Miller v. Blue Ridge Transp. Co, No. 9157.

CourtSupreme Court of West Virginia
Writing for the CourtRILEY
Citation15 S.E.2d 400
PartiesMILLER. v. BLUE RIDGE TRANSP. CO. et al.
Decision Date10 June 1941
Docket NumberNo. 9157.

15 S.E.2d 400

MILLER.
v.
BLUE RIDGE TRANSP. CO. et al.

No. 9157.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

June 10, 1941.


[15 S.E.2d 401]
Syllabus by the Court.

1. The cases of Marshall v. Conrad, 118 W.Va. 321, 191 S.E. 553, and Acree v. Eureka Pipe Line Co., 122 W.Va. 242, 8 S.E.2d 186, distinguished.

2. "Where the evidence on a controlling point in a case is so conflicting that this court would not be justified in saying that the verdict is so plainly against the decided weight and preponderance of conflicting evidence as to make the rendition of the verdict palpably unjust, the verdict will not be set aside as being contrary to the law and the evidence." Pt. 3, Syl., Denoff v. Fama, 102 W.Va. 494, 135 S.E. 578.

3. In an action at law a trial court should not entertain a motion to poll the jury regarding the method used in arriving at the amount of its verdict. The only proper inquiry is whether the verdict is that of each juror.

4. In an action for personal injuries resulting in a miscarriage or an abortion, unaccompanied by permanent injuries, a verdict of $7,725 is excessive.

Error to Circuit Court, Marion County.

Action by Violet Miller against the Blue Ridge Transportation Company and others, comprising, and doing business under the trade-name of "Blue Ridge Lines", to recover damages for alleged personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff while a passenger on a motorbus operated for hire by defendants. To review a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendants bring error.

Verdict set aside, judgment reversed, and new trial awarded.

Terence D. Stewart and Ezra E. Ham-stead, both of Morgantown, for plaintiff in error.

Alfred R. Putnam and L. T. Eddy, both of Fairmont, for defendant in error.

RILEY, Judge.

The plaintiff, Violet Miller, instituted this action in the Circuit Court of Marion County against the Blue Ridge Transportation Company, a corporation, White Star Lines, Inc., and Penn Bus Company, a corporation, comprising, and doing business under the trade name of, "Blue Ridge Lines", to recover damages for alleged personal injuries sustained while a passenger on a motor bus operated for hire by defendants between Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Fairmont, West Virginia. To a judgment in the amount of $7,725, entered on a jury verdict in plaintiff's favor, defendants prosecute this writ of error.

The declaration alleges, in substance, that the defendant corporations comprise, and do business under the trade name of, "Blue Ridge Lines"; that on February 25, 1940, and for a long time prior thereto, defendants were the owners and operators of certain motor busses for hire from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, through Morgantown to Fairmont, West Virginia; that on said day, plaintiff became a passenger for hire on one of defendants' busses for the purpose of being carried from Pittsburgh to Fairmont; that the defendants negligently and carelessly operated the bus, in which plaintiff was riding, at an excessive rate of speed, to-wit, at fifty miles per hour, over an uneven, rough and bumpy portion of, or break in, the highway, thereby causing said bus to lurch and jump in such a violent manner that plaintiff "was thrown from her seat and against the seats in front of her and against the sides of said bus, " and that as a result of said negligent operation of the bus plaintiff was painfully and permanently injured, prevented from performing her usual occupation as a housekeeper for about six weeks, and caused to suffer an abortion or miscarriage and expend sums of money in an endeavor to regain her health.

On the morning of the day of the alleged injury, plaintiff and a companion, a Mrs. Coleman, purchased round-trip tickets to Pittsburgh. These tickets, according to the legend thereon, were issued by "Blue Ridge Lines comprising" the several corporate defendants. The bus, which they entered at Fairmont at 9:10 a. m., had painted on its sides "Blue Ridge Lines", and in smaller letters "White Star Lines". At 7:30 p. m., after a day in Pittsburgh, plaintiff and her

[15 S.E.2d 402]

companion boarded the same type of bus, returning, however, by a different route, through Uniontown, Pennsylvania, to Mor-gantown, and thence south through Rives-ville to Fairmont. At Uniontown, one W. D. Ridgeley, known to Mrs. Coleman but not to plaintiff, got on the bus as a passenger.

To the south of Rivesville, according to plaintiff's evidence, there is a "bump" or sharp break, a "drop off of the concrete" extending across the highway and dipping toward Fairmont, due to an old slide. It is at this point that plaintiff claims to have received the injury upon which the instant action is based.

Plaintiff's witnesses testified that the bus was running at a speed of forty-five to fifty miles per hour at the time it struck the broken portion of the road; that the approach to this place was over smooth concrete for more than a half mile; that it was late at night and there was nothing to call the attention of the passengers to any impending peril or danger; and that as the bus went over the "bump" or break it was caused to lurch to the left and then to the right, throwing plaintiff with force against the back of the seat in front of her and then sideways. Plaintiff was sitting to the right of the center of the rear seat, which extended across the entire width of the bus. Mrs. Coleman was seated next to her, and Ridgeley occupied the seat to the left of the aisle and directly in front of the rear seat. Plaintiff testified that she immediately experienced a "catch", in the lower part of her back and leg, and the next day pain in her stomach. Both Mrs. Coleman and Ridgeley testified plaintiff held herself across the abdomen and back, and complained. When the bus arrived at Fairmont, Mrs. Coleman protested to the driver against the way he operated the bus. She testified further that plaintiff stumbled and appeared to be "in a faint" after alighting from the bus, and the driver inquired if plaintiff desired the services of a physician. Plaintiff then accompanied Mrs. Coleman to the latter's home, a short distance away, and shortly thereafter, took a taxicab home, where, her husband says, he assisted her into the house.

