Miller v. Bridgeport Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 30 July 2013
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-01287 (VLB)
• Citation: Miller v. Bridgeport Bd. of Educ., CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-01287 (VLB) (D. Conn. Jul 30, 2013)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: JOSEPHINE MILLER, Plaintiff, v. BRIDGEPORT BOARD OF EDUCATION and MARK ANASTASI, Defendants.

JOSEPHINE MILLER, Plaintiff,

v.BRIDGEPORT BOARD OF EDUCATION and MARK ANASTASI, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-01287 (VLB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

Dated: July 30, 2013

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

[Dkt. #15]

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Josephine Miller ("Miller"), an African-American attorney licensed in Connecticut, brings this action for racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts under 42 U.S.C § 1981 against Defendants Bridgeport Board of Education (the "Board") and Mark Anastasi ("Anastasi"), the City Attorney for the City of Bridgeport, in his official and individual capacities. Defendants have moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

II. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff's action arises from her representation of Andrew Cimmino, an employee of the Board, in a civil action filed in 2006 in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, captioned Lyddy, et al. v. Andrew Cimmino, et al., No. 3:06cv01420(WWE). [Dkt. 1, Compl. ¶ 4]. Plaintiff alleges that Cimmino, a defendant in the Lyddy action, was entitled to a "defense and indemnity by the Bridgeport Board of Education" pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 7-101a. [Dkt. 1, Compl. ¶ 5]. From the outset of the litigation in 2006 through February 2010, Plaintiff alleges that Cimmino selected and was represented by an attorney whom the Board compensated for legal services provided pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-101a. [Dkt. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 6-7].

On February 12, 2010, Plaintiff entered an appearance in the above litigation at Cimmino's request and on his behalf "in lieu of the appearance of Cimmino's prior attorney," and performed legal services for Cimmino until at least August 31, 2012, the date of the complaint in the present action. [Id. at ¶¶ 8, 11]. Prior to her appearance on Cimmino's behalf, Plaintiff "inquired of Defendant Anastasi [the City Attorney for the city of Bridgeport] if there was any requirement she needed to fulfill in order to assume the defense of Cimmino." [Id. at ¶ 9]. Miller alleges that "[a]t no time did Anastasi inform Plaintiff of any reason why she was prohibited from assuming the defense of Cimmino, nor any other impediment to her providing legal services." [Id. at ¶ 10]. Miller does not allege that Anastasi acquiesced to her representation of Cimmino. In addition, she does not allege that she sent a letter of representation to Anastasi delineating the scope of the engagement and the basis for calculating or the amount of fees she would charge. Finally, she does not allege that she received a countersigned letter of representation from Anastasi.

On March 31, April 30, and May 31, 2010, Plaintiff submitted invoices to the Board for legal services performed representing Cimmino, but the Board "has failed and refused" to pay Plaintiff for the "valuable legal services performed." [Id. at ¶¶13-14]. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants "have paid Caucasian attorneys for the legal services performed by them, unlike [their] refusal to pay for such services performed by Plaintiff," thereby depriving her of "the same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens." [Id. at ¶¶ 15, 16].

Plaintiff has brought two counts alleging that the Defendants have racially discriminated against her in the making and enforcing of contracts in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981: the first against the Board and Anastasi in his official capacity, and the second against Anastasi in his individual capacity. Currently pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss both counts.

III. Standard of Review

"'To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Sarmiento v. U.S., 678 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and internal quotations omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement torelief.' " Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (internal citations omitted).

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court should follow a "two-pronged approach" to evaluate the sufficiency of the complaint. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). "A court 'can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.'" Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). "At the second step, a court should determine whether the 'well-pleaded factual allegations,' assumed to be true, 'plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations omitted).

In general, the Court's review on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "is limited to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint, the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated by reference." McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court may also consider "matters of which judicial notice may be taken" and "documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit." Brass v. Am.Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993); Patrowicz v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 140, 144 (D. Conn. 2005) (MRK).

IV. Discussion

Plaintiff alleges two counts of discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendants contend that Plaintiff's complaint must fail because she has failed to plead particularized facts sufficient to establish that the Defendants engaged in any discriminatory conduct or had an intent to discriminate against her on the basis of race, or that the alleged discrimination concerned the making or enforcing of a contract cognizable under § 1981. Plaintiff counters that Connecticut General Statute § 7-101a, which provides for a municipality's indemnification of the legal costs associated with certain actions brought against its officers or employees, forms the basis of a contract between her and the municipality and on which her § 1981 action is based, and that she has sufficiently pled discrimination in the making or enforcement of that contract.

42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides in relevant part that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every state and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). To successfully plead a § 1981 claim, a plaintiff must show: "(1) that she is a member of a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) that the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in § 1981." Broich v. Inc. Vill. of Southampton, 462 F. App'x 39, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 527 (2012) (quoting Lauturev. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 216 F.3d 258, 261 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Morris v. Yale Univ. Sch. of Med., 477 F. Supp. 2d 450, 458 (D. Conn. 2007) (same). Here, Plaintiff has established the first element of her § 1981 claim as it is not disputed that she is a member of a racial minority. As Plaintiff concedes that her § 1981 claim rests only on her allegedly impaired ability to make and enforce contracts (see Dkt. 16, p. 6), the Court now examines whether Plaintiff has met the second and third elements of her claim by successfully alleging intentional racial discrimination in the making or enforcement of a contract.

a. 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Intent to Discriminate

"Essential to an action under Section 1981 are allegations that the defendants' acts were purposefully discriminatory and racially motivated." Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 571 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Penn., 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) (section 1981 can be violated only by purposeful discrimination). "In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must specifically allege the events claimed to constitute intentional discrimination as well as circumstances giving rise to a plausible inference of racially discriminatory intent." Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 1994); Timmons v. City of Hartford, 283 F. Supp. 2d 712, 717 (D. Conn. 2003) (AWT) (quoting same); Evans-Gadsden v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman, LLP, 332 F. Supp. 2d 592, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (same). "[A] complaint consisting of nothing more than naked assertions, and setting forth no facts upon which a court could find a violation of the Civil Rights Acts, fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)." Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 713 (citing Martin v. N.Y. State Dep't of MentalHygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir. 1978)); Timmons, 283 F. Supp. at 717 (same); Evans-Gadsden, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 596. Further, to state a claim for individual liability under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege a...