Miller v. Cantorna
Decision Date | 11 May 2016 |
Docket Number | Case No. 4:15-CV-1754 |
Parties | STACY PARKS MILLER, Plaintiff, v. BERNARD CANTORNA, et. al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Brann)
On August 25, 2015, the current District Attorney of Centre County, Stacy Parks Miller, hereinafter "Parks Miller," filed a thirteen count complaint against twelve defendants in the Court of Common Pleas of that county. It was removed to this Court two weeks later. In response to the motions to dismiss filed by all Defendants, Parks Miller filed an amended complaint.1 All of the various defendants next filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint. This Memorandum Opinion deals with the motion filed by Defendant Bernard Cantorna, hereinafter "Cantorna," an attorney practicing in Centre County.
The motion has been fully briefed, and I held oral argument on the motionson March 3, 2016. The matter is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, I will grant the motion in its entirety.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may file a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Such a motion "tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading" and "streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding."2 "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law."3 This is true of any claim, "Without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one."4
Beginning in 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States initiated what some scholars have termed the Roberts Court's "civil procedure revival" by significantly tightening the standard that district courts must apply to 12(b)(6) motions.5 In two landmark decisions, Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Roberts Court "changed . . . the pleading landscape" by "signal[ing] to lower-court judges that the stricter approach some had been takingwas appropriate under the Federal Rules."6 More specifically, the Court in these two decisions "retired" the lenient "no-set-of-facts test" set forth in Conley v. Gibson and replaced it with a more exacting "plausibility" standard.7
Accordingly, after Twombly and Iqbal, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"8 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."9 "Although the plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."10 Moreover, "[a]sking for plausible grounds . . . calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [wrongdoing]."11
The plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."12 No matter the context, however, "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistentwith' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'"13
When disposing of a motion to dismiss, a court must "accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]."14 However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."15 "After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or 'bare-bones' allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss."16 "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."17
As a matter of procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that:
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.18
The procedural dictate when faced with a motion to dismiss is that the court is to accept the facts alleged as true. "Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations."19 However, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."20 That said, the following is a recitation of the allegations according to Parks Miller.
Parks Miller has been District Attorney of Centre County since 2009. During the pendency of an investigation of an inmate allegedly attempting to contract someone to murder one of the assistant district attorneys in the office, Parks Miller, together with defense counsel for a second inmate, acting as a prison informant, devised a plan to move the informant to another prison as part of the investigation into the murder attempt. Parks Miller and the informant's defense counsel decided that they needed what the parties alternately and curiously refer to as a "pretend" or "fake" order granting the informant release on bail. Another defendant in this civil matter, a former employee of Parks Miller, accused Parks Miller of forging the signature of Judge Pamela Ruest on the pretend bail order. A grand jury investigation against Parks Miller was ultimately undertaken. The grand jury in duecourse cleared Parks Miller of wrongdoing.
The following paragraphs from the amended complaint comprise the allegations against Defendant Bernard Cantorna.
"Generally, consideration of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is limited to consideration of the complaint itself."21 Typically, to consider materials outside the complaint, it must be converted to a motion for summary judgment.22 However, "[c]onsideration of materials outside the complaint is not entirely foreclosed on a 12(b)(6) motion."23 It is permissible to consider full text of documents partially quoted in complaint.24 It is also permissible to consider documents relied upon by plaintiff in drafting the complaint and integral to the complaint.25 "However, before materials outside the record may become the basis for a dismissal, several conditions must be met."26 "For...
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