Millaga v. City of Sioux City
| Decision Date | 25 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. C02-4009-MWB.,C02-4009-MWB. |
| Citation | 258 F.Supp.2d 976 |
| Parties | Douglas MILLAGE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SIOUX CITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Dennis M. McElwain, Smith & McElwain, Sioux city, IA, for plaintiff.
James L. Abshier, City Atty., Connie E. Anstey, Assist. City Atty., City Attorney's Office, Sioux City, IA, for defendant.
I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................978
A Procedural Background...................................................978
B. Factual Background.....................................................979
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS..............................................................981
A. Standards For Summary Judgment...........................................981
B. Timeliness Of The Administrative Charge..................................982
1. Arguments of the parties.............................................982
2. Analysis.............................................................983
a. Limitations period for administrative charge....................984
b. Is there a "deferral-state agency"?.............................984
c. Was the charge "initially filed" with the deferral-state
agency?........................................................984
C. Disability Discrimination................................................986
1. Arguments of the parties..............................................986
2. Analysis..............................................................988
a. The "disability" at issue..........................................988
b. "Qualified to perform the essential functions of the position".....989
i. Blanket exclusion......................................990
ii. Individualized assessment.......................................992
iii. Inconsistent representations of disability......................994
III. CONCLUSION................................................................995
In this lawsuit, filed February 15, 2002, plaintiff Douglas Millage alleges that his former employer, the City of Sioux City, Iowa, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., when the City placed him on a leave of absence from his job as a bus driver on or about August 21, 2000, because he is an insulin-dependent diabetic. In Count I of his Complaint, Millage asserts a "perceived disability" discrimination claim, and in Count II, he asserts a "record of disability" discrimination claim. He prays for reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages, attorney fees and costs, and such other relief as the court deems proper.
The City filed its Answer on March 19, 2002, denying Millage's claims, and also asserting various affirmative defenses. More specifically, the City alleges as affirmative defenses that Millage's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; that Millage's administrative charge was untimely, thus barring his claims in this lawsuit; that Millage is not disabled or is not a qualified person with a disability within the meaning of the ADA; that Millage failed to meet the minimum qualifications for continued employment as a motor coach operator; that Millage posed a direct threat to the health and safety of others owing to his inability to meet the physical qualifications set forth in the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Standards; that Millage is not a qualified individual with a disability as a matter of law, because he has applied for and received long-term disability benefits conditioned on his total disability from performing any job; that Millage never sought reasonable accommodation from the City and rejected the City's offer regarding preference; and that the accommodation Millage now requests would improperly require the City to disregard job qualifications, which require motor coach operators to have a valid commercial driver's license (CDL) and to meet the physical qualifications set forth in the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.
By order dated July 23, 2002, this court set this matter for jury trial on June 16, 2003. Thereafter, this case proceeded without other incident requiring mention here until March 10, 2003, when the City filed the motion for summary judgment presently before the court. Millage resisted the motion for summary judgment on March 28, 2003, asserting that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment, and the City filed a reply on April 4, 2003. Neither party requested oral arguments on the motion for summary judgment in the manner set forth in N.D. IA. L.R. 56.1(f), and the court has concluded that no oral arguments are necessary. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is now fully submitted.
Whether or not a party is entitled to summary judgment ordinarily turns on whether or not there are genuine issues of material fact for trial. See, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the court will not attempt here a comprehensive review of the undisputed and disputed facts in the record. Rather, the court will present here only sufficient factual background to put in context the parties' arguments for and against summary judgment on Millage's claims. More attention will be given to specific factual disputes, where necessary, in the court's legal analysis.1
The parties agree that Millage was employed as a Motor Coach Operator, i.e., a bus driver, for the City from August 19, 1984, until his termination effective March 15, 2002. Millage has offered evidence that, of the approximately twenty-one city bus routes, the City of Sioux City has three bus routes that require the driver to take the bus out of the city limits, and two of those bus routes require the driver to cross state lines into North Sioux City, South Dakota, and South Sioux City, Nebraska, respectively. The City contends that all bus drivers must be able to drive all routes, but Millage contends that he has sufficient seniority to be assigned only to intra-city routes and to refuse even "emergency" assignment to an interstate route. This dispute apparently goes to whether or not the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Standards for interstate drivers, upon which the City relies, are applicable to Millage's bus driver position.
The parties do not dispute that, throughout his employment, Millage had a satisfactory safety record. Although Millage suffered a diabetic reaction on June 20, 2000, which involved his feeling "clammy, sweaty, and having the shakes," and had to be removed from his bus, it does not appear that even this incident involved any danger to passengers. Millage was off work for either one week or two immediately thereafter—the parties disagree about which—apparently on doctor's orders, so that he could attempt to get his diabetes under control.
Millage avers that he was diagnosed with diabetes in 1988, but that he was able to treat the condition with oral medications for several years thereafter. However, he admits that, at some time before the summer of 2000, his diabetes began to require treatment with injected insulin. He apparently did not inform the City of the change in his diabetes treatment regimen. Instead, during a routine bi-annual physical examination in August of 2000, which was required for all bus drivers, the City learned that Millage's diabetes required insulin treatment.
As a result of the City's discovery that Millage suffered from insulin-dependent diabetes, the City determined that Millage no longer met the minimum physical requirements of the Federal Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety for interstate drivers, set forth at 49 C.F.R. § 391.41, which, along with possession of a valid CDL, were requirements for a position as a Motor Coach Operator for the City of Sioux City under an agreement with the local transit workers' union. Consequently, the City placed Millage on a paid leave of absence on the ground that he did not meet the requirements for his position as a bus driver.
The City contends that Millage has been unable to control his diabetes and that he has neither a valid CDL nor the necessary medical certification to work as a City bus driver. The City contends that it held a disciplinary hearing on August 17, 2000, at which it gave Millage from August 17, 2000, through August 25, 2000, to produce a valid CDL and medical certification, but that he was unable to do so. The City asserts that it then gave Millage until March 2002 to produce such a medical certification, but he was still unable to do so. Therefore, the City states that it terminated Millage's employment on March 15, 2002. Millage, however, disputes whether his diabetes is under adequate control. He also disputes whether he is required to pass the minimum physical requirements of the Federal Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety to retain his job as a bus driver with the City, because he contends that a waiver of those requirements for interstate drivers is available under state law, where, for example, he could be assigned to drive strictly intra-city and intra-state bus routes. Finally, he disputes whether he has a valid medical certificate, because he has submitted what he asserts is a medical examiner's certificate dated August 24, 2002. See Plaintiffs Appendix at 5. However, the City argues that the certificate is incomplete, because it is not signed by the doctor who purportedly conducted the examination.
Although Millage does not contend that he is actually disabled within the meaning of the ADA, he applied for both long-term disability benefits under a benefits plan with the City and for disability benefits...
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