Miller v. Chenoweth
| Decision Date | 10 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11–0148.,11–0148. |
| Citation | 727 S.E.2d 658,229 W.Va. 114 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Joe E. MILLER, Commissioner, West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles, Petitioner v. Michael CHENOWETH, Respondent. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. Syllabus point 1, Clower v. West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, 223 W.Va. 535, 678 S.E.2d 41 (2009).
2. “Evidentiary findings made at an administrative hearing should not be reversed unless they are clearly wrong.” Syllabus point 1, Francis O. Day Co., Inc. v. Director, Division of Environmental Protection, 191 W.Va. 134, 443 S.E.2d 602 (1994).
Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, Scott E. Johnson, Elaine L. Skorich, Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for Petitioner.
George J. Cosenza, Parkersburg, WV, for Respondent.
This appeal by Joe E. Miller, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter referred to as “Commissioner Miller”), the petitioner herein, challenges a circuit court finding that a law enforcement officer conducted an illegal stop of a driver suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol, and the circuit court's application of the exclusionary rule to an administrative driver's license revocation proceeding. Because we conclude that there was no illegal stop, we reverse the circuit court's order without reaching the issue pertaining to the exclusionary rule.
According to the appendix record submitted in connection with this appeal, during the early morning hours of May 7, 2009, Mr. Michael S. Chenoweth (hereinafter referred to as “Mr. Chenoweth”), the respondent herein, was driving his vehicle, a 1991 Mercury Grand Marquis, south on Emerson Avenue in Parkersburg, West Virginia. He made a right-hand turn onto West Virginia Avenue and then pulled off the road just past an entrance to a Fire Department. During the administrative hearing, Mr. Chenoweth testified that, after he pulled his car off the road, a State Police cruiser came around the corner and stopped in the road near Mr. Chenoweth's car. The cruiser was being operated by Trooper J.S. Pauley of the West Virginia State Police (hereinafter referred to as “Trooper Pauley”). Mr. Chenoweth stated that, after sitting in the roadway for ten or fifteen seconds, Trooper Pauley turned on his emergency lights and pulled his vehicle behind Mr. Chenoweth's car. Mr. Chenoweth was clear that Trooper Pauley did not cause him to pull off the road. Instead, he had already pulled off the road and was checking messages on his phone when Trooper Pauley approached him.
The D.U.I. Information Sheet subsequently completed by Trooper Pauley indicates that he stopped because Mr. Chenoweth's vehicle was parked in such a manner that it protruded into the roadway. Trooper Pauley then approached Mr. Chenoweth and, while speaking to him, observed the smell of alcohol. In addition, Trooper Pauley noticed that Mr. Chenoweth's eyes were glassy and bloodshot and that his speech was slow. The D.U.I. Information sheet further notes that Mr. Chenoweth was unsteady exiting the vehicle and standing. Trooper Pauley administered a gaze nystagmus test, which Mr. Chenoweth failed. Mr. Chenoweth refused to take either the walk and turn or one-leg stand field sobriety tests. The results of a preliminary breath test administered by Trooper Pauley showed that Mr. Chenoweth had a blood alcohol concentration of .144%. Trooper Pauley then arrested Mr. Chenoweth for driving a motor vehicle in this State while under the influence of alcohol. After transporting Mr. Chenoweth to the Parkersburg Police Department, Trooper Pauley administered a secondary chemical breath test. The secondary test measured Mr. Chenoweth's blood alcohol concentration at .155%.
