Milledge v. Oaks

• Decision Date: 14 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 93A02-0104-EX-233., No. 93S02-0206-EX-346
• Citation: 784 N.E.2d 926
• Parties: Phyllis MILLEDGE, Employee-Appellant, v. THE OAKS, a Living Center, Employer-Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

784 N.E.2d 926

Phyllis MILLEDGE, Employee-Appellant, v. THE OAKS, a Living Center, Employer-Appellee.

Nos. 93S02-0206-EX-346, 93A02-0104-EX-233.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 14, 2003.

Ronald E. James, Benson, Pantello, Morris James & Logan, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Robert D. Woods, Hunt Suedhoff Kalamaros, LLP, South Bend, IN, Attorney for Appellee. RUCKER, Justice.

Case Summary

This case presents the question of when and to what extent an injury resulting from an unexplained accident occurring in the workplace is compensable under Indiana's Worker's Compensation Act. We conclude that an unexplained accident represents a "neutral risk" and that the "positional-risk" doctrine applies. Under which, an injury is compensable if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the condition or obligation of the employment put the employee in the position at the time of injury.

Facts and Procedural History

In 1983 Phyllis Milledge began working as a housekeeper at a nursing home known as "The Oaks, A Living Center." On October 21, 1994, she arrived at work shortly before 7 a.m. to begin her usual shift and parked her car in the nursing home parking lot. After closing the door upon exiting the car Milledge twisted her ankle. She proceeded to her job and completed the majority of her shift but the pain in her ankle prevented Milledge from finishing her duties. Leaving work early, Milledge went to the emergency room of a local hospital where x-rays revealed a sprained ankle. However, her ankle still bothered her a week after the injury. Among other things she suffered swelling in her right leg, and her right foot was severely discolored. In addition, a large blister had developed on her ankle, which her husband lanced on two occasions. Milledge returned to the hospital on November 6, 1994, where she was treated with antibiotics. On November 14, 1994, after surgical procedures failed to control the infection that had developed, Milledge's right leg was amputated below the knee. Subsequently, she was fitted with a prosthesis.

When The Oaks' worker's compensation insurance carrier denied her claim for benefits on March 3, 1995, Milledge filed an Application for Adjustment of Claim before the Worker's Compensation Board. On July 21, 1999, a hearing was conducted before a single-member hearing officer who denied the claim concluding in part:

The record shows [Milledge's] injury may have occurred in the course of her employment, but fails to show any causal connection between her ankle sprain and her work duties for [The Oaks]. Thus, [Milledge's] injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment with [The Oaks] for the purposes of the [Indiana Worker's Compensation] Act.

Appellant's App. at 9. In a vote of five to two, the Full Board adopted the single hearing officer's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. See Milledge v. The Oaks, 764 N.E.2d 230 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Having previously granted transfer, we now reverse the decision of the Worker's Compensation Board and remand this cause for further proceedings.

Discussion

The Worker's Compensation Act authorizes the payment of compensation to employees for "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." Ind.Code § 22-3-2-2(a). An injury "arises out of" employment when a causal nexus exists between the injury sustained and the duties or services performed by the injured employee. Outlaw v. Erbrich Prods. Co., Inc., 742 N.E.2d 526, 530 (Ind.Ct.App.2001); Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Roush, 706 N.E.2d 1110, 1113 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. An accident occurs "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while the employee is fulfilling the duties of employment or while engaged in doing something incidental thereto. Outlaw, 742 N.E.2d at 530; Tanglewood Trace v. Long, 715 N.E.2d 410, 413 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999), trans. denied. Both requirements must be met before compensation is awarded, and neither alone is sufficient. Conway v. Sch. City of East Chicago, 734 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. The person who seeks Worker's Compensation benefits bears the burden of proving both elements. Id.