Mrs. Coleman visited plaintiff on the afternoon following the Pittsburgh trip, and remained with her that night and every night thereafter for about a month. On the day of her first visit, Mrs. Coleman accompanied plaintiff to the office of Dr. Paul Yost who had been plaintiff's physician from about 1935 until 1938, and during that period had treated her for female disorders. Dr. Yost testified that plaintiff complained of her back and stated she thought she had had a miscarriage; that he made only a cursory examination. This doctor stated that, because of the condition for which he had formerly treated plaintiff, she was unable to have a child.

Dr. Keister of Fairmont testified that on February 27, 1940, he was called to plaintiff's home, where he found plaintiff in bed, having uterus bleeding and paroxysmal cramps. From his examination on that occasion and the history which he obtained from plaintiff he was of opinion that plaintiff was threatened with an abortion, which he described as an interruption of pregancy at any time from conception to the end of three months. He further testified that he made no examination of plaintiff on the occasion of his first visit because of the danger of infection; that the next morning he received a telephone call to the effect that plaintiff was unable to come to his office, as he had requested; and that he then visited plaintiff at her home, made a vaginal examination, noticed bleeding, softness of the cervix, which he said was indicative of pregnancy. Thereafter, he treated her every few days until some time after March 20, 1940; that on March 21, 1940, he was again called to plaintiff's home, made an examination, found the mouth of the womb open and bleeding, and noticed an unusual odor, which witness stated led him to believe that a dead foetus had been expelled. His opinion that plaintiff had lost a...

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14 practice notes
  • Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 10309
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • May 5, 1951
    ...should be, and the aggregate of said sums is then divided by twelve.' Miller v. Blue Ridge Transportation Co., 123 W.Va. 428, 437, 15 S.E.2d 400, 404. A verdict rendered by a jury in a civil action in accordance with a prior agreement by the jurors 'to accept one twelfth of the aggregate am......
  • State v. Scotchel, 14726
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • December 15, 1981
    ...noted that Johnson involved misconduct extrinsic to the jury's deliberative process. In Miller v. Blue Ridge Transp. Co., 123 W.Va. 428, 15 S.E.2d 400 (1941), the defendant sought to impeach the jury verdict on the ground that it was a "quotient verdict" but the trial court declined to perm......
  • Reece v. Hall, 10809
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • December 18, 1956
    ...S.E.2d 393; Browning v. Monongahela Transport Co., 126 W.Va. 195, 27 S.E.2d 481; Miller v. Blue Ridge Transportation Co., 123 W.Va. 428, 15 S.E.2d 400; Acres v. Eureka Pipe Line Co., 122 W.Va. 242, 246, 8 S.E.2d Another principle of law would deny plaintiff any recovery against the defendan......
  • Kimball v. Walden, 15403
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • March 14, 1983
    ...(1955). See also Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 135 W.Va. 594, 64 S.E.2d 606 (1951); Miller v. Blue Ridge Transportation Co., 123 W.Va. 428, 15 S.E.2d 400 (1941). The vice which renders a quotient verdict invalid is not the use of the arithmetic formula, but, rather, the advance agreement of t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
14 cases
  • Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 10309
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • May 5, 1951
    ...should be, and the aggregate of said sums is then divided by twelve.' Miller v. Blue Ridge Transportation Co., 123 W.Va. 428, 437, 15 S.E.2d 400, 404. A verdict rendered by a jury in a civil action in accordance with a prior agreement by the jurors 'to accept one twelfth of the aggregate am......
  • State v. Scotchel, 14726
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • December 15, 1981
    ...noted that Johnson involved misconduct extrinsic to the jury's deliberative process. In Miller v. Blue Ridge Transp. Co., 123 W.Va. 428, 15 S.E.2d 400 (1941), the defendant sought to impeach the jury verdict on the ground that it was a "quotient verdict" but the trial court declined to perm......
  • Reece v. Hall, 10809
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • December 18, 1956
    ...S.E.2d 393; Browning v. Monongahela Transport Co., 126 W.Va. 195, 27 S.E.2d 481; Miller v. Blue Ridge Transportation Co., 123 W.Va. 428, 15 S.E.2d 400; Acres v. Eureka Pipe Line Co., 122 W.Va. 242, 246, 8 S.E.2d Another principle of law would deny plaintiff any recovery against the defendan......
  • Kimball v. Walden, 15403
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • March 14, 1983
    ...(1955). See also Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 135 W.Va. 594, 64 S.E.2d 606 (1951); Miller v. Blue Ridge Transportation Co., 123 W.Va. 428, 15 S.E.2d 400 (1941). The vice which renders a quotient verdict invalid is not the use of the arithmetic formula, but, rather, the advance agreement of t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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