Miller v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Docket No. 177517

Citation218 Mich.App. 221,553 N.W.2d 371
Decision Date09 August 1996
Docket NumberDocket No. 177517
PartiesDale MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan (US)

John D. Tallman, Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellant.

Dilley, Dewey, Damon & Condon, P.C. by Jonathan S. Damon, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellee.

Before HOOD, P.J., and YOUNG and T.L. BROWN, * JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition to defendant. We affirm.

In his appeal, plaintiff asks this Court to revisit an issue conclusively addressed by our Supreme Court in Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Churchman, 440 Mich. 560, 489 N.W.2d 431 (1992). We decline to do so.

I
A

This case involves a series of startling admissions by plaintiff that he intended to commit suicide. Plaintiff incurred serious injuries when he drove his truck into a tree at seventy miles an hour. Just before the collision, plaintiff had been cleaning stalls at a stable to pay the boarding expenses for his horses. On the date he was injured, plaintiff argued with the stable owner's son and in an attempt to calm down, drove off in his truck. Yet, while driving, plaintiff became increasingly agitated and stopped to write a note to his wife stating:

Honey, I Love You. I Can't Take It. I Love You But I can't Take I [sic] it Any More [sic]. Love Dale.

Plaintiff returned to the stable and threw the note to his wife, and left again in his truck. After leaving the stable, plaintiff drove into the tree.

Frank Vargo, a Kent County Sheriff's Deputy was dispatched to the scene of the accident. After ascertaining plaintiff's identity, Deputy Vargo asked plaintiff what happened. Plaintiff informed Deputy Vargo that he had closed his eyes and tried to kill himself. Deputy Vargo reported that plaintiff appeared alert and in stable condition. Plaintiff's wife arrived at the scene shortly thereafter and informed Deputy Vargo that plaintiff was "coming off" antidepressant drugs. She also provided Deputy Vargo with the note written to her by plaintiff. When Deputy Vargo interviewed plaintiff at the hospital later that evening, plaintiff stated that the reason he was not wearing a seat belt was because he was attempting to kill himself.

In his deposition, plaintiff testified that he remembered very little of the incident, but he could recall seeing the tree and the speedometer in front of him. He testified that he had done "something stupid and attempted suicide." Plaintiff also acknowledged telling the police officer that he tried to kill himself.

B

Notwithstanding plaintiff's admissions that he had attempted to kill himself, plaintiff later filed a claim for his injuries with defendant, his no-fault carrier. Defendant denied plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff then instituted this action to recover for his injuries, claiming that he was entitled to the insurance benefits because his injuries resulted from an automobile-related accident. In response, defendant argued recovery was precluded in accordance with M.C.L. § 500.3105(4); M.S.A. § 24.13105(4). The no-fault statute precludes recovery when injuries result from intentional acts. The statute provides:

(1) Under personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter.

* * * * * *

(4) Bodily injury is accidental as to a person claiming personal protection insurance benefits unless suffered intentionally by the injured person or caused intentionally by the claimant. Even though a person knows that bodily injury is substantially certain to be caused by his act or omission, he does not cause or suffer injury intentionally if he acts or refrains from acting for the purpose of averting injury to property or to any person including himself. [M.C.L. 500.3105(1), (4); M.S.A. § 24.13105(1), (4) (emphasis added).]

In moving for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), defendant argued that there was no factual dispute that plaintiff attempted suicide or that his injuries resulted from this attempt, and thus it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because attempted suicide is an intentional act. In response, plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary disposition with an affidavit from his treating social worker, attesting to the fact that plaintiff had undergone treatment for severe depression and lacked the mental capacity to form the intent to commit suicide.

The trial court granted defendant's motion, finding that plaintiff intended to commit suicide. The court reasoned that plaintiff's mental capacity was not relevant in determining, pursuant to Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Churchman, supra, whether he intended the act and the injury.

II

On appeal, plaintiff makes the following arguments: (1) the trial court erred in finding that there was no genuine issue of fact concerning whether plaintiff could form the intent to commit suicide and (2) plaintiff was entitled to summary disposition because defendant failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with affidavits or other documentary evidence that disputed the affidavit of plaintiff's treating social worker. Essentially, plaintiff asks this Court to conclude that his mental illness created a genuine issue of fact concerning whether he intended to commit suicide. Under these facts, we decline to do so.