There is no question that the injury Milledge sustained in this case occurred in the course of her employment. She sprained her ankle on the parking lot of her employer while arriving for work at her regularly scheduled time. See, e.g., Lawhead v. Brown, 653 N.E.2d 527, 529 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (employee entitled to compensation where injury occurred immediately after employee "clocked-out" but while present on employer-controlled parking lot); Ward v. Tillman, 179 Ind. App. 626, 386 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (1979) ("[L]iability of employers has been extended beyond the immediate job site.... Accidents resulting from the ingress-egress of employees to a plant within workmen's compensation coverage [are] an employment-related risk."). Rather, the question is whether Milledge's injury arose out of her employment. Highlighting the Board's finding that the parking lot was "clean, dry, level and clear of debris" the Court of Appeals concluded the injury Milledge sustained did not arise out of her employment. Milledge, 764 N.E.2d at 234. This was so because the facts of this case lacked the requisite causal connection between the injury and the employment. Id.

Commenting on the causal connection necessary to show that an accidental injury arises out of employment, this Court has said "[the] nexus is established when a reasonably prudent person considers the injury to be born out of a risk incidental to the employment, or when the facts indicate a connection between the injury and the circumstances under which the employment occurs." Wine-Settergren v. Lamey, 716 N.E.2d 381, 389 (Ind.1999); see also Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Machinery, Inc. v. Dacus, 505 N.E.2d 101, 102-03 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) ("[A] connection is established when the accident arises out of a risk which a reasonably prudent person might comprehend as incidental to the work. It is not necessary that the injury should have been expected or foreseen."), trans. denied. The "risk[s] incidental to employment" fall into three categories: (1) risks distinctly associated with employment, (2) risks personal to the claimant, and (3) risks of neither distinctly employment nor distinctly personal in character. Roush, 706 N.E.2d at 1114; see also 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law 4-1 (2002). Risks that fall within categories numbered one and three are generally covered under the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act. However risks personal to the claimant, those "caused by a pre-existing illness or condition unrelated to employment," are not compensable. Kovatch v. A.M. Gen., 679 N.E.2d 940, 943 (Ind.Ct.App.1997),trans. denied.

Risks in category number one are those we intuitively think of as work connected. As Professor Larson explains, this category includes: "[a]ll the things that can go wrong around a modern factory, mill, mine, transportation system, or construction project ... and constitute the bulk of what not only the public but perhaps also the original drafters of compensation acts had in mind as their proper concern." Larson, supra, § 4.01, at 4-1—4-2. See, e.g., Control Techniques, Inc. v. Johnson, 762 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Ind.2002) (electrician severely burned while measuring the voltage in a circuit breaker at a factory); Mid-West Box Co. v. Hazzard, 195 Ind. 608, 146 N.E. 420, 420-21 (1925) (employee's finger severed while operating machinery); Turner v. Richmond Power & Light Co., 756 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind.Ct. App.2001) (employee electrocuted when excavating a sewer line after co-worker hit a buried power line), trans. denied. The underlying theme uniting these cases is that the injury sustained by the claimant was the result of conditions inherent in the work environment. In this case there was nothing inherent in The Oaks' parking lot that either caused or contributed to Milledge's injury. As such her injury was not born out of a risk categorized as distinctly associated with employment.

As for category number two, the record does not show that Milledge's injury to her ankle was the result of a pre-existing illness or condition. To the contrary, although the Board made no finding on this point, uncontroverted evidence of record reveals that prior to the accident of October 21, 1994, Milledge experienced no problems with her right leg in general or to her ankle in particular. R. at 21, 32-33. The record also shows, that although Milledge suffered from diabetes for thirty years, at the time of the accident she was taking medication for her diabetes and she reported having no trouble with the illness; additionally, she noted that diabetes had never prevented her from fulfilling her job responsibilities. R. at 13, 24. In this case Milledge simply has no explanation of what caused her to twist her ankle; nor does the record give any indication of causation. The facts here are thus analogous to those cases involving injuries suffered by an employee as the result of an "unexplained" fall. As the Court of Appeals has observed:

Workplace falls can result from either an employment, personal or neutral risk, or from a combination thereof. Some falls clearly result from risks personal to the employee; that is, they are caused by a pre-existing illness or condition, unrelated to employment. As a general matter, these "idiopathic" falls are not compensable. In contrast, some falls are "unexplained" in that there is no indication of causation. Most jurisdictions compensate such falls, classifying them as neutral risks.

Kovatch, 679 N.E.2d at 943 (citations omitted).¹ Courts have taken three approaches in addressing the "arising out of" element in unexplained fall cases. One approach requires the worker to...