Miller v. Columbia Cnty.

• Decision Date: 16 November 2016
• Docket Number: A158838
• Parties: Samantha MILLER, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. COLUMBIA COUNTY, Defendant–Appellant, and Phil Werner, Defendant.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

282 Or.App. 348

385 P.3d 1214

Samantha MILLER, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v. COLUMBIA COUNTY, Defendant–Appellant,andPhil Werner, Defendant.

A158838

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and submitted June 28, 2016.

November 16, 2016

Matthew J. Kalmanson, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Hart Wagner LLP.

Geordie Duckler, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.

Before Sercombe, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and Edmonds, Senior Judge.

DEHOOG, J.

In this civil action, plaintiff sued defendant Columbia County for, among other things, false arrest and malicious prosecution.¹ Defendant appeals from a judgment awarding damages and costs entered after a jury found in plaintiff's favor on both of those claims. Defendant raises five assignments of error, the second of which contends that the trial court erred in denying defendant's directed-verdict motions as to those claims. Defendant argues that, because the officer who arrested plaintiff had probable cause for the arrest, each of plaintiff's claims failed as a matter of law. For the reasons discussed below, we agree that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motions.² Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

We begin with our standard of review. We review the denial of a motion for directed verdict for legal error. Batzer Construction, Inc. v. Boyer , 204 Or.App. 309, 317, 129 P.3d 773, rev. den. , 341 Or. 366, 143 P.3d 239 (2006). A defendant's motion for directed verdict must be denied if there is any evidence from which the jury could find all of the facts necessary to establish the elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. Ballard v. City of Albany , 221 Or.App. 630, 639, 191 P.3d 679 (2008) ("A directed verdict * * * is appropriate only if the court can affirmatively say that there is no evidence from which a jury could find facts necessary to establish each element of the claim."). In reviewing the denial of defendant's motions for directed verdict, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party. See id. (a defendant is entitled to a directed verdict if, "on the basis of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, [the defendant] was entitled to prevail as a matter of law").

We state the relevant facts from trial in that light. Plaintiff lived and kept a large number of dogs on a two-acre parcel in Columbia County. On November 16, 2010, plaintiff had a dispute with her neighbor, Werner, regarding plaintiff's dogs. As a result of that encounter, Werner called 9–1–1 and reported that plaintiff had pointed a gun at him and verbally threatened to kill him. Deputy Peabody, an officer with the Columbia County Sheriff's Office, responded to the call and interviewed Werner. Werner told Peabody that he had been driving his all-terrain vehicle (ATV) near plaintiff's property and stopped next to her fence. He told Peabody that he had stood on top of his ATV and demanded that plaintiff, who was in her yard, keep down the noise from her dogs. According to Werner, plaintiff ran inside, returned with a dark-colored handgun in a soft holster, removed and pointed the gun at Werner, and told Werner that she was going to shoot him.

As part of the same investigation, Peabody also spoke to Groves, another neighbor of plaintiff's. Groves told Peabody that he had been outside when the incident between plaintiff and Werner had occurred. Groves said that he had seen Werner stop his ATV near plaintiff's property and that he had heard Werner call plaintiff a derogatory name and say something about keeping her dogs quiet.

Having spoken to Werner and Groves, but not to plaintiff, Peabody sought and obtained a warrant to search plaintiff's property for the handgun and related evidence. Several days later, while driving to plaintiff's home to execute the search warrant, Peabody learned through dispatch that there had been a shooting at that residence sometime before November 16. The evidence also showed that Peabody knew at that time that there had been an ongoing dispute between plaintiff and her neighbors.

Upon arriving at plaintiff's home, Peabody handed her the search warrant, at which point plaintiff phoned her mother. Plaintiff's mother, in turn, connected plaintiff's attorney to the call, and plaintiff remained on the phone for the duration of Peabody's search. When Peabody asked plaintiff where "the gun" was located, plaintiff simply pointed to a loaded handgun on the kitchen counter. Peabody seized the gun, together with several boxes of ammunition that he found on top of plaintiff's refrigerator.