III

Michigan's no-fault insurance system aims to provide victims of automobile-related accidents with assured, adequate, and prompt payment for economic losses. Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 578-579, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978). The no-fault act mandates that insurers "pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle." M.C.L. § 500.3105(1); M.S.A. § 24.13105(1). The act defines bodily injury as accidental "unless suffered intentionally by the injured person or caused intentionally by the claimant." M.C.L. § 500.3105(4); M.S.A. § 24.13105(4). One acts intentionally if he intended both the act and the injury. Schultz v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 212 Mich.App. 199, 201, 536 N.W.2d 784 (1995); Bronson Methodist Hosp. v. Forshee, 198 Mich.App. 617, 629-630, 499 N.W.2d 423 (1993). The subjective intent of an actor is the focus of determining whether the actor acted intentionally. Schultz, supra, at p. 201, 536 N.W.2d 784; Frechen v. DAIIE, 119 Mich.App. 578, 580-582, 326 N.W.2d 566 (1982). Germane to plaintiff's claim on appeal is whether evidence of an actor's mental capacity raises a factual question regarding the actor's subjective intent. In light of our Supreme Court's decision in Churchman, supra, at 568-570, 489 N.W.2d 431, we conclude that a claim of mental illness, by itself, does not create a factual question regarding the actor's intent.

A

In Churchman, the insured, Henry G. Frost, Jr., became engaged and killed Gary Churchman, and then turned the gun on himself. Id. at 563-564, 489 N.W.2d 431. When Churchman's mother and girlfriend brought actions against Frost's estate, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Frost's homeowner's insurer, instituted a declaratory action. Id. at 564-565, 489 N.W.2d 431. Auto-Owners insisted that Churchman's injuries resulted from the intentional acts of Frost, and that Frost's policy excluded recovery for bodily injury "expected or intended" by the insured. The trial court denied Auto-Owners' claim on the basis of evidence that Frost was a paranoid schizophrenic. Id. at 565, 489 N.W.2d 431. Looking to the law in other jurisdictions, the trial court reasoned that Frost could not form the intent because of his mental illness. Id. This Court affirmed the trial court's decision. 184 Mich.App. 699, 459 N.W.2d 24 (1990). The Supreme Court reversed and concluded that "an insane or mentally ill person can intend or expect the results of his actions." Churchman, supra, 440 Mich. at 569-570, 489 N.W.2d 431. Churchman's holding effectively resolved a conflict of decisions from this Court, and thus is dispositive of the issue in this case. 1

B

Before Churchman, two panels of this Court reached opposite results in determining whether evidence of mental illness affects a finding that an insured intended his or her actions. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller (Miller I), 175 Mich.App. 515, 521-522, 438 N.W.2d 638 (1989), remanded 434 Mich. 882, 452 N.W.2d 209 (1990) (when a person cannot form an intent to act because of insanity, he has not acted "intentionally" as that term is used in insurance policies); Transamerica Ins. Corp. of America v. Boughton, 177 Mich.App. 253, 258-259, 440 N.W.2d 922 (1989) (a person who has been deemed insane can act intentionally as contemplated by an insurance exclusion).

In Miller I, the insured randomly shot inside a restaurant, took a hostage and shot her in the head at close range. The insured was shot and killed by the police at the scene. Miller I, supra at p. 516-517, 438 N.W.2d 638. The insured's policy excluded coverage for injuries resulting from the criminal or intentional actions of the insured that the insured "intended" or "reasonably expected" to result from his actions. Id. at 520, 521, 438 N.W.2d 638. Evidence was presented to the lower court that the insured was not aware of what he was doing or was unable to control his actions when he engaged in this killing spree. Id. at 522, 438 N.W.2d 638.

The Miller I panel noted that in the criminal context insanity mitigates a defendant's ability to form intent for criminal liability and observed that other jurisdictions considering the question have extended this principle to hold that insanity precludes a finding that an insured acted intentionally. Id. at 521, 438 N.W.2d 638 (citing anno: Liability insurance:...

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