Miller v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
| Decision Date | 27 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 12-862 (MAS) (TJB) |
| Parties | STEVE MILLER and ANDRES CASTANEDA, Plaintiffs, v. COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss Counts III, IV, V, VI, IX, XII and XIII of the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6). (Defs.' Br., ECF No. 23-1.) Plaintiffs Steve Miller and Andres Castaneda ("Plaintiffs") filed Opposition. (Pls.' Opp'n, ECF No. 24.) Defendants filed a Reply. (ECF No. 26.)2 The Court has carefully considered the Parties' submissions and decided the matter without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, and other good cause shown, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as follows: Counts III, IV, IX, and XII are dismissed without prejudice; Count V, Count VI, and Count XIII are dismissed with prejudice.
This matter was removed to this Court from the Superior Court of New Jersey. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs thereafter filed a Motion to Remand that was denied because § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, preempted their state law claims, thus conferring subject matter jurisdiction upon this Court. (ECF Nos. 5, 19.) Specifically, the Court found that although the Plaintiffs' Complaint did not expressly reference the Parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"), the claims therein substantially depended on its interpretation. (ECF No. 19.) Defendants subsequently filed this Motion to Dismiss.
The following facts are drawn from the Complaint and are taken as true for purposes of this Opinion. Plaintiffs are currently employed by CCR. (Compl. 2 ¶ 1, 8 ¶ 1, ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff Castaneda, a Hispanic male, applied for a Cooler Technician position at CCR in July 2010. (Compl. 2 ¶¶ 2-3.) He alleges that he was entitled to a company van but never received one. (Id.) Moreover, he alleges that his probation period was longer than normal and that he did not receive the standard four to six months of training that this position normally entails. (Id. ¶ 6.) In November 2010, Castaneda was demoted to a Merchandiser position for inadequate job performance. (Id. ¶ 8.) As a result, Castaneda complained to Human Resources about these events. (Id. ¶9.)
In May 2011, he was promoted to Cooler Mover, but alleges that he was not given the commensurate increase in pay of $7.00 per hour that is normally given to those so promoted. (Id.¶ 10.) He then filed two additional grievances specifically complaining about not being called into work two Saturdays, as other technicians allegedly were. (Id. ¶ 12.) Defendant Chadwick then told Defendant O'Brien that Plaintiff was performing his duties unsatisfactorily, which allegedly caused Castaneda to feel "as if his reputation was being defamed." (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) As a result, he alleges that he had to seek professional medical assistance for stress. (Id. ¶ 17.) Castaneda also enrolled at Lincoln Tech hoping to obtain an increase in pay, but never received such an increase. (Id. ¶ 20.) In October 2011, he injured his shoulder at work and was subsequently sent to Concentra Medical Center. (Id. ¶ 25.) Dr. Khaling put him on light duty for two days. (Id.) Castaneda explained this limitation to Defendant Pietkun who then made Castaneda come into work even though CCR does not have light duty work. (Id.) Castaneda alleges that as a result of the Defendants' treatment towards him, he suffers from further pain, disability, and discomfort. (Id. ¶ 26.) Castaneda alleges that a majority, if not all of this alleged discrimination, occurred because he is Hispanic. (Id. 7-8 ¶ 24.)
Plaintiff Miller, an African-American, alleges that since 2006, he "has been subject to ongoing disparate treatment, harassment[], hostile work environment, disparate assignments, constant degrading expressions, words and attitude from the named defendants herein." (Id. 9 ¶ 2.) In July 2007, Miller filed a racial discrimination complaint against supervisors Gary Matinate and Scott Chadwick alleging that he and other African-Americans employed at CCR suffered disparate treatment as compared to similarly situated whites. (Id. ¶ 3.) Subsequently, his treatment worsened, and he developed severe, emotional distress and depression for which he received outpatient therapy and was prescribed medication. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.)
In August 2010, Miller was required to work a Flex Shift Schedule due to the Defendants' alleged prejudicial treatment. (Id. ¶ 7.) According to the CBA, Miller could not be placed on such a schedule. (Id.) He also alleges other racially motivated disparate treatment, including being forced to work different hours, different job assignments, and being denied transfer opportunities. (Id. ¶¶ 8-10.) Miller successfully filed a grievance regarding these disparities. (Id. ¶ 11.) As a result, he alleges he. was retaliated against in the form of receiving an unfavorable work schedule. (Id.) He further alleges that Defendant Guerino treated him in such a way as to violate Plaintiffs seniority according to CBA Article 38. (Id. ¶ 12.) Specifically, he alleges that junior employees received more favorable opportunities and that Defendant Pietkun violated the seniority list by not letting Miller bid to drive a utility truck. (Id. ¶¶ 15-18.)
Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks to hold Defendants liable via several theories: 1) Hostile Work Environment (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12); 2) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Article VII of New Jersey Constitution); 3) Misconduct in Office (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:1-1 et seq.; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2; Article I, VII, New Jersey Constitution); 4) Casting of Plaintiffs in a False Light (Article I, Paragraph I, New Jersey Constitution); 5) Official Deprivation of Civil Rights (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2); 6) Intentional Interference with Plaintiffs' Beneficial Economic Advantage; 7) Unlawful Conspiracy; 8) Unlawful Retaliation (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-1 et seq.); 9) Place of Public Accommodation (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1 et seq.); 10) Failure to Accommodate and Disability Discrimination; 11) New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD") Disparate Treatment and Retaliation; 12) Deprivation of Freedom of Speech and to Grieve (New Jersey Constitution Article I, Paragraphs 1, 5, 6, 18, 19);13)3 State law claims under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:1-1 et seq. and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2; and 14)4 Disparate Treatment and Unequal Pay.
A. Standard for Motion to Dismiss
Rule 8(a)(2) "requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds on which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a "defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented." Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005).
A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). "First, the court must 'take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Second, the court must accept as true all of a plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fowler v. UPMC Shady side, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). The court, however, must disregard any conclusory allegations proffered in the complaint. Id. For example, the court is free to ignore legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations which merely state that "the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Finally, once the well-pleaded facts have been identified and the conclusory allegations ignored, a court mustnext determine whether the "facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief" Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Determining plausibility is a "context-specific task which requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Plausibility, however, "is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545). In the end, facts which only suggest the "mere possibility of misconduct" fail to show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Count III alleges that CCR negligently hired and failed to properly train and supervise the individually named Defendants. (Compl. 17 ¶ 4.) "[T]he federal district court in New Jersey 'has repeatedly interpreted [the CRA] analogously to § 1983."' Filgueiras v. Newark Public Schools, 426 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div.) certif. denied 208 N.J. 366 (2011), supra.) "Under both § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs must also prove that defendants are state actors." Wilson v. Cnty. of Gloucester, 256 F.R.D. 479, 188 n. 13 (D.N.J. 2009). This cause of action is facially defective.
In Moore v. Youth Correctional Institute at Annandale, the court found that "[c]ertain offenses, such as misconduct in office, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:30-2, are inherently related to public office or employment. 230 N.J. Super. 374, 396 (App. Div. 1989). In their Complaint, Plaintiffs fail to...
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