Miller v. Campana
| Decision Date | 28 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:20-CV-00485,4:20-CV-00485 |
| Parties | JODY A. MILLER, Plaintiff, v. GABRIEL CAMPANA, DAMON HAGAN, FREDERICK L. MILLER IV, and WILLIAM E. NICHOLS, JR., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Brann)
On October 15, 2020, Plaintiff, Jody A. Miller filed a two-count First Amended Complaint against Defendants Gabriel Campana, Damon Hagan, Frederick L. Miller IV, William E. Nichols, Jr. Bringing his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have retaliated against him, in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. This Court previously dismissed Plaintiff's initial complaint and granted leave to amend.1
On October 29 and 30, 2020, the various Defendants filed motions to dismiss. Defendants once again argue that Plaintiff's complaint violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8's requirements that a complaint contain a "short and plain statement" of the claim and be "simple, concise, and direct." Defendants further move, once more, to dismiss the complaint on its merits under FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
The motion is now ripe for disposition; for the reasons that follow, Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted. The action is dismissed, but this time, Plaintiff will not receive leave to amend.
A. The FAC does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court dismisses a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff has failed to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A motion to dismiss "tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading"2 and "streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding."3 "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositiveissue of law."4 This is true of any claim, "without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one."5
Following the Roberts Court's "civil procedure revival,"6 the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly7 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal8 tightened the standard that district courts must apply to 12(b)(6) motions.9 These cases "retired" the lenient "no-set-of-facts test" set forth in Conley v. Gibson and replaced it with a more exacting "plausibility" standard.10
Accordingly, after Twombly and Iqbal, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"11 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."12 "Although the plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has actedunlawfully."13 Moreover, "[a]sking for plausible grounds . . . calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [wrongdoing]."14
The plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."15 No matter the context, however, "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'"16
When disposing of a motion to dismiss, the Court "accept[s] as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw[s] all inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]."17 However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."18 "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."19
As a matter of procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that:
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.20
The facts alleged in the FAC, which I must accept as true for the purposes of this motion, are as follows.
Plaintiff is an officer with the Williamsport Bureau of Police ("WBP").21 He served in a number of positions throughout his tenure with the WBP.22 In late 2015, one of the Defendants, Gabriel Campana (the then-mayor of Williamsport) hired David Young as the new chief of the WBP.23 Chief Young began working in the WBP in April 2016.24
Plaintiff was tasked with administering the Mayor's and Chief's reform goals. His "job was . . . to broadly implement progressive management."25
Plaintiff was retained by Chief Young as the Captain of Patrol Operations.26 As "part of his duty as a police administrator[]," Plaintiff "identified numerousareas of significant concern regarding identified fraud, waste, abuse . . ."27 He frequently voiced his concerns "to a variety of City officials."28 Plaintiff was apparently "lauded" by Mayor Campana and the City Council members for his "effective, proactive efforts, and continued progress in the reform of the WBP."29
According to Plaintiff, however, not everyone was pleased with Chief Young's police administration; its attempts to "revamp the WBP" were met with some level of "animosity."30 Lawsuits, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaints, and other grievances ensued.31 These filings were intended to put public pressure on the Mayor.32
Plaintiff alleges that at some point, the police administration's relationship with Mayor Campana deteriorated.33 Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that Chief Young announced his resignation from the WBP, and that Mayor Campana issued a press release which "indicated that he was appointing [Plaintiff] as Chief of Police."34 Plaintiff claims that Mayor Campana eventually reneged on his offer to appoint Plaintiff, and instead appointed another individual to that post.35 Plaintiff alleges that he was subsequently subject to harassment, disparity of treatment, andretaliation.36 Plaintiff was assigned to a new position in March 2020, and asserts this assignment was a constructive demotion and marginalization.37
The claims in this action have changed slightly from the original complaint. Plaintiff asserts that he was retaliated against for engaging in free speech (Count 1) and for exercising his freedom of association (Count 2). Although "public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment"38 the United States Supreme Court has noted the need to strike a "careful balance 'between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern[,] and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.'"39
In order to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, "a public employee must show that (1) his [activity] is protected by the First Amendment and (2) the [activity] was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action, which, if both are proved, shifts the burden to the employer to prove that (3) the same action would have been taken even if the [activity] had notoccurred."40 "A public employee's statement is protected activity when (1) in making it, the employee spoke as a citizen, (2) the statement involved a matter of public concern, and (3) the government employer did not have an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public as a result of the statement he made."41 Accordingly, the first question for this Court is whether Plaintiff's statements were made in his role as an employee, or his role as a citizen. If Plaintiff spoke as an employee, his First Amendment claim must fail at step 1.42
Defendants suggest that Plaintiff's claim must fail because: (1) the speech at issue is not constitutionally protected; (2) there was no retaliatory conduct; and (3) there is no causal link between any alleged speech and retaliatory conduct. Therefore, I begin with the question of whether Plaintiff engaged in protected speech.
First, I consider whether Plaintiff spoke as a citizen or pursuant to his official duties. "When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employerdiscipline."43 Under Garcetti v. Ceballos, this Court must engage in a "practical" inquiry; this does not turn merely "on an employee's formal job description."44 As noted by my colleague, the Honorable Malachy E. Mannion of this Court, "[e]xpression does not have to fall within a public employee's job description or response to an employer's inquiry in order to constitute speech made pursuant to the speaker's official duties."45 Instead, the Court should consider factors such as "employee's duties, the impetus for his or her speech, the setting and subject matter of that speech, and the identities of the individuals to whom that speech is addressed."46 In determining if the alleged speech is protected, I may also consider "whether the speech was made inside or outside of the work place and whether it concerned the subject matter of the speaker's employment."47
Plaintiff's...
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