Millar v. Joint School Dist. No. 2, Village of Wild Rose
| Decision Date | 03 December 1957 |
| Citation | 2 Wis.2d 303,86 N.W.2d 455 |
| Parties | William D. MILLAR, Appellant, v. JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, VILLAGE OF WILD ROSE, etc., Respondent. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Edward J. Hart, Waupaca, for appellant.
Boyd A. Clark, Wautoma, for respondent.
On March 12, 1955, the plaintiff, William D. Millar, a qualified teacher of this state holding an unlimited life certificate, and the defendant's school board entered into a written contract whereby the plaintiff was employed to teach science and social studies in the public school at Wild Rose for a term of nine months commencing on or about September 6, 1955. The plaintiff had been a teacher in the Wild Rose public school system for a period of seven years previous to the term for which his services were engaged under the contract in question. He taught at the school until February 23, 1956, when he was dismissed by action of the school board. In part the contract provided:
'Employment: The teacher is employed subject to such rules and regulations as have been or may be hereafter adopted by the School Board, and subject to the supervision and control of the (Superintendent, Supervising Teachers, and Supervising Principal.)
'Termination: The disqualification of the teacher to continue teaching for any legal cause whatsoever shall automatically terminate the contract * * *.'
The controversy centers primarily upon issues of law arising from events occurring after the school board had requested the plaintiff to attend a special meeting of said board, and the failure of the plaintiff to appear at that meeting.
There is no conflict in the evidence as to material particulars. At the trial the plaintiff testified that on Friday, February 17 1956, he received a written notice from George Brownlow, clerk of the school board, without read as follows:
'Wild Rose Wis.
'Feb 16-56
'Mr. Millar:
'The School board will meet Tues Feb. 21 8:00 p. m. at the school house.
'I have been requested to notify you and request that you be present at this meeting.
'Sincerely
George B.'
On the morning of Saturday, February 18, 1956, the plaintiff went to the home of the school principal, William Harvey and asked Mr. Harvey what the meeting was about. Mr. Harvey said he did not definitely know what it was about, but that he imagined it concerned the discipline situation. The plaintiff stated that during the period in which he taught at the school, he had insisted that children who attended his classes were there to learn and to behave,--that they were to pay attention and have their assignments,--that those who did not behave properly were punished accordingly,--that on several occasions some parents considered his discipline too strict and complained to the board, whose members in turn talked to the plaintiff about it. The plaintiff testified further that after he had spoken to Mr. Harvey, he went to the home of the president of the school board, Everett Wilcox, and asked him what the meeting was about. Mr. Wilcox said that he did not know. The plaintiff requested Mr. Wilcox to change the date of the meeting to Monday night, February 20, as he had another engagement on the night of February 21. Mr. Wilcox said he would try to do so and that he would let the plaintiff know on the early evening of that day as to whether the board could meet that night. On the evening of February 20 Mr. Wilcox told the plaintiff that he could not arrange the meeting for that night and that the meeting would take place on February 22. However, Mr. Wilcox agreed that if the plaintiff could arrange to get the board members together later on the night of February 20, the meeting would then be held. While the plaintiff was attempting to contact the other members of the board, he met the clerk, Mr. Brownlow, outside the school house. The plaintiff asked Mr. Brownlow what the meeting was about. Mr. Brownlow told the plaintiff that the school board had previously decided not to rehire him for the following year, and that the meeting was for the purpose of giving the plaintiff an opportunity to resign,--more or less, as plaintiff believed, to save face professionally. When the plaintiff asked Mr. Brownlow whether the matter of discipline of the students was involved, Brownlow said that he was tried of having people call. The plaintiff told Mr. Brownlow that in his own heart and mind he was a good teacher,--that he had the welfare of the children in mind at all times,--that the State Department of Public Instruction had recognized him as a good teacher,--that he would not resign,--that he would not attend the meeting,--that Brownlow could go to hell.
On the same evening the plaintiff again met with Mr. Wilcox and told him that there was no need for a meeting,--that Brownlow had told him that the board would not offer him a contract for the following school year,--that he would not appear at the meeting on February 22.
On the morning of Tuesday, February 21, the plaintiff told the students of his first class that he had been informed that the board would not offer him a contract for the following year and that hence he would not be back at the school then. He also stated to the class that the board did not want his type of discipline in the school, and that in the future he would not punish them for infractions,--misconduct which theretofore he deemed important considerations in educational procedure, such as whispering and moving around without permission. The plaintiff testified that other teachers in the Wild Rose School commonly permitted whispering and similar relaxations of discipline. During the course of that day the plaintiff told his other classes that the board would not engage his services again, but he made no mention to them of relaxing his discipline. On Tuesday and Wednesday, (February 21 and 22) the plaintiff attended and taught all of his classes in the usual way. His students created no disturbances,--the classes all behaved well. There were no unusual absences. The principal, Mr. Harvey, did not contact the plaintiff on those days in regard to his teaching. Mr. Harvey never told the plaintiff that there was anything wrong with his teaching. On Tuesday and Wednesday the plaintiff received on orders from Mr. Harvey or the board requiring that he do anything different in regard to his teaching. Neither Mr. Brownlow nor Mr. Wilcox requested him to attend the meeting after he told them that he would not come, nor did anyone else do so. The plaintiff testified further that he felt that he had answered the board's request to resign in lieu of being refused a new contract and that there was no reason to attend the meeting.
The meeting was held on February 22. The plaintiff did not attend. The minutes of the meeting read:
'Special Meeting
'Meeting adjourned
'George Brownlow'
A communication addressed to the plaintiff and signed by the members of the board was mailed to the plaintiff and was received by him on the morning of February 23rd. It read:
'Wild Rose Public School
'Wild Rose, Wisconsin
'February 22, 1956
'Mr. William Millar
'Wild Rose Public School
'Wild Rose, Wisconsin
'Dear Mr. Millar:
'At a special meeting of the Wild Rose Board of Education, by a unanimous vote, for reason of insubordination, your contract is terminated with the Wild Rose Public School effective immediately.
'Signed:
'Signatures of members of the board)'
The plaintiff also testified that he had not been notified that the board was going to consider his immediate discharge at the February 22 meeting; that he was given no opportunity to appear before the board in regard to his discharge during the term; that no charges were made against him.
At the trial the parties stipulated that in the event it was to be found that the plaintiff had been illegally dismissed, he would be entitled to damages of $1,250, which amount represented the balance due under the contract.
Everett Wilcox, president of the school board, a witness for the defendant at the trial, did not dispute the testimony of the plaintiff in regard to the plaintiff's conversations with him before the meeting of February 22. He testified that at a regular board meeting held February 6, the board decided to ask the plaintiff to a meeting to inform him that his contract would not be renewed, and to give him a chance to resign; that on February 18 when the plaintiff called on him, the witness did not tell the plaintiff the purpose of the meeting of February 22; that in the conversation of February 18 when the matter of discipline was discussed, the plaintiff stated that he would never let the public or the school board put a ring in his nose; that after talking to Brownlow on February 20 the plaintiff told the witness that he had been 'fired' and said 'Everett, I will not take this laying down;' that the only purpose in calling the plaintiff to the meeting was to 'save his face' and permit him to get out of it gracefully without having the stigma of discharge by the board upon him; that the plaintiff had no obligation to attend the meeting for the purpose of being discharged or to file his resignation; that the witness was satisfied with plaintiff's teaching, but did not always agree with his discipline; that the plaintiff's immediate discharge was ordered because of his failure to attend the meeting and in view of the report from the principal as to the manner in which the plaintiff conducted himself at the school on the two days preceding the meeting; that...
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