Miller v. CBC Companies, Inc.
| Decision Date | 29 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 95-24-SD. |
| Parties | Susan Y. MILLER; Michael B. Miller v. CBC COMPANIES, INC.; Credit Bureau Services of NH, Inc.; William B. Price; William H. Price. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire |
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John M. Lewis, Portsmouth, NH, for plaintiffs.
Debra Dyleski-Jajjar, Nashua, NH, for defendants.
In this civil action, plaintiffs Susan Y. Miller (Miller) and Michael B. Miller seek recovery from defendants CBC Companies, Inc. (CBC); Credit Bureau Services of New Hampshire, Inc. (CBS), a subsidiary of CBC; William B. Price, owner and chairman of the board of CBC and CBS; and William H. Price, owner of CBC and CBS. Plaintiff Susan Miller brings the following claims: (1) sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (Count I); (2) discrimination due to association with a disabled individual in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111, et seq. (ADA) (Count II); (3) breach of contract and wrongful discharge (Count III); (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV); and (5) reckless infliction of emotional distress (Count V). Plaintiff's husband, Michael Miller, brings a separate claim for loss of consortium (Count VI).
Presently before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss Counts II, III, IV, V, and VI of the complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P.
In 1983 CBS hired Susan Miller and soon after promoted her to a management position.1 While on maternity leave in 1992 after giving birth to twins, she asked that she be considered for another promotion. Complaint ¶ 22. Her employer instead gave the position to a female co-worker with five years less seniority than Miller. Id. ¶ 22. Miller alleges that when returned from her leave, she was further denied growth opportunities and also received undue criticism of her work. Id. ¶¶ 24, 38. Eventually, in late December 1993, her employer formally terminated Miller's employment, citing "a difference in philosophy." Id. ¶ 26.
The complaint alleges that lurking behind these unfavorable employment actions was unlawful discrimination in violation of, inter alia, the ADA. Defendants allegedly discriminated against her on the basis of her association with her oldest son, who has Down's Syndrome. In 1988, shortly after her son was born, defendant William B. Price allegedly began to question Miller's commitment to the company. Complaint ¶ 20. Price also allegedly made comments such as that women should stay at home while their husbands worked to provide for the family. Complaint ¶ 21. Furthermore, when Miller was passed over for the promotion in 1992, both William B. Price and William H. Price allegedly stated that her parental obligations to her disabled son made her unpromotable within the company. Complaint ¶¶ 40, 41.
On February 28, 1994, Miller filed a charge of discrimination (original charge) with the New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights (NHCHR) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that her employer's conduct in refusing to promote her and ultimately in terminating her was due to sex discrimination, under the theory that her employer considered her three children when it made personnel decisions and did not consider the family obligations of similarly situated male employees. On May 10, 1994, Miller amended the charge to include a claim under the ADA for discrimination based on her association with her disabled son.
After the EEOC investigated the matter and issued a right-to-sue letter, plaintiffs filed the instant action in this court on January 17, 1995.
To resolve defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must "take the well-pleaded facts as they appear in the complaint, extending plaintiff every reasonable inference in her favor." Pihl v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir.1993) (citing Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 442-43 (1st Cir.1992)). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate "`only if it clearly appears, according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory.'" Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Ponce Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 958 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir.1990)).
Plaintiff alleges that defendants' conduct in refusing to promote her and in ultimately terminating her employment violated the ADA. Defendants challenge the ADA claim on the following grounds: (a) plaintiff failed to file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC and to exhaust her administrative remedies; (2) the claim is time-barred because it is based on conduct that occurred prior to the effective date of the ADA; and (3) the claims against defendants William B. Price and William H. Price are barred because the ADA does not provide for individual liability.
Defendants first contend that the ADA claim is time-barred. They further argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, as aspects of her civil claim go beyond the scope of her EEOC charge. In making both arguments, defendants assert that plaintiff never claimed in an EEOC charge that her December 1993 termination was due to disability discrimination.
Prior to filing a civil action under the ADA, an aggrieved party must, inter alia, file an administrative charge with the EEOC.2 The filing of a charge serves the dual purpose of giving the employer notice of plaintiff's charges and providing the agency with information and "an opportunity to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices through informal methods of conciliation." Powers v. Grinnell Corp., 915 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir.1990) (citation omitted). The administrative charge affords "`the EEOC with a "jurisdictional springboard"'" to investigate the alleged discrimination. Id. at 38 (quoting EEOC v. General Electric Co., 532 F.2d 359, 364 (4th Cir.1976) (quoting EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir.1975))). Thus, "an administrative charge is not a blueprint for the litigation to follow," nor need the exact wording of the charge exactly predict the subsequent judicial pleading. Id. Instead, plaintiff's civil claims must merely "come within the `scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.'" Id. at 39 (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir.1970)) (emphasis added).
In the amended charge, plaintiff makes the following allegation: "I believe my differing treatment after my return from maternity leave resulting in adverse evaluations were due to stereotyping based on illegal sex and disability discrimination." See May 10, 1994, Charge of Discrimination ¶ 12 (). Moreover, plaintiff's submission in support of her charge, which defendants received, notes that "CBC saw me as extra baggage to be done away with because I had family obligations, including twins and a handicapped child." See Plaintiff's Information Response at 8 ().
In addition, plaintiffs' ADA claim arises from essentially the same facts as the original EEOC charge for sex discrimination, which expressly set forth a claim for unlawful termination. Indeed, the ADA claim could be construed as a further refinement of the sex discrimination charge which, like the ADA claim, alleges that defendants were motivated by plaintiff's parental responsibilities when they failed to promote her and eventually terminated her.
The court finds and rules that plaintiff's EEOC charge gave defendants sufficient notice that she would potentially bring an ADA claim for her termination. As the EEOC charge was filed within the 300-day time limit,3 plaintiff's ADA claim is not time-barred to the extent it relates to her termination. Moreover, defendants have not succeeded in showing plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The ADA claim could "reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination," Powers, supra, 915 F.2d at 38 (quotation omitted) and therefore was within the scope of the EEOC charge.4
Defendants next argue that the ADA claim must be dismissed because the alleged failure to promote occurred prior to the date the ADA became effective for most employment actions, July 26, 1992. Although the alleged failure to promote occurred in April 1992, the alleged discriminatory termination occurred in December 1993, well after the ADA's effective date. Accordingly, to the extent the ADA claim is based on plaintiff's termination, defendants' motion to dismiss must be denied.
However, whether plaintiff can be compensated for the alleged failure to promote, which occurred prior to the ADA's effective date, presents a more difficult question. The United States Supreme Court recommends a two-step inquiry to approach the retroactivity question: (1) whether Congress has "expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach" so as to displace the presumption against retroactivity and (2) if not, whether, in the court's determination, "the new statute would have retroactive effect". Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1505, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). If Congress did not clearly intend that the statute apply retroactively, and if the new statute would so operate, courts must apply the "traditional presumption" against retroactivity and find the statute does not govern. Id.
(1) Retroactivity
Absent a clear statement of congressional intent, there is a traditional presumption against giving retroactive effect...
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