Milio v. Bar Ass'n of Baltimore City

Decision Date19 February 1962
Docket NumberNo. 162,162
Citation177 A.2d 871,227 Md. 527
PartiesLouis R. MILIO v. BAR ASSOCIATION OF BALTIMORE CITY.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Louis R. Milio, appellant, in pro. per.

Jack L. Hardwick and John H. Somerville, Baltimore, for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and HAMMOND, HORNEY, MARBURY and SYBERT, JJ.

BRUNE, Chief Judge.

On or about May 2, 1961, the appellee, The Bar Association of Baltimore City, acting under Code (1957), Art. 10, § 13, filed a disciplinary proceeding entitled 'Petition for Disbarment' against the appellant, Louis R. Milio, before the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City. Milio filed a response thereto on June 1, entitled 'Demurrer and Answer to Petition and Motion Ne Recipiatur to Said Petition and Affidavit Thereto.' Testimony was presented on June 23, arguments on the demurrer, on the motion nerecipiatur and on the merits were heard; and on June 28, 1961, the Supreme Bench entered two orders, the first overruling the demurrer and denying the motion, the second, setting forth that the court was of the opinion that Milio had been guilty of unprofessional conduct and suspending him from the practice of law for five years. Milio appeals from that part of the first order which denies his motion ne recipiatur. He states that he 'reserves the right to a further appeal upon the merits' in the event of an adverse ruling on his appeal from the denial of the motion. (No authority for the reservation of this alleged right to appeal after the expiration of thirty days allowed under Maryland Rule 812 for taking an appeal is cited or suggested.)

The charges against Milio are, in brief, (a) the mishanding of the funds of the estate of a decedent through commingling of funds and withdrawals therefrom and through improper accounting in the Orphans' Court, and (b) the misapplication of funds placed in his hands by other clients, in order to make good a deficiency in the funds of the estate. The petition shows that all funds had been restored and ultimately properly accounted for. The appellant's combined answer, demurrer and motion set up, in brief, (i) that the Orphans' Court had been fully informed of the estate matters and that since it had power under Code (1957), Art. 10, § 23, to initiate disciplinary proceedings, but had not deemed it appropriate to do so, the Bar Association had no power to do so, (ii) that no one had suffered any ultimate loss, and (iii) that the clients whose money had been misapplied were satisfied after the restoration of their funds. After the hearing, but not in his pleading, the appellant complained that records of his bank account had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and he seeks to raise that point on this appeal, in which he attacks only the disposition of his motion ne recipiatur. Since he has not appealed from the order of suspension and has directed that none of the testimony at the hearing be included in the record on this appeal, no question of the admissibility of evidence is before us on the basis of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, or any other basis. Cf. Shorey v. State, No. 138 this Term, Md., 177 A.2d 245, decided January 23, 1962.

The appellant complains that his motion was not ruled upon prior to the taking of the testimony. That, we think, was discretionary with the Supreme Bench, and we see no basis upon which to hold that there was any abuse of its discretion. On that score the appeal must be dismissed. See Lancaster v. Gardiner, 225 Md. 260, 170 A.2d 181, cert. den. 368 U.S. 836, 82 S.Ct. 63, 7 L.Ed.2d 37.

Of greater importance is the fact that the order appealed from is not a final order. The denial of the appellant's motion ne recipiatur did not have the effect of 'putting him out of court.' Contrast McCormick v. St. Francis De Sales Church, 219 Md. 422, 149 A.2d 768, where the granting of a motion to quash the summons did have the effect of depriving the plaintiff of the means of prosecuting his suit further against the moving parties, and the order was therefore held to be final and appealable. The motion ne recipiatur in the instant case seems to be essentially a demurrer insofar as jurisdiction to proceed...

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7 cases
  • Dackman v. Dackman
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 7 Febrero 1969
    ...nothing finally. An order which does none of these things is not appealable.' This holding was followed in Milio v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 227 Md. 527, 530, 177 A.2d 871, and see Middleman v. Md.-Nat. Capital Park & Planning Comm., 232 Md. 285, 289, 192 A.2d 782, and Lawrence v.......
  • Bailey v. Woel
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 1 Septiembre 1983
    ...Md. 368, 372-373, 206 A.2d 710 (1965); McCormick v. Church, 219 Md. 422, 426-427, 149 A.2d 768 (1959). Compare Milio v. Bar Association, 227 Md. 527, 529, 177 A.2d 871 (1962) (denial of motion ne recipiatur not having effect of putting party out of court is not final order).2 § 3-2A-02(a) o......
  • U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, 166
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 30 Junio 1977
    ...statutes similar to § 40(7) to require that the judgment from which the appeal is taken be final. See, e. g., Milio v. Bar Association, 227 Md. 527, 529-30, 177 A.2d 871 (1962) (appeal under Art. 10, § 17 required to be from a "final order"); Collins v. Cambridge Hospital, 158 Md. 112, 115-......
  • Merlands Club, Inc. v. Messall
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 14 Abril 1965
    ...may only be taken from a final judgment. See Middleman v. Md. Nat. Commission, 232 Md. 285, 192 A.2d 782 (1963); Milio v. Bar Association, 227 Md. 527, 177 A.2d 871 (1962); Eisel v. Howell, 220 Md. 584, 155 A.2d 509 (1959). See also State v. Harman, 199 Md. 209, 86 A.2d 397 (1952) and Bonne......
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