Milhouse v. State
| Decision Date | 27 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2070,2070 |
| Parties | STEVEN MILHOUSE v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 116354015
UNREPORTED
Reed, Gould, Sharer, J., Frederick (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Sharer, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
Following separate trials, Steven Milhouse was convicted by juries in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted of a disqualifying crime, and of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.1 All of the offenses were charged in a single indictment.
Milhouse was tried three times under the same indictment charging the crimes noted, supra. The first trial ended in a mistrial declared during the State's case-in-chief because of the admission of inadmissible and prejudicial evidence. That evidentiary issue is not implicated in this appeal.
The second trial proceeded to deliberations, which lasted several days. Ultimately, the jury returned a partial verdict of guilty on the firearm possession count but was deadlocked on the remaining counts. The court declared a mistrial and ordered a new trial on the remaining counts—first-degree murder, conspiracy, and use of a handgun.
The third jury trial resulted in convictions on each of the remaining counts. In his timely appeal from that trial, Milhouse challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the earlier conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm, and the sufficiency of the evidence of his criminal agency for the murder and related offenses.2
Firearm possession
Milhouse first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying crime.
Initially, we consider the State's "Motion to Dismiss in Part," which asserts that Milhouse did not note a timely appeal following his conviction and sentencing on the firearm possession count, following the second trial.
The jury verdict following the second trial was returned on September 15, 2017, and Milhouse was sentenced on that count on October 17, 2017, to a term of five years. The third trial commenced on March 26, 2018, guilty verdicts were returned on March 29, 2018, and Milhouse was sentenced on those verdicts on July 30, 2018. He noted the instant appeal on August 3, 2018, challenging, as we have noted, the verdicts on all counts rendered in both the second and third trials.
In its Motion to Dismiss, the State asserts that Milhouse's appeal of the firearm possession conviction was not noted within the 30-day period provided by Md. Rule 8-202(a), which began to run on October 17, 2017, the date of his sentencing on that count.3 In support, the State cites Moore v. State, 198 Md. App. 655 (2011), for the rule that a final, appealable judgment is rendered in a criminal case when a "sentence is imposed on a verdict of guilty." 198 Md. App. at 706 (quoting Chmurny v. State, 392 Md. 159, 167 (2006)). The State further argues that it neither waived nor forfeited its right to challenge the timeliness of the appeal.
Anticipating the State's challenge to the timeliness of his appeal, Milhouse, in his opening brief, in a footnote, suggests that the verdict and sentencing on the possession count did not amount to a final judgment for the purpose of fixing the commencement of the 30-day appeal period. That is so, he argues, because the pendency of a trial on the counts not decided in the earlier trial precludes a finding of finality of the judgment on all counts of the single indictment. He concedes that Maryland courts "do not appear to have addressed the necessity of filing an interim notice of appeal on one of several related counts when a retrial is contemplated on remaining counts." He cites to State v. Gregg, 163 Md. 353, 354 (1932), which, in quoting State v. Floto, 81 Md. 600, 602 (1895), stated that "'[a]ppeals in criminal cases are upon the same footing as appeals in civil cases, and in neither case can an appeal be taken until after final judgment.'" Gregg, of course, predates the modern Rules of Procedure.
Pursuing that argument, first raised in a footnote of his opening brief, in his Reply Brief, appellant analogizes the present question with the provision of Maryland Rule 2-602(a), noting that it's "a civil rule of procedure, provid[ing] that a judgment is not 'final' if it 'adjudicates less than an entire claim.'" However, as the State points out, "[t]here is no analogous rule or statute governing partial verdicts in criminal cases." Nor, do we find, as Milhouse suggests we should, a parallel between the finality of judgments in criminal cases and the finality of judgments in civil cases.
Maryland Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP), § 12-301 provides that "a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a ... criminal case by a circuit court." The Code defines a "final judgment" as "a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other action by a court, ... from which an appeal, application for leave to appeal, or petition for certiorari may be taken." CJP § 12-101(f). As this Court has explained:
"[I]n a criminal case, a final judgment is not rendered until the court has entered a verdict and a sentence." Christian v. State, 309 Md. 114, 119 (1987). "In a criminal case, a final judgment consists of a verdict and either the pronouncement of sentence or the suspension of its imposition or execution." Lewis v. State, 289 Md. 1, 4 (1980). Buckner v. State, 11 Md. App. 55, 59 (1971)....
Johnson v. State, 142 Md. App. 172, 201-02 (2002). Accord, Campbell v. State, 373 Md. 637, 665 (2003) (). In the instant appeal, the jury's guilty verdict on the possession count was entered on September 15, 2017, and became a final judgment on October 17, 2017, when the court imposed a sentence. Despite having been advised of his appeal rights atsentencing, including the deadline for which to note an appeal, Milhouse failed to timely note an appeal to that final judgment pursuant to Rule 8-202(a).
In Rosales v. State, 463 Md. 552 (2019), the Court of Appeals recently clarified the legal bounds of Rule 8-202(a), providing that it "is a claim-processing rule, and not a jurisdictional limitation on [appellate courts]." 463 Md. at 568. The Court further observed that the 30-day time limit "remains a binding rule on appellants[ ]" and will continue to be enforced. Id. The Court further explained that "as the Rule is not jurisdictional, a reviewing court must examine whether waiver or forfeiture applies to a belated challenge to an untimely appeal." Id.
We hold that the appeal was untimely and that the State has not waived the untimeliness. Therefore, we shall grant the State's motion to dismiss in part. Thus, we need not consider the sufficiency of the evidence generated in the second trial on the possession count, except as it relates to the questions raised by Milhouse in his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in respect to the remaining charges. Milhouse stands convicted on the possession count.4Sufficiency of the Evidence - murder and related counts
We review Milhouse's sufficiency challenge by considering, "'after viewing [both direct and circumstantial evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom][,] in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [whether] any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Handy v. State, 201 Md. App. 521, 558 (2011) (emphasis in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Further, the Jackson Court stated that "[t]his familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." 443 U.S. at 319.
Although the circumstances of the shooting that resulted in the death of Jamie Christian are clear, the identities of the perpetrators are less so. Milhouse, in his opening brief, relates the evidence in summary form:
Although we have granted the State's Motion to Dismiss in Part as to the firearm possession, we shall discuss substantially the same evidence, as it was offered in both trials, that is relevant to Milhouse's alleged possession of the firearm because it is a significant link in the circumstantial chain that leads to the answer of the ultimate question: whether the evidence supports a finding of Milhouse's criminal agency in the fatal shooting of Christian.
Milhouse posits that "[i]n light of the State's failure to offer any testimony identifying [him]...
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