Miller v. Foley

• Decision Date: 02 April 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-1223.,81-1223.
• Citation: Miller v. Foley, 317 N.W.2d 710 (Minn. 1982)
• Parties: Susan D. MILLER, et al., Respondents, v. Tom FOLEY, County Attorney, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

317 N.W.2d 710 (1982)

Susan D. MILLER, et al., Respondents, v.Tom FOLEY, CountyAttorney, et al., Appellants.

No. 81-1223.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 2, 1982.

Briggs & Morgan, Richard G. Mark and Michael H. Streater, St. Paul, for appellants.

Leonard, Street & Deinard, Morris M. Sherman, Stephen J. Davidson, and Martha C. Brand, Minneapolis, for respondents.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

SCOTT, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Ramsey County District Court granting a temporary injunction restraining appellants, Ramsey County Attorney Tom Foley and the Ramsey County Board of Commissioners, from terminating respondents' employment by Ramsey County pending a determination of the action on the merits.By order dated February 10, 1982, this court reversed the granting of the temporary injunction, noting that this opinion setting out the reasoning underlying the court's action would follow.315 N.W.2d 593.

Respondents, Susan D. Miller, Neleta Kay Dunkelberger, and Grace M. Adams, are long-time civil service employees in the Legal Resources Services (LRS) Division of the Ramsey County Attorney's Office.All hold supervisory positions in LRS, which is the division primarily responsible for the collection of child support.

As a result of a severe financial crisis facing Ramsey County, the Ramsey County Board of Commissioners(Board) enacted countywide budget cuts in the fall of 1981.Respondents are three of 178 Ramsey County employees who lost their jobs in these cuts.

Respondents brought this action seeking temporary and permanent injunctions restraining appellants from terminating respondents' employment and seeking compensatory and punitive damages.Respondents contend that the action of appellants in eliminating funding for respondents' positions was arbitrary and capricious and not in the public interest, and that the action was a deprivation of respondents' civil rights since it was a retaliation by appellants against respondents for "exercising their constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom of speech and expression."Respondents support their claims with their own affidavits stating that Foley, the county attorney, dislikes them and is using the budgetary problems as an excuse to terminate their employment.They believe it is not logical to make budget cuts in a revenue collection department, and that since there were no budgetary reasons for the elimination of their positions, there must be other impermissible reasons.Respondents would have preferred an alternative budget considered by the Board that eliminated additional non-supervisory positions instead of their own.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the granting of the temporary injunction by the trial court constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.SeeEakman v. Brutger,285 N.W.2d 95(Minn.1979).

A temporary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy.Its purpose is to preserve the status quo until adjudication of the case on its merits.Pickerign v. Pasco Marketing, Inc.,303 Minn. 442, 444, 228 N.W.2d 562, 564(1975).Not every change in circumstances merits such relief, however.Because a temporary injunction is granted prior to a complete trial on the merits, it should be granted only when it is clear that the rights of a party will be irreparably injured before a trial on the merits is held.Id. at 444, 228 N.W.2d at 564;North Central Public Service Co. v. Village of Circle Pines,302 Minn. 53, 60, 224 N.W.2d 741, 746(1974);Thompson v. Barnes,294 Minn. 528, 533, 200 N.W.2d 921, 924(1972).

In Dahlberg Brothers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,272 Minn. 264, 137 N.W.2d 314(1965), this court specified five factors to be considered in making that determination:

(1) The nature and background of the relationship between the parties preexisting the dispute giving rise to the request for relief.

(2) The harm to be suffered by plaintiff if the temporary restraint is denied as compared to that inflicted on defendant if the injunction issues pending trial.

(3) The likelihood that one party or the other will prevail on the merits when the fact situation is viewed in light of established precedents fixing the limits of equitable relief.

(4) The aspects of the fact situation, if any, which permit or require consideration of public policy expressed in the statutes, State and Federal.

(5) The administrative burdens involved in judicial supervision and enforcement of the temporary decree.

Id. at 274-75, 137 N.W.2d at 321-22(footnotes omitted).

The relationship between the parties here is personal employment.Respondents Miller, Dunkelberger, and Adams have been employed by Ramsey County since 1969, 1966, and 1966 respectively.While they are long-term employees, this factor is not determinative since the equity policy against enforcing personal service contracts requires an extraordinarily strong showing of harm to justify a temporary injunction, Sampson v. Murray,415 U.S. 61, 83-84, 94 S.Ct. 937, 949-950, 39 L.Ed.2d 166(1974).SeeBoise Cascade International, Inc. v. Northern Minnesota Pulpwood Producers Association,294 F.Supp. 1015, 1020-21(D.Minn.1968)(the court cannot compel specific performance of personal service contracts);cf.Minn.Stat. §§ 185.02,185.03 (1980)(injunctions shall not be used in any case between employer and employee in labor disputes).

The district court made the specific finding that respondents would suffer irreparable harm if the temporary injunction were denied.Respondents will certainly suffer loss of income which is approximately half of the family income in each case.Employee benefits of life and medical insurance will also be lost.Respondents' affidavits also state that they will be unable to find comparable employment and that the loss of their incomes will mean their families will be unable to meet their monthly expenses.In addition, respondents claim the elimination of their positions will cause irreparable injury to their professional reputations.

In evaluating the harm alleged in an employee termination situation, we are guided by the discussion of irreparable harm in Sampson v. Murray,415 U.S. 61, 94 S.Ct. 937, 39 L.Ed.2d 166(1974).Considering all the facts alleged in the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to respondents, we conclude that respondents have failed to carry their burden of showing that the harm justifies temporary relief.

In Sampson, the United States Supreme Court reversed the granting of a temporary injunction in an employment situation, holding that loss of income and damage to reputation were insufficient to constitute irreparable injury and failed to provide a basis for temporary injunctive relief.Id. at 91-92, 94 S.Ct. at 953.The Court stated that "the temporary loss of income, ultimately to be recovered, does not usually constitute irreparable injury,"id. at 90, 94 S.Ct. at 952(footnote omitted), and quoted fromVirginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. FPC,259 F.2d 921, 925(D.C.Cir.1958):

"The key word in this consideration is irreparable.Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough.The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will

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