Miller v. Carson, 74-382-Civ-J-S.
Decision Date | 25 February 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 74-382-Civ-J-S.,74-382-Civ-J-S. |
Citation | 392 F. Supp. 515 |
Parties | Richard Franklin MILLER et al., Plaintiffs, v. Dale CARSON, Individually and in his capacity as Sheriff of Duval County, Florida and the Consolidated City of Jacksonville, Florida, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
William J. Sheppard, Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiffs.
William L. Coalson, Jacksonville, Fla., for defendants.
Raymond L. Gearey, Dept. of Legal Affairs, Civ. Div., Tallahassee, Fla., for the State.
John L. Briggs, U. S. Atty. (Lembcke) Jacksonville, Fla., for U. S. Marshal.
This case came before the Court with respect to the city defendants' motion to modify injunction and/or motion for relief from judgment or order, filed herein February 6, 1975.
The parties have stipulated that a ruling on points 8 and 9 regarding guard control and visitation can be deferred pending submission by the city defendants of a report with respect to the Duval County Jail by officials of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Department of Justice. In addition, the plaintiffs and the city defendants filed with the Court stipulations regarding points 2 and 5 with respect to hygenic supplies and isolation cells so that no ruling thereon is necessary. Therefore, the Court will reach the other points seriatim.
The city defendants have requested that the Court modify paragraph 3 of section I of its order and preliminary injunction of January 31, 1975, at page three, so as to increase the use of the holding cells from two hours to four hours and to increase the ordered maximum of ten inmates confined in any one holding cell to 21 inmates in holding cell 1-H only with all other holding cells to remain at the ordered maximum of ten each.
The principal reason stated by the city defendants for the requested increase in the use of the post-booking holding cells from two to four hours is simply that there are presently insufficient correctional personnel to perform all the necessary post-booking administrative tasks such as fingerprinting, taking mug-shots, assigning permanent cells, etc., within two hours after an inmate is placed in the post-booking holding cells. Although this particular problem could obviously be alleviated by the hiring of additional correctional staff, the Court recognizes that the hiring and training of such additional personnel requires time. Therefore, although the Court is reluctant to do so, the preliminary injunction will be modified in this regard to the limited extent that the city defendants will be allowed until April 1, 1975, to keep an inmate in a holding cell up to four hours. In addition, the city defendants will be allowed until May 1, 1975, to keep an inmate in a holding cell up to three hours. After May 1, 1975, no inmate shall be kept in a holding cell for longer than two hours. By that time, the city defendants should be able to have sufficient staff to streamline their post-booking procedures so as to meet the two hour time limit.
In addition, the city defendants have also requested that they be allowed to house as many as 16 to 21 inmates in holding cell 1-H instead of the required maximum of ten since holding cell 1-H is a little less than twice the size of each of the other four post-booking holding cells.
Because of the capacity of holding cell 1-H being somewhat greater than that of the other four post-booking holding cells, it seems reasonable to allow the city defendants to be able to use that cell to its logical capacity. However, this Court is of the opinion that no more than 15 inmates be housed in that particular cell because, although cell 1-H is somewhat larger than the other four, it has only one commode and only one water faucet for the use of the inmates incarcerated therein. Therefore, the preliminary injunction will be modified to allow the city defendants to house fifteen (15) inmates in holding cell 1-H.
The city defendants have proposed a modification and clarification of this Court's preliminary injunction with respect to the provision requiring them to take immediate steps to comply with the state fire marshal's rules and regulations as well as the Jacksonville city fire code and to submit a report within 30 days thereof as to the particular steps taken. Said provision further required that "every effort . . . be made to include an indorsement to the aforesaid report from a representative of the State Fire Marshal as well as a representative from the Bureau of Fire Prevention, Jacksonville Fire Division." Paragraph 6 of section II, at page 5, of the preliminary injunction of January 31, 1975.
What the city defendants seem to be requesting is a technical interpretation of the state fire marshal's rules and the Jacksonville city fire code as they apply to the Duval County Jail. Since this Court obviously lacks the technical expertise to make this initial determination, the city defendants' challenge to enter this particular thicket will be declined. In fact, that is the reason that this Court initially required that every effort be made to include the indorsement of the state fire marshal's representative and of the Bureau of Fire Prevention of the Jacksonville Fire Division in the first place. Therefore, the motion will be denied as to that particular point.
The city defendants request a clarification of the preliminary injunction which requires in part that no juvenile be housed in the Duval County Jail. Paragraph 2 of section IV, at page 8, of the preliminary injunction of January 31, 1975.
Section 39.03(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes regarding the judicial treatment of juveniles provides in pertinent part as follows:
If the child is alleged to be both dependent and delinquent or in need of supervision, the intake officer may authorize either detention care or shelter care. Under no circumstances shall the intake officer authorize the detention of any child in a jail or other facility intended or used for the detention of adults, except when a child is charged with a felony in the first degree, a life felony, or a capital felony. However, no child shall be placed in the same cell with any other adult or child alleged to have committed, or who has been adjudged to have committed, a crime. . . . (emphasis added)
Section 39.03(5)(b) of the Florida Statutes provides as follows with respect to where a circuit judge may place a juvenile:
It appears that subsection (5) (b) 1.a. of Section 39.03 erroneously refers to Section 39.02(6) as the applicable provision for waiver or removal of juvenile court jurisdiction, the clearly applicable subsection being subsection (5) of Section 39.02. Subsection (5) provides as follows:
The city defendants interpret the foregoing provision to mean that once a juvenile court judge (that is, a judge of the juvenile division of the circuit court) certifies that a child should be tried "as if the child were an adult," thereby vesting jurisdiction in the criminal division of the circuit court, a child may be placed in a jail such as the Duval County Jail.
This argument is clearly without merit. The clear import of subsection (5) (b) of Section 39.03 is that no child shall be in any facility intended or used for the detention of...
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