Miller v. City of Atlanta
| Decision Date | 29 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:21-cv-03752-SDG |
| Parties | TOMIKA MILLER and the ESTATE OF RAYSHARD BROOKS by and through Tomika Miller, Administrator, Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA; and GARRETT ROLFE, in his individual capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
This matter is before the Court on the following motions Defendant City of Atlanta's (the City) motion to dismiss the original complaint [ECF 14], request to withdraw that motion [ECF 28], motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (FAC) [ECF 34], and motion for leave to respond to Plaintiffs' notice of supplemental authority [ECF 54] Defendant Garrett Rolfe's motion to dismiss [ECF 31] and motion to respond to Plaintiffs' supplemental authority [ECF 53]; and Plaintiffs' motion to exclude extrinsic evidence supporting Rolfe's motion to dismiss [ECF 40]. For the following reasons, the City's motion to withdraw its motion to dismiss the original complaint [ECF 28] is GRANTED and the motion to dismiss the original complaint [ECF 14] is DENIED as moot. The City's motion to dismiss the FAC [ECF 34] is DENIED. Defendants' motions to respond to Plaintiffs' supplemental authority [ECF 53; ECF 54] are GRANTED. Rolfe's motion to dismiss [ECF 31] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs' motion to exclude extrinsic evidence [ECF 40] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. Background
For purposes of Defendants' motions to dismiss, the Court treats all well-pleaded facts in the FAC as true and construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 1999).
On the evening of June 12, 2020, Rayshard Brooks drove his car to the drive-thru lane of a Wendy's fast-food restaurant on University Avenue in Atlanta, Georgia.[1] While waiting in the drive-thru line in his car, Brooks fell asleep.[2] A Wendy's employee reported this to the police.[3] Officer Devin Brosnan of the Atlanta Police Department (APD) was dispatched in response.[4] When Brosnan arrived at the Wendy's, he saw Brooks asleep in his car in the drive-thru.[5] Brosnan approached the car, woke Brooks, and began to question him.[6] Brosnan directed Brooks to move his car to a nearby parking spot in the restaurant's parking lot.[7] Brooks complied.[8] Brooks opened the driver's side door, but remained in the car and Brosnan continued questioning him.[9] During that exchange, Officer Garrett Rolfe (also of the APD) arrived.[10] Brosnan and Rolfe conferred briefly, away from where Brooks had parked.[11] Brooks remained in the car.[12] Rolfe then began to question Brooks.[13] Eventually, Rolfe asked Brooks to exit the car and whether he would consent to a search.[14] Brooks agreed to the search and exited the car.[15] Rolfe did not find any weapons.[16] Rolfe also administered several field sobriety tests and a breath test on Brooks.[17] Shortly after conducting the breath test, Rolfe started to arrest Brooks and place him in handcuffs.[18] At that point, what had been a calm and uncontentious encounter markedly changed.
As Rolfe was attempting to handcuff Brooks, Brooks pulled away.[19] Rolfe and Brosnan tackled him.[20] Brosnan pulled his APD-issued TASER and discharged it into Brooks's leg, using “drive stun” mode.[21] Brooks grabbed the TASER and a struggle broke out, during which Brooks took control of the TASER.[22] The weapon was discharged, although the pleading does not indicate by whom.[23] Brooks then started to run away.[24] Rolfe responded by drawing his own TASER and firing it at Brooks twice.[25] The shots were not effective.[26] Rolfe gave chase.[27] Brooks began to increase the distance between himself and Rolfe.[28] Brooks turned and fired the TASER he had taken from Brosnan.[29] The FAC alleges that Rolfe knew he was outside the TASER's range when Brooks fired it.[30] Rolfe then pulled his gun and fired three shots at Brooks's back without warning.[31] One shot hit an occupied vehicle in the Wendy's parking lot.[32] Two of the shots hit Brooks in the back and Brooks collapsed.[33]
While Brooks was lying on the ground, Rolfe and Brosnan went and stood over him.[34] Brooks was alive but suffering from gunshot wounds in his upper torso that required immediate medical attention.[35] Neither officer immediately attempted to provide any such assistance.[36] Instead, the FAC alleges that Brosnan put a foot on Brooks's shoulder and Rolfe kicked him.[37] Brooks was transported to the hospital where he died following surgery.[38]
On September 10, 2021, Tomika Miller, Brooks's widow, filed suit against Rolfe, Brosnan, and the City on behalf of herself and in her capacity as the administrator of Brooks's estate.[39] On October 22, the City moved to dismiss the initial complaint.[40] In response, on November 12, Plaintiffs filed the FAC.[41] The City accordingly sought to withdraw its first motion to dismiss.[42]
