Miller v. City Hosp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 23089,23089
• Citation: 197 W.Va. 403,475 S.E.2d 495
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Patti MILLER, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. CITY HOSPITAL, INC., Defendant Below, Appellee.

Page 495

475 S.E.2d 495

197 W.Va. 403

Patti MILLER, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. CITY HOSPITAL, INC., Defendant Below, Appellee.

No. 23089.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted May 2, 1996.

Decided July 17, 1996.

[197 W.Va. 404] Syllabus by the Court

1. " 'A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.' Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). Syllabus Point 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W.Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992)." Syllabus Point 1, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

2. "Summary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of the evidence presented, the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove." Syllabus Point 2, Williams v. Precision

[197 W.Va. 405] Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

3. "If the moving party makes a properly supported motion for summary judgment and can show by affirmative evidence that there is no genuine issue of a material fact, the burden of production shifts to the non-moving party who must either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked by the moving party, (2) produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial, or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure." Syllabus Point 3, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

4. "The statute creating a legislative standard for loss of employer immunity from civil liability for work-related injury to employees found in W.Va.Code § 23-4-2 (1983) essentially sets forth two separate and distinct methods of proving 'deliberate intention.' " Syllabus Point 1, Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc., 185 W.Va. 88, 405 S.E.2d 15 (1990).

5. "A plaintiff may establish 'deliberate intention' in a civil action against an employer for a work-related injury by offering evidence to prove the five specific requirements provided in W. Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) (1983)." Syllabus Point 2, Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc., 185 W.Va. 88, 405 S.E.2d 15 (1990).

6. "The essential elements for a successful defamation action by a private individual are (1) defamatory statements; (2) a nonprivileged communication to a third party; (3) falsity; (4) reference to the plaintiff; (5) at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (6) resulting injury." Syllabus Point 1, Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 173 W.Va. 699, 320 S.E.2d 70 (1983).

Carolyn Sue Daniel, Shepherdstown, for Appellant.

Lucien G. Lewin, Tracey B. Dawson, Steptoe & Johnson, Martinsburg, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Patti Miller appeals a summary judgment order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County dismissing her complaint against City Hospital, Inc., her former employer. The circuit court found that Ms. Miller's alleged injuries were covered under the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, W.Va.Code 23-1-1 (1995) et seq., and that Ms. Miller failed to state a claim under the "deliberate intention" second exception of W.Va.Code 23-4-2(c)(2) (1994). On appeal, Ms. Miller contends that summary judgment is inappropriate because of the existence of disputed material facts that, if believed by a trier of fact, would show that her claim falls within the "deliberate intention" exception to the employer immunity provisions of the Compensation Act. Because the record shows Ms. Miller failed to establish any violation of statutory or safety standards, one of the five elements required under W.Va.Code 23-4-2(c) (1994), we affirm the decision of the circuit court. ¹

I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND

Between July 6, 1992 and October 15, 1993, Ms. Miller was employed by City Hospital as a psychiatric/chemical dependency therapist in its mental health unit. Initially, Ms. Miller's employment status was occasional part-time, which is an "as needed" position receiving no benefits. On September 21, 1992, Ms. Miller applied for a status change from "occasional part-time" to "part-time," which is a regular part-time position with benefits and reduced pay to offset the award of benefits. ² Ms. Miller contends that the hospital failed in its promise to employ her full time with benefits after a three-month probationary period.

Alleging that Tammy Davis, the nurse manager of the mental health unit in which Ms. Miller was working, engaged in "unjust continual harassment" toward her, Ms. Miller filed a grievance on November 23, 1992. On March 11, 1993 the Director of Human Resources sent Ms. Miller a letter stating that because she failed to request further action, he considered the working relationship improved and the matter resolved. Ms. Miller did not respond to the March 11, 1993 letter.

In her complaint, Ms. Miller alleges that the matter was not resolved because Ms. Davis verbally abused her, criticized her work, required her to perform the same work as required for a forty-hour week, and scheduled work hours so that she could not attend meetings designed to improve her work. Ms. Miller also alleges that she was denied personal leave for illness, forced to accept in-house healthcare, received threatening telephone calls and was threatened with physical harm. Ms. Miller notes that some substance, maybe grease, was placed at her work station and that her car was damaged in the parking lots. In addition, Ms. Miller notes that vicious rumors were circulated stating that she was having an affair with a co-worker who was in a supervisory position. Ms. Miller contends that even after she notified management of these problems, the hospital forced her to continue to work with the employees who were threatening her. Ms. Miller contends that because of the hospital's failure to act, which ratified the outrageous conduct, she had a severe emotional reaction and was forced to resign and to accept employment at a reduced wage rate.

On February 25, 1994, Ms. Miller filed her complaint alleging: first, the hospital through its employees had engaged in outrageous conduct thereby intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her; and second, the hospital had ratified the defamatory statements that were made about her by a hospital's employee thereby forcing her to change her employment. The hospital denied the allegations and after substantial discovery, the hospital filed a motion for summary judgment maintaining that Ms. Miller's claims were precluded by the Workers' Compensation Act and that the hospital was not legally responsible for the alleged defamatory remarks. Ms. Miller's response to the motion for summary judgment alleged that circumstantial evidence showed the hospital's intent, creating a question of material fact, which precluded summary judgment, and that the defamatory statements were imputable to the hospital. By order entered on October 14, 1994, the circuit court granted the hospital summary judgment finding that Ms. Miller failed to state a claim under the "deliberate intention" exception of the Workers' Compensation Act and that the alleged defamatory statements were not made under the actual or apparent authority of the hospital and were not defamatory per se.

Ms. Miller appealed to this Court alleging that summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether her claim was barred by the employer's immunity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act and whether the statements were defamatory and made under the authority of the hospital.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The central issue of this case is the appropriateness of summary judgment. "A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo." Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). In accord Powderidge Unit Owners Association v. Highland Properties, Ltd., 196 W.Va. 692, 698, 474 S.E.2d 872, 878 (1996); Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 58, 459 S.E.2d 329, 331, rehearing denied (1995). Our traditional standard for granting summary judgment is stated in Syl. pt. 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of N.Y., 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). "A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law." In accord Syl. pt. 3, Mallamo v. Town of Rivesville, 197 W.Va. 616, 477 S.E.2d 525 (1996); Syl. pt. 1, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., supra; Syl. pt. 2, Painter v. Peavy, supra; Syl. pt. 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W.Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992).

Rule 56 (1978) of the W.Va.R.Civ.P. is " 'designed to effect a prompt disposition of controversies on their merits without resort to a lengthy trial,' if there essentially 'is no real dispute as to salient facts' or if it only involves a question of law." Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. at 58, 459 S.E.2d at 335, quoting, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. at 192 n. 5, 451 S.E.2d at 758 n. 5, quoting, Oakes v. Monongahela Power Co., 158 W.Va. 18, 22, 207 S.E.2d 191, 194 (1974). Subsection c of Rule 56 states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Syl. pt. 2 of Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc. states:

Summary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of the evidence presented, the record could not lead a rational...