Miller v. Detroit Pub. Sch.

• Decision Date: 27 May 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 14-cv-12819
• Citation: 189 F.Supp.3d 671
• Parties: M. Heather Miller, Plaintiff, v. Detroit Public Schools, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

189 F.Supp.3d 671

M. Heather Miller, Plaintiff,

v.Detroit Public Schools, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-12819

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed May 27, 2016

George B. Washington, Scheff & Washington, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.

Theophilus E. Clemons, Detroit Public Schools District, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO LIABILITY ON COUNT II [#57] AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [#60]

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Heather Miller has filed a two-count Second Amended Complaint alleging that Defendants Detroit Public Schools ("DPS"), Dr. Sherrell Hobbs, Cassandra Washington and Wilma Taylor-Costen,¹ violated her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("FMLA") when they unlawfully excluded her from the recall process for laid-off teachers based on absences that were protected by the FMLA (Count I). In Count II, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they failed to recall her in retaliation for her extensive speech on matters relating to DPS.

Presently before the Court are two motions: (1) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability on Count II and (2) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. These matters are nearly fully briefed² and a hearing was held on May 19, 2016. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability on Count II and will deny Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working for DPS as a middle school math teacher in August of 2001. Since that time, she and her husband, Steve Conn, have been outspoken, activist teachers against many of the policies of the DPS. According to Plaintiff, she and her husband are the most famous activists in the DPS.

In 2007, the Chairman and Superintendent of the School Board, terminated both Plaintiff and her husband. Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Doyle O'Connor of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission ("MERC") issued a decision finding that those terminations were in retaliation for Plaintiff and her husband's activities in opposition to school closings and other policies. Plaintiff and her husband filed an action in this Court asserting that their terminations violated their First Amendment rights. Judge Stephen J. Murphy issued a preliminary injunction reinstating Plaintiff and her husband to their positions after concluding that they had a substantial likelihood of success on their First Amendment claim. Conn v. Board of Educ. of City of Detroit , 586 F.Supp.2d 852 (2008).

Following their reinstatement, Plaintiff and her husband resumed teaching, as well as their activities opposing many DPS policies. For instance, they denounced charter schools, asserted that Detroit was being subjected to discriminatory treatment, organized pickets against layoffs and school closings, opposed the contract negotiated by the Emergency Financial Manager, and filed legal actions against deductions from the teachers' pay. Plaintiff distributed thousands of leaflets in front of the DPS schools, faxed fliers to hundreds of school offices, sent numerous emails to hundreds of teachers, helped gather 2,000 signatures in support of the recall petition, and appeared on television and radio broadcasts on several occasions.

In fact, Plaintiff asserts that she has never met a member of DPS management who did not know her political activity. Defendant Cassandra Washington, who works in DPS's Human Resources Department, has testified that Plaintiff's political activity was "generally known" throughout the District.

During the 2010-2011 academic year, Plaintiff began to develop a serious health condition. She was hospitalized twice and had numerous absences. In the following academic year, Plaintiff's condition worsened. From September through December, she sought treatment from Dr. Stephen Wilson on 13 occasions for abdominal pain caused by her condition. Following Christmas break, she sought treatment from Dr. Wilson on five other occasions. In late February, Plaintiff's condition became even more serious and she missed nine consecutive days from February 27, 2012 through March 9, 2012. On March 2, 2012, she sought treatment at Henry Ford Hospital's Emergency Room and was admitted to Beaumont Hospital on March 4, 2012. She called her school and spoke to Patricia Parker, the school secretary, who had been designated by the administration to handle calls regarding attendance. She informed Parker of her medical condition and Parker sent her a blank FMLA request.

When Plaintiff returned to work, Parker and the principal, Dwana Brown, told Plaintiff that she had to turn her FMLA form in at an unspecified office downtown. Plaintiff went from office to office until she found someone who accepted her FMLA form. DPS claims that it has no record of Plaintiff's FMLA request.

On April 16, 2012, Plaintiff missed work again when she sought treatment at Henry Ford Hospital's Emergency Room and with Dr. Michael Mahoney. After seeing Dr. Mahoney on several other occasions, he finally recommended that Plaintiff receive surgery. Plaintiff underwent surgery at Beaumont Hospital in May of 2012. She requested nine more days of FMLA leave due to the surgery and recovery period. Plaintiff claims that out of the total thirty-one days she missed during the 2011-2012 academic year, all but one or two were attributable to her serious health condition.

In the midst of Plaintiff's ongoing health issues, on April 10, 2012, Plaintiff, like many DPS teachers, received a notice of layoff. Following her layoff, Plaintiff was placed in a pool for recall. At that time, recalls were governed by an evaluation scale whereby teachers were scored in five different categories, with a total possible score of 100. A teacher needed a score of 70 points to be eligible for recall. When Plaintiff was evaluated in the spring of 2012, Brown marked all thirty-one of her absences as unexcused. This caused her to receive a 0 out of the possible fifteen points for attendance on her evaluation, thus resulting in a total score of 64. This violated DPS's policy since "[a]pproved medical/FMLA Leave" absences were not to be counted as unexcused. See Plf.'s Resp., Ex. 4. Because Plaintiff received a score lower than 70, she was not recalled to any schools for the 2012-2013 academic year.

Plaintiff was able to find a recall opportunity on her own when she contacted Defendant Sherrell Hobbs, the principal of Golightly Educational Center. Hobbs had been interested in hiring Plaintiff the year prior, however DPS had a hold on transfers. When Plaintiff contacted Hobbs about a possible position, Hobbs immediately returned her call and set up an interview.

During the interview, Hobbs told Plaintiff that she knew and admired her activism and that of her husband. Hobbs eventually showed Plaintiff a teacher roster with her name on it and told her that she was hiring her to teach math at Golightly for the 2012-2013 academic year. She also told Plaintiff that she wanted her to march in the following week's back-to-school parade and directed the Assistant Principal to show Plaintiff the school and "her classroom." He did as directed and when they reached the third floor, he took Plaintiff to the math room and said "this will be your room." He also discussed the equipment she would need and the extracurricular activities she would lead. Plaintiff left Golightly at 1:00 p.m. believing she would be employed for the coming school year.

However, within hours of Hobbs notifying the DPS central office of her plan to hire Plaintiff, Defendant Assistant Superintendent Wilma Taylor-Costen called her and claimed Hobbs' staff had been cut by one position. Hobbs immediately sent an "URGENT" email to the hiring office telling them not to send the hiring letter to Plaintiff. However, she did not contact Plaintiff and let her know the offer of employment was rescinded.

Thirteen days later another math position purportedly became available at Golightly. However, the central office referred another mathematics teacher to Hobbs and she hired that person one day later. Hobbs claims that she did not hire Plaintiff because she "forgot."

Plaintiff filed an unfair labor practice charge with the MERC in February of 2013. Plaintiff alleged that she had been laid off and not recalled due to her union activism in violation of the Public Employment Relations Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.210 et seq. ("PERA"). On April 21, 2015, ALJ David M. Peltz issued a decision concluding that Plaintiff had been laid off and not recalled due to her protected union activities. On May 18, 2016, the ALJ's decision was affirmed by the full MERC.

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

1. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) empowers the court to render summary judgment forthwith "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Redding v. St. Eward , 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir.2001). The Supreme Court has affirmed the court's use of summary judgment as an integral part of the fair and efficient administration of justice. The procedure is not a disfavored procedural shortcut. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; see also Cox v. Kentucky Dept. of Transp. , 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir.1995).

The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is " ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ " Amway Distributors Benefits Ass'n v. Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477...