Miller Transfer & Rigging Co. v. Alcoa Corp., 2:20cv41

• Decision Date: 08 May 2020
• Docket Number: 2:20cv41
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
• Parties: MILLER TRANSFER & RIGGING CO., Plaintiff, v. ALCOA CORPORATION doing business as ALCOA INC. Defendant.

MILLER TRANSFER & RIGGING CO., Plaintiff, v. ALCOA CORPORATION doing business as ALCOA INC. Defendant.

2:20cv41

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

May 8, 2020

Electronic Filing

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Miller Transfer & Rigging, Co. ("Miller" or "Plaintiff") initiated this action by filing a three (3) Count Complaint against Defendant, Alcoa Corporation d/b/a Alcoa Inc. ("Alcoa" or "Defendant") alleging : (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Unjust Enrichment; and (3) Action on Account Stated. Alcoa has filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative Motion for More Definite Statement, Miller has responded, and the matter is now before the Court.

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Miller is a specialty transportation carrier that services the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Complaint ("Compl.") ¶ 5. From October 2017 through July 2018, Alcoa, a global supplier of aluminum, entered into numerous written contracts (the "Contracts") under which Miller transported Alcoa's goods from Newburgh, Indiana to three separate locations in Mexico in exchange for the payment of freight charges. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 7 & 8. The Contracts were memorialized through the issuance of bills of lading (the "BOLs") for each of the Contracts. Compl. ¶ 9.

Miller alleges that it properly transported the shipments in accordance with the terms of the parties' contracts, and Alcoa fully paid the freight charges that Miller incurred with respect to 468 of 515 shipments. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 14-15. Miller alleges that Alcoa failed to pay the freight charges for the 47 other shipments and seeks damages in the amount of $189,750.30. Compl. ¶¶ 16-17.

III, LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). Although the plausibility standard "does not impose a probability requirement," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, it does require a pleading to show "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A complaint that pleads facts "merely consistent with a defendant's liability ... stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Theplausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Further, although the focus in assessing a motion to dismiss is on the allegations set forth in the pleadings, "matters of public record, orders [and] exhibits attached to the complaint" also may be considered. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1357).

Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it must "tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. Second, it should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. See also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) ("Mere restatements of the elements of a claim are not entitled to the assumption of truth." (citation and editorial marks omitted)). Finally, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

IV. DISCUSSION

As set forth above, Miller asserts three (3) state law claims for unpaid transportation services it provided to Alcoa, including, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and a book account claim. In its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, Alcoa contends that Miller's claims for unpaid freight charges are time-barred by the 18-month statute of limitations set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 14705. Miller maintains that § 14705 is inapplicable because the shipments terminated in Mexico and therefore, fall outside thejurisdiction of the statute at issue. Miller fails, however, to assert an applicable statute of limitations in § 14705's stead.

Notwithstanding Miller's failure to assert which state statute of limitations is appropriate in this instance, for the 18-month statute of limitations set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 14705 to apply, this Court must find that the appropriate state statute is preempted by the federal statute. It has "long been settled" that a preemption analysis begins with the presumption that federal statutes do not preempt state law. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (2014); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009). The presumption against preemption comes from two concepts "central to the constitutional design," the Supremacy Clause and federalism. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398-399 (2012). Although the Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law, federalism requires that preemption not be found easily. Id. A cornerstone of preemption jurisprudence is that "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case." Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). Moreover, "[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has 'legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,' . . . we 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S., at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).

Initially, the Court must determine Congress' purpose by "examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects." Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). Interstate transportation used to be "among the most pervasive and comprehensive of federal regulatory schemes." Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317-318 (1981). Congress first regulated the transportation ofgoods and people among the states under the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA"). See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 478 n.3 (2002) ("The first noteworthy federal rate-regulation statute was the [ICA] . . . which was principally concerned with railroad rates but generally governed all interstate rates."). The ICA required motor carriers to file a tariff with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and charge all shippers the tariffed rate. See Gaines Motor Lines, Inc. v. Klaussner Furniture Indus., 734 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2013).

In 1995, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act ("ICCTA") which amended the ICA and significantly reduced federal regulation of interstate commerce.¹ 49 U.S.C. Ch. 137. See Munitions Carriers Conference, Inc. v. U.S., 147 F.3d 1027, 1032, 331 U.S. App. D.C. 213 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The ICCTA largely rolled back this pervasive scheme of federal regulation and voided nearly all of the tariffs required by the ICA, instead allowing private contracts with shippers. Id. at 1029-1030; see Gaines Motor Lines, Inc. v. Klaussner Furniture Indus., 734 F.3d at 302-303 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 14101(b)). Despite the many changes implemented by the ICCTA, Congress retained the ICA's statute of limitations governing claims brought by carriers against shippers. See 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a).

The federal statute of limitations at issue here, § 14705(a), states: "A carrier providing transportation or service subject to [federal] jurisdiction . . . must begin a civil action to recover charges for transportation or service provided by the carrier within 18 months after the claim accrues." 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a). Miller argues that, because the shipment terminated in Mexico, it does not fall under the jurisdiction of the ICCTA. This Court finds such argument to be without merit. Section 13501 of the ICCTA provides in relevant part: "[t]he Secretary and theBoard have jurisdiction . . . over transportation by motor carrier and the procurement of that transportation, to the extent that passengers, property, or both, are transported by motor carrier— (1) between a place in— (A) a State and a place in another State; . . . or (E) the United States and a place in a foreign country to the extent the transportation is in the United States." 49 U.S.C. § 13501(emphasis added). The statute is quite clear, Miller transported the goods between a place in "the United States," that being Newburgh, Indiana, and three separate locations in Mexico, "a place in...