Because the handgun in plaintiff's kitchen was loaded, easily accessible, and, like the gun Werner had described, enclosed in a soft holster, Peabody concluded that it was most likely the same handgun. Peabody did not question plaintiff about the handgun or the reported incident because, based on what he had overheard of plaintiff's phone conversation, he believed that she was seeking legal advice and did not want "to go around her attorney." Based upon his witness interviews and discovery of the handgun, Peabody believed that he had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for the crimes of menacing, ORS 163.190, and pointing a firearm at another, ORS 166.190, and arrested her for both offenses.

Plaintiff was taken to jail, where she was booked and fingerprinted. Approximately five hours later, the jail released plaintiff, after first requiring her to post bail and sign a release agreement setting a court appearance in December 2010. She appeared in court as required in December but, by then, the state had decided not to pursue formal charges against her. As a result of her arrest, detention, and required court appearance, plaintiff later brought this tort action, alleging that defendant's actions had comprised false arrest and malicious prosecution.

Plaintiff's theory at trial was that, before arresting her, Peabody had a duty to investigate whether she had acted in self-defense. Plaintiff reasoned that, if she had been defending herself, she could not have been guilty of the crimes for which she was arrested. Plaintiff presented evidence that an investigation would have disclosed that, before November 16, plaintiff had had several encounters with Werner, during which Werner had threatened to kill her and had fired a rifle at her house. Plaintiff testified that she had contacted the sheriff's office following those events, but that no action was taken to protect her from Werner. As a result, plaintiff explained, she had feared for her life and purchased the handgun to protect herself.

As for the incident leading to her arrest, plaintiff testified that further investigation would have disclosed that Werner had climbed onto plaintiff's fence bearing a semiautomatic rifle, and that plaintiff had responded by running into her house, grabbing her gun, and yelling at Werner to get off of the fence. Plaintiff argued that, had Peabody properly investigated those facts, he would have realized that she was not guilty of menacing or pointing a firearm at another. Accordingly, she argued at trial that Peabody's belief that there was probable cause to arrest her had not been reasonable and, therefore, could not justify her arrest.

Defendant, in turn, argued that Peabody had no duty to investigate further before arresting plaintiff, and that his failure to do so did not render his probable cause determination unreasonable. Thus, at the close of evidence, defendant moved for directed verdicts on both the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. Defendant first argued that, because Peabody had probable cause for an arrest, plaintiff could not establish that her arrest had been unlawful, which, defendant noted, was an essential element of the false arrest claim. Defendant similarly argued that plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim failed as a matter of law.³ The trial court denied defendant's motions, reasoning that the evidence gave rise to questions of fact for the jury to resolve regarding both causes of action. Specifically, the court left to the jury the question of whether the arrest was supported by probable cause, stating that the jury, not the court, should determine whether Peabody "had an obligation to ask questions of the plaintiff before arresting her." As the trial court put it, the existence of probable cause—and, particularly, whether Peabody had a duty to investigate and rule out self-defense—was "the central question in this case."⁴

As noted, defendant's second assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motions for directed verdict, because the presence of probable cause to arrest plaintiff defeated both of her claims as a matter of law. We begin with defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict as to plaintiff's false arrest claim.⁵

The basic parameters of a false arrest claim are "familiar and well settled."

Hiber v. Creditors Collection Service , 154 Or.App. 408, 413, 961 P.2d 898, rev. den. , 327 Or. 621, 971 P.2d 413 (1998). "The gravamen of the claim is the unlawful imposition of restraint on another's freedom of movement." Id . (internal quotation marks omitted). A false arrest claim consists of four elements: (1) the defendant must confine the plaintiff; (2) the defendant must intend the act that causes confinement; (3) the plaintiff must be aware of the confinement; and (4) the confinement must be unlawful.⁶ Id.

Of those four elements, only the last one—whether the confinement was unlawful—is at issue in this appeal. As in its directed-verdict motion, defendant argues on appeal that the existence of probable cause for plaintiff's arrest provided a complete defense to the false arrest claim, because it rendered plaintiff's arrest—and her resulting confinement—lawful. Defendant's premise is that the facts known to an officer at the time of an...