Miller v. Connelly
| Decision Date | 23 February 1955 |
| Citation | 142 Conn. 144,112 A.2d 202 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Richard P. MILLER, Executor (Estate of Guy P. Miller) v. William F. CONNELLY, Tax Commissioner. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
W. Bradley Morehouse, Bridgeport, for plaintiff.
Herman Levine, Inheritance Tax Attorney, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, were William L. Beers, Atty. Gen., and Frederic W. Dauch, First Asst. Tax Commissioner, Hartford, for defendant.
Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.
The following facts have been stipulated for this reservation: Guy P. Miller of Fairfield, Connecticut, was born on February 11, 1875, and died on August 16, 1950, leaving a will dated October 11, 1948, which was admitted to probate in the Probate Court for the district of Fairfield. On December 30, 1940, the decedent, hereinafter referred to as the settlor, then aged sixty-five, executed an irrevocable trust agreement and transferred and delivered to trustees certain property to be held under it. The agreement provided that the net income of the trust should be paid to the settlor's daughter, Catharine M. Towne, during her life. On her death, the trust fund is to be transferred and delivered to her issue in equal shares per stirpes, provided, however, that the share of any issue who has not attained his twenty-fifty birthday at the time of her death shall be set aside and held in trust for him until not later than his twenty-fifth birthday. In the event she is survived by any issue whose share of the trust fund is held in trust and who dies before the time it vests in his possession, which in no case can be later than his twenty-fifth birthday, his share is to be transferred and delivered to his issue in equal shares per stirpes 'or, if there be no such issue, to the person or persons who would have been entitled to take the intestate estate of such beneficiary, had he died intestate, according to the laws of the State of Connecticut in force at the date of his death and in the proportions fixed by such laws.' In the event Catharine M. Towne is not survived by issue, the trust fund is to be transferred and delivered 'to the person or persons who would have been entitled to take her intestate estate, had she died intestate, according to the laws of the State of Connecticut in force at the date of her death and in the proportions fixed by such laws.'
The trust agreement authorizes the trustees to invade the principal of Catharine M. Towne's trust to provide for her 'comfortable support (including the comfortable support and reasonable educational requirements of her children).' Further, the trustees may invade the principal of any trust established for issue, after first taking into account the beneficiary's other sources of income, to provide for his 'comfortable support and reasonable educational requirements.'
At the time of execution of the trust agreement, Catharine M. Towne was thirty-eight years of age and had two sons, aged fifteen and twelve. She was divorced and had insufficient income with which to support herself and to support and educate her sons. To a considerable extent, it had been necessary for the settlor to support her and her sons, his grandchildren, and his purpose in establishing the trust was to provide her with an independent income. At the time of the death of the settlor, she and her two sons were all living and unmarried. In addition, the settlor's son, Richard P. Miller, and another daughter, Mary C. Cleborne, together with their respective issue, were living.
The parties have also agreed that under the terms of the trust agreement and the Connecticut intestate laws, as they existed at the time of the settlor's death, no part of the trust fund could have been distributed to the settlor unless he outlived both his daughter and his daughter's issue, all such issue died before attaining the age of twenty-five, and the last one dying left no widow. The questions upon which advice is desired are as follows: (a) Does the termination, by the settlor's death, of the possibility that he might be an intestate heir of the life tenant or of her issue subject any part of the trust fund, as constituted at his death, to the Connecticut succession tax as a 'gift or grant intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the transferor'? (b) If question (a) is answered in the affirmative, should the value of the remainder interests of the life tenant's two sons be subtracted from the trust fund in computing the amount subject to the Connecticut succession tax?
Section 2020 of the General Statutes provides for the imposition of a tax upon transfers, in trust or otherwise, of certain classes of property or any interest therein or income therefrom, under prescribed conditions and limitations. We are concerned with that portion of § 2021 which provides that the transfers enumerated in § 2020 shall be taxable if made '(d) by gift or...
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Lichtenstein's Estate, In re
...rely on one state and two federal cases construing the 'at or after death' provisions of their respective statutes. Miller v. Connelly, 142 Conn. 144, 112 A.2d 202 (1955) (but cf. Bridgeport-City Trust Co. v. Sullivan, 146 Conn. 184, 148 A.2d 549 (1959)); Commissioner v. Bank of California,......
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Naylor v. Brown
...is 'the shifting of the enjoyment of property-the economic benefits thereof or economic interests therein.' Miller v. Connelly, 142 Conn. 144, 148, 112 A.2d 202, 204; Pape v. Sullivan, supra; Fabian v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 456, 460, 58 A.2d 384; 42 Am.Jur.2d, Inheritance, Estate, and Gift Taxes......
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Dolak v. Sullivan
...vesting in interest which is the basis of the tax levy. Cochran v. McLaughlin, 129 Conn. 176, 179, 27 A.2d 120.' Miller v. Connelly, 142 Conn. 144, 149, 112 A.2d 202, 204. The tax is on 'the shifting of the enjoyment of property--the 'economic benefits' thereof or 'economic interest' therei......
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Estate of Moore, CROCKER-CITIZENS
...be deducted from the value of the corpus in determining the amount subject to tax. That was the method of disposition in Miller v. Connelly, 142 Conn. 144, 112 A.2d 202, cited by Controller, although not as the result of the judicial decision but because the tax commissioner conceded it was......