Millard County v. Millard County Drainage Dist. No. 1

• Decision Date: 23 May 1935
• Docket Number: 5489
• Citation: 46 P.2d 423,86 Utah 475
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: MILLARD COUNTY et al. v. MILLARD COUNTY DRAINAGE DIST. NO. 1 et al

46 P.2d 423

86 Utah 475

MILLARD COUNTY et al. v. MILLARD COUNTY DRAINAGE DIST. NO. 1 et al

No. 5489

Supreme Court of Utah

May 23, 1935

Appeal from District Court, Fifth District, Millard County; LeRoy H Cox, Judge.

Action by Millard County and another against the Millard County Drainage District No. 1 and others. Judgment for plaintiffs and defendants appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, and reversed in part, with directions.

Soule &amp Spalding and S. R. Thurman, all of Salt Lake City, for appellants.

Grover A. Giles, A. C. Melville, and J. A. Melville, all of Salt Lake City, and O. A. Tangren, of Delta, for respondents.

WOLFE, Justice. ELIAS HANSEN, C. J., and FOLLAND, EPHRAIM HANSON, and MOFFAT, JJ., concur.

OPINION

WOLFE, Justice.

The plaintiff Parker Robison, one of the respondents here, brought this action to quiet title to 80 acres within the boundaries of Millard county drainage district No. 4, which district is a part of Millard county, Utah. He alleged that the general taxes for the year 1926 were not paid, and as a result an auditor's tax deed to the property was taken by Millard county and by the county conveyed to him. It appears that the land in question was sold to the county on the 10th day of January, 1927, and a certificate dated May 28, 1927, issued to the county followed on March 25, 1931, by auditor's deed to the county; that the property was offered by the county for sale in May, 1931, and not being sold at public auction, was thereafter, on September 1, 1931, sold to Parker Robinson and by quitclaim deed conveyed from the county. On October 1, 1931, this suit was filed by Parker Robinson in the lower court to quiet title as aforesaid. Milard county was joined as a plaintiff in said suit. There were also joined as defendants H. W. Stucki and I. E. Jeffery, the then acting board of supervisors of said district No. 4. There was in addition joined as a defendant the Utah Realty Corporation, which owned $ 39,500 of par value of bonds of the Millard county drainage district No. 4, due and unpaid. The owner of the land before auditor's deed, his wife, the Deseret Savings Bank, and a group of parties by the name of Church, were also joined as defendants under an allegation that they claimed some right, title, and interest in the property.

For reasons which will be apparent hereafter, we expressly separate and name in this second paragraph the following additional defendants who were joined, to wit: Millard county drainage district No. 1, Millard county drainage district No. 2, and Millard county drainage district No. 3, together with each set of three individuals respectively constituting the board of supervisors of said drainage districts, and the Millard Realty Corporation and the Delta Realty Corporation. Both of these latter corporations were owners of a large number of bonds of the Millard county drainage district No.2 and Millard county drainage district No.3, but held no bonds of Millard county drainage district No. 4. It will be noted, therefore, that on the one side Millard county is joined as a plaintiff and on the other side the parties named in this present paragraph as additional defendants, all of whom, as it will appear hereafter, had no direct interest in the land. The land to which it is sought to quiet title is in drainage district No. 4. Millard county parted with its interest by quitclaim deed as above stated. The theory upon which Millard county and the defendants named in the present paragraph of this opinion are joined is that they are proper parties against whom a declaratory judgment may be had under the provisions of chapter 24, Laws Utah 1925 (now with modifications, chapter 64, title 104, R. S. Utah 1933) dealing with declaratory judgments. More will be said about this later.

Parker Robinson was in no way connected with the title to the land in controversy until he made the purchase and received the quitclaim deed from Millard county on September 1, 1931. He claims ownership by virtue of this quitclaim deed, and sets up in his complaint a recital of all of the proceedings taken under the statutory provisions for the assessment, levy, collection, and sale of real estate, asserting that they were regularly and properly performed. The defendants who answered were drainage districts Nos. 1 and 4 and the supervisors of each, and the three realty corporations, the other defendants having defaulted.

The Millard county drainage district No. 4 on June 1, 1919, issued and sold bonds in the sum of $ 310,000 to raise funds with which to construct a drainage system. These bonds were issued under authority of title 26, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, (section 2040 et seq.), as amended by chapter 41, Laws Utah 1919, which amendatory chapter became effective March 19, 1919. Section 2058, Comp. Laws 1917, being part of title 26 of that compilation relating to drainage districts, was by chapter 47, Laws of Utah 1921, amended. The original section and amendment will be found set out in the writer's opinion in the case of Henry Hanson v. Oak Burris, et al., 86 Utah 424, 46 P.2d 400. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff Parker Robison quieting title against all of the defendants, and a general declaratory judgment purporting to adjudicate certain rights between Millard county, plaintiff, on the one hand and all the drainage districts and the supervisors thereof and the Millard and Delta Realty Corporations on the other hand.

The appealing defendants--the three realty corporations--contended in this court, as they had in the lower court, that the amendment of 1921 impaired the obligation of the bondholders' contract with the district, and therefore that the tax proceedings after 1921 founded on that amendment as to the bondholders were invalid; that as a consequence the quitclaim deed from the county to Parker Robison, founded on such alleged invalid tax proceedings, was also invalid. It was further contended by the appealing defendants that, even though the title of Parker Robison based on the quitclaim deed from the county was good, still the land covered by the quitclaim deed, of necessity physically remaining in the drainage district, was liable for its share of the annual assessment of principal and interest of the bonds still to be collected during the remaining life of the bonds up to the limit of the assessed benefits. These two question, that is, the question of impairment of the obligation of the contract and as to whether an auditor's deed extinguishes the right subsequently to levy for bond principal and interest have been decided in the case of Henry Hanson v. Oak Burris et al., 86 Utah 424, 46 P.2d 400. What is said there is controlling upon these two points raised in this case.

Other questions are raised in this appeal by the first five assignments of error. The appealing defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that there was a misjoinder of both parties plaintiff and parties defendant. Such demurrers on the part of the realty corporations were overruled, and such rulings are assigned as error in assignments Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The trial court also found in finding of fact No. 11 to the effect that each of the parties to said action was a proper party to be joined therein and in finding No. 12 that Millard county was properly joined as a plaintiff in the action.

The situation is anomalous. We have a suit to quiet title between Robison, as plaintiff, and certain defendants who were properly named because they were set out as claiming some interest in the land in regard to which Robison wanted his title quieted. We have, in addition, a parallel suit entirely independent of that suit. This independent and parallel suit is between Millard county as plaintiff and all of the defendants named in paragraph two above, together with district No. 4, which is required to be, under plaintiff's theory, a party to both actions. Moreover, in the second or parallel suit we have no subject, definite or particular, in respect to which litigation can pertain nor upon which a judgment can operate. In the suit between Robinson and the defendants alleged to claim an interest in the land described in the complaint, there is a tract of land which was the subject of the litigation and upon which a judgment may operate. In the other and parallel suit it is sought to make the solution of the law questions involved in the Robinson suit binding as to all lands in the four drainage districts similarly situated; that is, all lands which have been sold to the county by auditor's deed. It is sought to have the judgment in favor of Robinson, which relates to a specific and definitely described piece of land carry over and be binding as between the county and all the four drainage districts. So that not only have we two parallel and independent suits in the same action in which the only cohesive is the fact that there are law points in common which will be controlling in both cases, but we have one of the lawsuits without any definite...