contract,² the defendants provided the plaintiff with notice³ that the incident and investigation constituted force majeure events, as defined by § 13.1 of the contract.⁴ The notice did not include a claim under § 9.5 of the contract seeking changes in the time needed to complete the project or in the amount of compensation to be paid to the defendants. The plaintiffs rejected the notice, asserting that it was untimely and that neither the incident, nor the subsequent investigation, constituted a force majeure event under the contract. Thereafter, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-29 and Practice Book § 17-55,⁵ the plaintiff commenced this declaratory judgment action, seeking, inter alia, a judicial declaration that the notice letter had been untimely and a determination that the incident and subsequent investigation had not constituted a force majeure. The plaintiff claimed that a judicial declaration was necessary in order to allow the parties to "ascertain their rights and duties under the Contract with respect to confirming the Contract Price and Substantial Completion Date."⁶

The defendants moved to dismiss the action claiming that, because the notice of the force majeure event did not include a claim for additional time or money to construct the project, there was no justiciable controversy between the parties. They argued that the action was premature because it depended on a number of events that had not yet transpired, and that accordingly, no practical relief could be afforded. The plaintiff opposed the motion contending that it was entitled to a declaratory judgment to prevent the defendants in the future from "upset[ting] the parties' contractual liquidated damages regime. . . ." Essentially, the plaintiff contended that the action was ripe because it anticipated that the defendants would claim entitlement to an equitable extension of time and, therefore, would object to the plaintiff's assessment of liquidated damages.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the action was justiciable. Specifically, the court concluded that, because the notice letter could lead to a future dispute between the parties regarding the plaintiff's entitlement to liquidated damages for delays arising out of the incident and subsequent investigation, the action was ripe for adjudication.

Thereafter, the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on its claim that the notice was untimely under § 9.5 of the contract. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that, because timely notice was a strict condition precedent to the defendants' right subsequently to assert a claim for additional compensation for the project or time to complete the project, their untimely notice precluded any such future claim. The defendants opposed the motion on the grounds that: (1) timely notice was not a strict condition precedent to any such future claim and that the issue of prejudice resulting from its noncompliance with the notice provision presented an issue of material fact; (2) even if compliance had been a condition precedent to the right to submit a claim for additional time or money, the existence of the issue of whether the doctrine against inequitable forfeiture applied in this case; see Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Murphy, 206 Conn. 409, 412-15, 538 A.2d 219 (1988); precluded the entry of summary judgment.

The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion and entered partial summary judgment against the defendants, concluding that compliance with the notice provision was a condition precedent to the defendants' right to later assert a claim for additional time or money due to the adverse impact of the incident and resulting investigation, and that the doctrine against equitable forfeiture did not pertain under the facts of this case. Thereafter, litigation continued with respect to a second count of the complaint; see footnote 6 of this opinion; which is not the subject of this appeal, until May 17, 2002, when the parties stipulated to the entry of a final judgment for the plaintiff with respect to the first count and to the dismissal without prejudice of the second count. This appeal followed.

The defendants claim that the trial court improperly determined that: (1) there was a justiciable controversy; (2) compliance with the notice provision was a condition precedent; and (3) the doctrine of inequitable forfeiture did not apply. We agree with the first claim and, accordingly, do not address the remaining claims. See Crone v. Gill, 250 Conn. 476, 479 n.5, 736 A.2d 131 (1999).

We begin by setting forth the fundamental principles that guide our resolution of this appeal. Justiciability and ripeness have been referred to by our Appellate Court as related doctrines. See American Premier Underwriters, Inc. v. National R. Passenger Corp., 47 Conn. App. 384, 390 n.12, 704 A.2d 243 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 901, 710 A.2d 174 (1998); Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 46 Conn. App. 514, 517-18, 699 A.2d 310 (1997), rev'd on other grounds, 247 Conn. 196, 719 A.2d 465 (1998); Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O'Neill, 45 Conn. App. 554, 556-57, 696 A.2d 1282 (1997), rev'd on other grounds, 245 Conn. 88, 713 A.2d 1267 (1998); ASL Associates v. Zoning Commission, 18 Conn. App. 542, 548-49, 559 A.2d 236 (1989). Although this court has not defined expressly the precise relationship between ripeness and justiciability, it is well settled in the federal courts that ripeness is one of several justiciability doctrines, including standing and mootness. See United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 260 (3d Cir. 2001) ("all of the justiciability doctrines — standing, ripeness, and mootness — stem in part from a desire to allow the other branches of government to engage in their normal process of lawmaking before invoking the judicial power to stop such efforts in their tracks"); Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir. 2000) ("[t]hree strands of justiciability doctrine — standing, ripeness, and mootness — play an important role in the determination of whether the plaintiff-appellants' case against the [defendant] presents [a] ... case or controversy" under article three of the federal constitution [internal quotation marks omitted]); United Transportation Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2000) ("In an attempt to give meaning to [the] . . . `case or controversy requirement' [of article three of the federal constitution], the courts have developed a series of principles termed `justiciability doctrines.' One such doctrine ... is ripeness."); National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("courts have developed a series of principles termed `justiciability doctrines,' among which are standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine"); see also E. Chemerinsky, "A Unified Approach to Justiciability," 22 Conn. L. Rev. 677 (1990) (examining ripeness in context of federal courts and describing it as one of "several justiciability doctrines," including standing, mootness and political question, which must be met in order for federal court to hear case). For purposes of this appeal, it suffices to state that we agree with the Appellate Court that "ripeness is a sine qua non of justiciability. . . ." American Premier Underwriters, Inc. v. National R. Passenger Corp., supra, 390-91 n. 12.

An issue regarding justiciability, which must be resolved as a threshold matter because it implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction; Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O'Neill, supra, 245 Conn. 91; raises a question of law. "When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide...