Milhollin v. Fuller
| Decision Date | 02 April 1891 |
| Docket Number | 33 |
| Parties | MILHOLLIN v. FULLER |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
From the Delaware Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
G. H Koons, for appellant.
R. S Gregory and A. C. Silverburg, for appellee.
This action was commenced before a justice of the peace. The complaint is as follows:
In the justice's court there was a trial by jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of the appellee, who was the plaintiff below, and an appeal was taken to the circuit court. In that court the appellant, for the first time, called in question the sufficiency of the complaint, first by motion to dismiss, and then by demurrer. The ruling of the circuit court was against the appellant in both instances. Exceptions were reserved by him, but no bill of exceptions was filed saving the point on the motion to dismiss. There was another trial by jury in the circuit court, resulting in a second verdict for the appellee, this time for an increased amount. After the court had overruled a motion for a new trial the appellant moved in arrest of judgment, and this motion, too, was overruled by the court. Final judgment was then rendered upon the verdict, and an appeal taken to the Supreme Court.
We pass over the question whether the record properly presents the ruling of the court below on the appellant's motion to dismiss. Neither do we deem it necessary, in view of the conclusion which we have reached, to decide the point made by the appellee that the appellant went to trial before the justice of the peace on the merits of the case, without first raising his objection to the complaint, and that therefore the objection comes too late.
Had the action originated in the circuit court, we doubt very much whether the complaint would have been sufficient on demurrer. But in pleadings before justices of the peace great liberality is indulged, even where the sufficiency of the instrument is called in question by a demurrer, or other direct attack. There is no formality whatever required.
All that is necessary, by way of a complaint, in a case like this, is a statement of the cause of action, which contains sufficient substance to apprise the defendant of the nature of the demand, and is such that a judgment thereon may be used as a bar to another suit for the same claim. Anderson v. Lipe, 114 Ind. 464, 16 N.E. 833; Smith v. Heller, 119 Ind. 212, 21 N.E. 657.
We think, when tested by this rule, the complaint must be held sufficient, even on demurrer, or motion to dismiss.
The pleading, as suggested by counsel, is somewhat of a unique affair, and is, in many respects, vague and indefinite. But we do not think it is open to the objection that it fails to apprise the defendant of the nature of the demand against him, and that a judgment thereon could not be legally pleaded as a bar to another action. It sufficiently appears from it that the plaintiff claims he did one hundred and forty-four days' work for the defendant between the 4th day of January, 1888, and the time of filing the complaint with the justice. We think it may fairly be inferred from this averment that the work was done by the request and consent of the appellant, if such an averment is necessary.
The appellant insists that the complaint, in order to be sufficient, should state that the debt was due. The complaint does state that the work was done "by the day." As this phrase is commonly understood, it means from one day to another, without certainty of continuance. We think where work is done in that way the compensation becomes due as each day's work is finished, unless the parties provide otherwise by special agreement. Hence, if it were necessary to charge that the debt was due, we think this averment would be sufficient; but we do not decide that this is necessary.
In the case of Smith v. Heller, supra, the complaint averred, among other things, that the defendant "justly owes the plaintiffs the sum of sixty-three and twenty-one one hundredths dollars, and that the payment of the said sum has been unreasonably delayed, and that there is the further sum of eleven and twenty-six one hundredths dollars as interest on the same."
This complaint the defendant in that case attacked by way of a motion in arrest of judgment. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the complaint, said:
"It is doubtful...
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