Miller v. Coffeen

• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM; LEEDY, J., and DEW and ANDERSON
• Citation: Miller v. Coffeen, 365 Mo. 204, 280 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. 1955)
• Decision Date: 13 June 1955
• Docket Number: No. 44063,44063
• Parties: Orville C. MILLER, Respondent, v. Carroll C. COFFEEN, Appellant.

Page 100

280 S.W.2d 100

365 Mo. 204

Orville C. MILLER, Respondent, v. Carroll C. COFFEEN, Appellant.

No. 44063.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

June 13, 1955.

Albert Copaken, Sylvia Copaken, Kansas City, for appellant.

Kaer P. Vanice, II, Edwin Earnshaw, Kirchner & Vanice, Kansas City, for respondent.

BARRETT, Commissioner.

The question presented by this appeal is whether, in the particular circumstances of this record, the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in decreeing specific performance of a contract to sell real estate, a house and lot in Kansas City.

Before considering the case upon its essential merits, however, it is necessary by way of introduction and approach to briefly note certain general factors concerning which the parties are not in complete agreement. The appellant seller claims, among other things, that the trial court prejudicially erred in the admission of evidence, and particularly in refusing to admit and consider certain proffered evidence. The appellant prepared and requested the court to make sixteen specific findings of fact. The court refused to adopt the appellant's sixteen requests and adopted as its findings of fact the respondent's fourteen specific requests. In addition the court adopted the respondent's offered declarations of law and accordingly entered a judgment decreeing that the appellant specifically perform the contract by conveying his house and lot to the respondent. In connection with these matters the appellant has briefed and argues twenty points, but it is not necessary to a disposition of this appeal to consider them in detail. Upon this appeal it is the duty of this court to 'consider any evidence which was rejected by the trial court and duly preserved for the appeal when the appellate court believes such evidence to be admissible', paying deference 'to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.' V.A.M.S. Sec. 510.310(4). In this connection in this case, this court defers to all findings of fact, which of necessity were solely dependent upon the trial court's persuasion and finding as to the credibility of conflicting oral evidence. Specifically, and contrary to the appellant's claim, there was no substantial evidence of fraud, mutual mistake of fact, or mental incapacity as those terms are generally defined and technically employed in equitable actions. Herzog v. Ross, 358 Mo. 177, 213 S.W.2d 921; Kirby v. Balke, 306 Mo. 109, 266 S.W. 704; Brown v. Fagan, 71 Mo. 563. On the other hand, the trial court declared as a matter of law that 'Owners have a right to sell for what they please, and buyers have a right to pay what they please. The consideration was not grossly inadequate, and the courts will specifically enforce contracts, even though it be a hard one,' but the court did not specifically find as a fact 'that the price was not grossly inadequate,' the fact was declared as a matter of law. In addition to the indicated rules and deference, however, this is, after all, a suit in equity to enforce specific performance of a contract to convey real property and it is the duty of this court to review the record anew and to enter such judgment as, having regard to the applicable, compelling, equitable principles, the trial court should have entered. V.A.M.S. Sec. 510.310(4); Glauert v. Huning, Mo., 266 S.W.2d 653; Herzog v. Ross, supra. One of the distinguishing characteristics of a suit for specific performance is that the trial court's discretion is reviewable anew upon appeal to this court, McClintock, Equity, pp. 129-130, and the essentially meritorious question here is whether in the circumstances the trial court appropiately exercised its discretion and decreed specific performance.

In brief outline the circumstances were that on June 15, 1951, the appellant, Carroll C. Coffeen, through the agency of a real estate broker, H. H. Flippo, entered into a contract with Floyd R. Finch by which they exchanged properties, an apartment, known as 2607-09 Cherry, owned by Mr. Coffeen and a house, known as 309 South Chelsea, owned by Mr. Finch. In the exchange the apartment was valued at $25,000 and the house on Chelsea at $12,000. In addition, in order that Mr. Finch might finance a loan on the apartment, Mr. Coffeen deposited $6,000 in a savings account as collateral security for the loan. Twelve days later, on the 27th day of June, Mr. Coffeen entered into a written contract with the respondent, Orville, C. Miller, by which he agreed to convey the property at 309 South Chelsea to Mr. Miller for the sum of $2,400, $100 to be paid upon the signing of the contract, $800 to be paid upon delivery of the deed and 'subject to a first Deed of Trust on said property held by the Sentinel Federal Savings & Loan Association of Kansas City, the unpaid balance of said loan being Fifteen Hundred ($1,500.00) Dollars.' Mr. Coffeen was to furnish an abstract within ten days showing 'good title,' and, according to the contract, the taxes and rental were to be prorated between the seller and the buyer. The following day Mr. Coffeen rued his bargain and sought, unsuccessfully, to be relased from his contract. Eight days later Mr. Miller instituted this action for specific performance and the trial court, as indicated, has entered a decree compelling Mr. Coffeen to execute a warranty deed conveying the property to Mr. Miller upon the payment of $2,400, which sum Mr. Miller actually paid into court after the entry of the decree, September 30, 1953.