Thereafter, on May 21, 2009, Commissioner Miller issued an order revoking Mr. Chenoweth's privilege to drive a motor vehicle. The revocation was to become effective on June 25, 2009. Mr. Chenoweth requested an administrative hearing, which was held on January 7, 2010. Mr. Chenoweth did not request the presence of Trooper Pauley at the administrative hearing. Following the administrative hearing, the hearing examiner proposed that Commissioner Miller conclude, as a matter of law, that Mr. Chenoweth violated W. Va.Code § 17C–5–2 (2008) (Repl.Vol.2009) by driving a motor vehicle in this State while under the influence of alcohol, and that he did so while having an alcohol concentration in his blood of .15% or more. The hearing examiner noted Mr. Chenoweth's argument that Trooper Pauley did not have any right to conduct a stop; therefore, Mr. Chenoweth's license revocation should be rescinded. Mr. Chenoweth based this argument upon his testimony that he had been legally parked when Trooper Pauley observed his vehicle on the side of the road. This testimony was contrary to Trooper Pauley's D.U.I. Information Sheet, which noted that Mr. Chenoweth's car was protruding into the roadway. After essentially observing that this conflicting evidence required a credibility determination, the hearing examiner found that the “dispute must be resolved in Trooper Pauley's favor.” In addition, the hearing examiner explained that, “[f]rom the Respondent's own testimony, Trooper Pauley never initiated any investigative stop of the Respondent's 1991 Mercury, but approached it only after the Respondent had stopped of his own volition on West Virginia Avenue....” The hearing examiner observed further that, “as the record also reflects, Trooper Pauley found the Respondent's Mercury to be oddly positioned, protruding into the roadway.” Commissioner Miller adopted these findings and entered a Final Order revoking Mr. Chenoweth's privilege to drive a motor vehicle for a period of forty-five days commencing July 28, 2010, and thereafter until Mr. Chenoweth fulfilled certain obligations.1
Mr. Chenoweth appealed Commissioner Miller's Final Order to the Circuit Court of Wood County. By order entered December 23, 2010, the circuit court reversed and vacated the revocation of Mr. Chenoweth's driver's license based on its finding that Trooper Pauley improperly stopped Mr. Chenoweth's vehicle without an articulable reasonable suspicion. The circuit court applied the exclusionary rule relating to improper and/or illegal stops and this Court's prior analysis requiring the driver to have been “lawfully placed under arrest.” 2 In reversing Commissioner Miller's final order, the circuit court reasoned that, based upon the facts that had been presented in this case,
the officer's actions were clearly a stop of the Petitioner's vehicle particularly with regard to the fact [of] the time period between when the officer first saw the Petitioner's vehicle and when he activated the emergency lights. Additionally, the record is empty with regard to ... any articulable reasonable suspicion to justify a stop....
... The Court finds and concludes that the officer improperly stopped the Petitioner's vehicle without an articulable reasonable suspicion.
Finally, the circuit court acknowledged that this Court previously has observed that the exclusionary rule 3 relating to improper and/or illegal stops is inapplicable to civil cases,4 and that “DMV cases, such as the present case, are civil proceedings.” Nevertheless, the circuit court “decline [d] to extend the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in civil cases to this case.” 5 It is from the circuit court's order that Commissioner Miller now appeals.
This case is before this Court on appeal from a circuit court's order reversing an administrative order rendered by Commissioner Miller. In these circumstances, the role of the circuit court in reviewing an administrativeorder is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, which directs that:
The court may affirm the order or decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. It shall reverse, vacate or modify the order or decision of the agency if the substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, decision or order are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedures; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
W. Va.Code § 29A–5–4(g) (1998) (Repl.Vol.2007).
In the case sub judice, the circuit court reversed the administrative order. With respect to this Court's review of a circuit court's order reversing an administrative order, we have held that:
“[i]n cases where the circuit court has [reversed] the result before the administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law de novo.” Syllabus point 2, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).
Syl. pt. 1, Clower v. West Virginia Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 223 W.Va. 535, 678 S.E.2d 41 (2009). Finally, we note that “[e]videntiary findings made at an administrative hearing should not be reversed unless they are clearly wrong.” Syl. pt. 1, Francis O. Day Co., Inc. v. Director, Div. of Envtl. Prot., 191 W.Va. 134, 443 S.E.2d 602 (1994). With due...
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