Miller v. Cleckler
Decision Date | 11 June 2010 |
Docket Number | 2090195. |
Citation | 51 So.3d 379 |
Parties | Elfreda MILLER v. Wesley CLECKLER. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Rex W. Slate of Smith & Alspaugh, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
Laura Sidwell Maki of Wade Anderson & Associates, Birmingham, for appellee.
Elfreda Miller, the plaintiff below, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of Wesley Cleckler, one of the defendants below, in Mrs. Miller's action alleging negligence and wantonness. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
This case involves a four-automobile accident that occurred on Interstate 65 ("I-65") in Shelby County. On Friday afternoon, August 4, 2006, Mrs. Miller was driving an automobile south on I-65. Mrs. Miller was traveling in the left lane behind her husband, Richard Miller, who was driving a separate automobile. Cleckler was also traveling south on I-65, driving his pickup truck. Cleckler testified that he was driving at a speed of 60 or 65 miles per hour and that traffic was "pretty heavy" at the time. Both Cleckler and Mrs. Miller testified that the speed limit was 70 miles per hour. Mrs. Miller testified that there was a "steady flow of traffic" with vehicles "moving freely." The record on appeal contains testimony from observers that Cleckler was "darting" through traffic "at a high rate of speed" "trying to pass everyone."
At some point, Cleckler merged his pickup truck from the right lane into the left lane in front of Mr. Miller's vehicle. Cleckler testified that, when he moved into the left lane ahead of Mr. Miller, he moved into a gap of about three or four automobile lengths. Cleckler further testified that, shortly after moving into the left lane, the vehicles in front of him began to brake, causing him to apply his brakes "pretty good." Mr. Miller testified that Cleckler moved "directly in front of" his vehicle and that Cleckler "slammed on his brakes" because he was too close to the vehicle in front of him. As a result of Cleckler's braking, Mr. Miller and the otherdrivers traveling behind Cleckler began to brake as well.
At that time, Charles Williams was driving a vehicle behind Mrs. Miller, who was behind Mr. Miller. Williams testified that he was traveling at a speed of approximately 70 miles per hour approximately one automobile length behind Mrs. Miller. Mrs. Miller testified that, when she applied her brakes in response to Mr. Miller's braking in front of her, Williams's vehicle struck her vehicle from behind, causing her vehicle to collide with the back of Mr. Miller's vehicle. Mr. Miller's vehicle in turn collided with the back of Cleckler's pickup truck. Mrs. Miller testified that her vehicle was not in danger of colliding with Mr. Miller's vehicle before Williams struck her from behind. However, Williams testified that he thought that Mrs. Miller's vehicle had collided with Mr. Miller's vehicle before his own vehicle collided with Mrs. Miller's vehicle, but he was not completely sure about that. The accident occurred at approximately 3:15 p.m. on a sunny day.
Mrs. Miller sued Cleckler, Williams, and fictitiously named parties, alleging negligence and wantonness and seeking to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained in the automobile accident. Cleckler answered and denied liability. Cleckler's answer asserted, among other things, that Mrs. Miller's injuries were proximately caused by the negligence or wantonness of another. Cleckler then moved for a summary judgment, asserting that his actions did not proximately cause the accident. Cleckler's summary-judgment motion also asserted that, although Alabama law prohibits a driver from following another driver too closely, Alabama law does not require a driver to look behind him before stopping for traffic. Cleckler's motion implicitly argued that Williams's conduct proximately caused the accident. The trial court entered a judgment granting Cleckler's summary-judgment motion, and the trial court certified that judgment as final, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Mrs. Miller appealed to the supreme court, and the supreme court transferred the appeal to this court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.
Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So.2d 341, 344 (Ala.1997).
On appeal, Mrs. Miller first argues that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in Cleckler's favor on the negligence claim because, she says, the record contains substantial evidence indicating that Cleckler's conduct proximately caused the accident. Conversely, Cleckler argues that the evidence establishes that Williams's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident. That is, Cleckler maintains that Williams's conduct served as an intervening cause between Cleckler's alleged negligence and the accident.
"In order to establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove: '(1) a duty to a foreseeable plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) damage or injury.' " S.B. v. Saint James Sch., 959 So.2d 72, 97 (Ala.2006) (quoting Martin v. Arnold, 643 So.2d 564, 567 (Ala.1994)). "A summary judgment is rarely appropriate in a negligence action." Nelson v. Meadows, 684 So.2d 145, 148 (Ala.Civ.App.1996). Typically, the question of proximate causation is a question of fact to be resolved by the jury; that question must be decided by the jury if reasonable inferences from the evidence support the plaintiff's claim. Dixon v. Board of Water & Sewer Comm'rs of Mobile, 865 So.2d 1161, 1166 (Ala.2003); City of Mobile v. Largay, 346 So.2d 393, 395 (Ala.1977). See also Tuscaloosa County v. Barnett, 562 So.2d 166, 169 (Ala.1990) ( ).
General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1194-95 (Ala.1985), overruled on other grounds, Schwartz v. Volvo North...
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