These are the bare facts of the case and it is necessary, at this point, to consider by way of discrimination certain other matters relating to the essence of the remedy of specific performance and particularly to consider in what circumstances the remedy is granted as a matter of right. It is argued by the respondent that if a contract is freely and voluntarily executed, and its terms are clear and specific 'and it is free from objection,' specific performance will be decreed as a matter of right and not as a matter of grace or favor. In this connection it is urged, in support of the court's declaration of law (not, as indicated, its finding of fact), that every man has a right to deal with his property as he pleases, that the consideration was not grossly inadequate, and, that the court would specifically enforce a contract 'even though it be a hard one.' Also in this connection it is said that old age, mental weakness, inadequate consideration, or confidential relation, are not in and of themselves independent and substantive grounds upon which a court of equity will relieve a party from a contract voluntarily entered into. Abstractly and in a general way there can be no objection to these assertions. However, a more accurate and complete statement of the general rule is that 'specific performance is somewhat of grace as over against a hard and fast matter of absolute right. The chancellor has discretion to perform or not to perform. But he has studied the law of specific performance to little purpose who supposes that discretion may be exercised without reason and of caprice. The discretion to be exercised is a sound (that is) judicial discretion. It is exercised against performance when plaintiffs come into a court of equity with unclean hands; or when the contract is incomplete or so ambiguous as to be uncertain in terms and intendment; or where the contract is unfair, overreaching, biting; or when there are present (in pleadings and proofs) elements of mutual mistake in matter of substance, covinous contrivances, fraud, imposition, surprise, or accident, as those terms are understood in the law. Absent such features, and present a fair, plain contract, one complete and certain in terms and intendments, specific performance goes as a matter of right.' Beheret v. Myers, 240 Mo. 58, 77, 144 S.W. 824, 830. See also annotation 65 A.L.R. 7, 'Specific Performance of a Contract as a Matter of Right.' These rules have been applied and specific performance appropriately decreed, absent the objectionable features, in many instances but, in addition to Beheret v. Myers, supra, two specific cases will suffice by way of illustration. Kirby v. Balke, 306 Mo. 109, 266 S.W. 704; and Frank A. Gilbert Realty Co. v. Timmerman, Mo., 183 S.W.2d 131.

Furthermore, as the respondent contends, absent the other inequitable incidents, a promise to transfer a specific interest in land is unique, Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 360, and 'mere inadequacy--that is, inequality in value between the subject-matter and the price--is not a ground for refusing the remedy of specific performance; in order to be a defense, the inadequacy must either be accompanied by other inequitable incidents, or must be so gross as to show fraud.' 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 926, p. 631; 2 Restatement, Contracts, comment pp. 665-666. Nevertheless, one of the equitable incidents for consideration in withholding or decreeing specific performance of a contract is the fairness and reasonableness of the consideration in view of all the circumstances. Annotation 65 A.L.R., loc. cit. 85; Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 367. In this connection, despite the statement that 'inadequacy as a negative defense, and as an affirmative ground for a cancellation, is governed by one and the same rule,' 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, p. 631, there is a difference in the suits to cancel deeds, relied upon by the respondent, and in the suits for the specific performance of contracts. Binnion v. Clark, 359 Mo. 202, 221 S.W.2d 214. Likewise, the suits for specific performance of contracts in consideration of support, of which Campbell v. McLaughlin, Mo., 205 S.W. 18, is an example, stand alone. In all the cases relied upon by the respondent where inadequacy of consideration was a factor and specific performance was decreed there were additional compelling factors. There had been part performance of the contract, Strachan v. Drake,...