The FAC asserts four causes of action. Counts I and II, asserted only against Rolfe, are both for excessive force under Section 1983 and battery under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-13.[43]Count III is asserted against Rolfe and is for deliberate indifference under Section 1983.[44] Count IV is brought against the City for municipal liability under Section 1983.[45] Plaintiffs seek compensatory, punitive, special, and nominal damages, as well as attorneys' fees.[46]
On November 29, 2021, Rolfe and then-Defendant Brosnan moved to dismiss the FAC.[47] On December 10, the City did likewise.[48] Plaintiffs filed their opposition briefs in response to both motions to dismiss on January 14, 2022.[49]Plaintiffs also moved to exclude extrinsic evidence filed in support of the individual Defendants' motion and filed a consent motion to dismiss Brosnan from this action with prejudice.[50] On January 28, 2022, the Court granted the consent motion and dismissed the claims against Brosnan.[51] The parties have fully briefed these motions as well as filed notices of supplemental authority.[52] II. Motions Concerning Supplemental Authority and Extrinsic Evidence
Because they implicate what the Court should consider in deciding whether Plaintiffs' claims are viable, the Court first addresses the parties' motions concerning supplemental authority and extrinsic evidence.
Plaintiffs' first notice of supplemental authority identifies two cases from this district that were decided after the parties had completed briefing on Defendants' motions to dismiss: English v. City of Gainesville, 2:20-cv-147-RWS, which discusses qualified immunity, and Pilgrim/Young v. City of Atlanta, 1:21-cv-02472-TWT, which addresses Monell claims.[53] Rolfe seeks leave to file a response to English in order to distinguish it from the instant case.[54] Similarly, the City asks permission to file a response about Pilgrim/Young to demonstrate why that case is purportedly not applicable here.[55] Plaintiffs did not oppose either motion. The Court therefore grants Defendants' leave to file their responses to Plaintiffs' supplemental authorities, and the Court has considered them in reaching its conclusions here.
Rolfe's motion to dismiss relies on a litany of evidence - including video and audio recordings - that was not attached to or directly referenced in the FAC.[56] Rolfe did not file these materials with the Court when he moved to dismiss. Rather, his motion embedded links to the evidence.[57] Plaintiffs argue that consideration of such extrinsic evidence at the motion to dismiss stage is improper and seek to exclude it.[58]
Although Plaintiffs put forward several arguments about why the Court should disregard Rolfe's evidence, the Court only finds it necessary to address one - the assertion that none of the materials have been authenticated.[59] Rolfe has filed a “verification” purporting to authenticate certain of the evidence,[60] and contends that authentication is not required when the contents are not in dispute.[61] Plaintiffs object to the authenticity of all of the evidence on which Rolfe's motion to dismiss relies.[62] Their reply brief addresses Rolfe's characterization of “authenticity” in this context and his assertion that the evidence is “undisputed.”[63]Rolfe objects to much of that portion of Plaintiffs' reply, contending that it contains new arguments.[64]
As a general rule, on a motion to dismiss if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). See also Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2005) (same). However, such extrinsic evidence may be considered without converting the motion to one for summary judgment “if it is central to the plaintiff's claim and the authenticity of the [evidence] is not challenged.” Adamson v. de Poorter, No. 06-15941, 2007 WL 2900576, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 4, 2007) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002) (same). As Plaintiffs point out, the purpose of this requirement is to prevent “the circumvention of the Rule 56 notice and opportunity to be heard provisions when extraneous materials are considered.” Id.[65]
Many of Plaintiffs' concerns about authenticity are valid. There are three broad categories of evidence on which Rolfe attempts to rely: (1) audio and video recordings (including police body and dash cam recordings) and other materials made by law enforcement;[66] (2) video recordings from the restaurant;[67] and (3) videos purportedly made by witnesses to the events.[68] Rolfe has...
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