Miller v. Ammon

• Decision Date: 16 May 1892
• Citation: 36 L.ed. 759,12 S.Ct. 884,145 U.S. 421
• Parties: MILLER v. AMMON
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

145 U.S. 421

12 S.Ct. 884

36 L.Ed. 759

MILLER v. AMMON.

May 16, 1892.

Action on an account by Ernst Ammon against Aut Miller. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Reversed.

STATEMENT BY MR. JUSTICE BREWER.

On March 16, 1887, the plaintiff in error, defendant below, then a citizen and resident of Wisconsin, purchased of the plaintiff, in Chicago, 1,125 gallons of sherry wine and 1,100 gallons of port wine, at an agreed price of $5,287. The purchase was on 90 days' credit, and the wine was delivered to defendant in that city. Thereafter, the defendant having failed to pay for these goods, plaintiff commenced this action in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Iowa to recover the purchase price. The defendant pleaded as a defense that by chapter 24 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois it was provided that 'the city council in cities * * * shall have the following powers:

* * * To license, regulate, and prohibit the selling or giving away of any intoxicating, malt, vinous, mixed, or fermented liquor the license not to extend beyond the municipal year in which it shall be granted, and to determine the amount to be paid for such license;' that this statute was in force at the time of the alleged purchase; that Chicago was a city of that state; that the city council of that city had passed the following ordinance:

'An ordinance concerning the licensing of wholesale liquor dealers.

'Section 1. No person, firm, or corporation shall sell or offer forsale any spirituous or vinous liquors in quantities of one gallon or more at a time, within the city of Chicago, without having first obtained a license therefor from the city of Chicago, under a penalty of not less than $50 or more than $200 for each offense. But no distiller who has taken out a license as such, and who sells only distilled spirits of his own production at the place of manufacture, shall be required to pay the license herein prescribed on account of said sale.

'Sec. 2. All such licenses shall be issued in accordance with the general ordinances of the city governing licenses, and for every such license there shall be charged at the rate of $250 per annum.'

That plaintiff was then a wholesale liquor dealer in the city of Chicago; that he was not a distiller and had not a distiller's license; that the wine mentioned in the petition was vinous and intoxicating liquor, within the meaning of said ordinance; and that the sale of the wine mentioned was in violation of said law and ordinance. A demurrer to this answer was filed, and, after argument, was sustained; and, the defendant electing to stand by his answer, judgment was rendered against him for the amount claimed in the petition. To reverse such judgment the defendant sued out this writ of error.

C. C. Cole, for plaintiff in error.

Louis J. Blum and Edgar C. Blum, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

Two questions are presented First, is the ordinance valid second, if so, can the plaintiff recover for liquor sold in violation of its terms?

The first question must be answered in the affirmative. The precise question, on the very ordinance, was presented to the supreme court of Illinois, and determined by it in the case of Dennehy v. Chicago, 120 Ill. 627, 12 N. E. Rep. 227. Counsel for defendant in error strenuously insist that that decision is not controlling on this court in this case, because it was not announced until May, 1887, and after this purchase had taken place. They say that this is a controversy between citizens of different states, in which the parties have a right to the independent judgment of the federal tribunals; that, prior to such decision, there had been no determination by the courts of Illinois of the validity of the ordinance, and that the decision in the Dennehy Case was in disregard of the general course of the legislation of the state of Illinois in respect to the liquor traffic, and of the spirit of at least two decisions of that court, (Strauss v. Town of Pontiac, 40 Ill. 302, and Wright v. People, 101 Ill. 133.) They refer us to the cases of Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556, 4 Sup Ct. Rep. 539; Gibson v. Lyon, 115 U. S. 439, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 129; and Anderson v. Santa Anna Tp., 116 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413,—as instances in which this court did not consider itself concluded by the decision of the state court.

While not disposed to limit or qualify in any respect what has been said so frequently as to the right and duty of independent judgment, we think that this is a case in which the decision of the supreme court of Illinois should control. The question is one of a particularly local character, affecting solely the internal police of the state, in respect to which we have no reviewing power, and in which is involved no matter of a federal character, or of general commercial law. The question as to what licenses shall or shall not be required of those who engage in the liquor traffic is a matter properly submitted to the states for determination. There is no natural or federal right claimed to have been trespassed upon by this ordinance, and the regulations as established and upheld by the state legislature and state tribunals should not be disregarded in the federal courts. The decision in the Dennehy Case determines for the people of the state of Illinois that at the time of the transaction in controversy there was this valid ordinance in the city of Chicago requiring a license. Why should not such decision conclude this plaintiff, as all other citizens of the state, in all their dealings within the state? It will be noticed that this is not a case in which a citizen of another state calls upon the federal courts to ignore the judgment of the state court, because of some supposed infringement by it upon his rights. It is a citizen of Chicago and Illinois who is asking us to disregard the decision of the highest court of his own state. If it be said that there is not simply a question of municipal or police regulation, but also one of contract rights, the reply is that no question of contract rights can arise till after that of the validity of the ordinance is determined; and also that the party who now seeks to raise the question is one who,...