Miller v. Ford Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 10 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-cv-01796-TLN-CKD |
| Parties | VANESSA MILLER, et al., as individuals and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Ford Motor Company's (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Stay Discovery. (ECF Nos. 51, 56.) Plaintiffs Vanessa Miller (“Miller”); Patsy Lund (“Lund”); Amber West, Evan West (collectively “Wests”); Darrick Christodaro (“Christodaro”); Amy Hoffer (“Hoffer”); James Padgett (“Padgett”); Jillian Constable (“Constable”); Monterio Butcher (“Butcher”); Harlampi Bozhinov (“Bozhinov”); Mary Glade (“Glade”) Teresa Balaszek[1] (“Balaszek”); Craig Morford Kelli Morford (collectively, “Morfords”); Aaron Manfra, Victoria Manfra (collectively “Manfras”); Stacey Coppock (“Coppock”); Rachel Goodrich (“Goodrich”); Brian Simonds (“Simonds”); David Schiavi (“Schiavi”); Robyn Pirog (“Pirog”); Zachary Scott Damm, Amanda Gates (collectively, “Damm and Gates”); and Shari Techlin[2] (“Techlin”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed oppositions. (ECF Nos. 57, 58.) Defendant replied. (ECF Nos. 59, 62.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Stay Discovery as moot.
Plaintiffs, 24 individuals spanning 15 states, purchased new and used 2013-19 Ford Edge, Escape, and Fusion vehicles equipped with 1.5L, 1.6L, or 2.0L Ecoboost engines. (ECF No. 43 ¶¶ 2, 12-171.) Plaintiffs allege the vehicles have a defect that causes engine coolant to leak, which purportedly can cause engine overheating and engine cylinder head cracking, corrosion in the cylinders, or “total engine failure.” (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 182-87.) Plaintiffs allegedly experienced engine-related issues at various times after purchase such as vehicles shaking violently while in use, overheating, running rough, or catching on fire. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 39, 53, 68, 80, 140.) Plaintiffs bring 51 claims based on an express and implied breach of warranty and fraud. (See generally id.) They further bring Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”), California's Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), California's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), implied warranty, fraud by concealment, and unjust enrichment claims on behalf of a putative nationwide class. (Id. at ¶¶ 275-331, 1293-1334.)
This action was initiated on September 4, 2020. (ECF No. 1.) On May 5, 2021, the Court issued an Order consolidating three related actions. (ECF No. 36.) The operative Consolidated Complaint was filed on June 21, 2021. (ECF No. 43.) Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss on August 2, 2021. (ECF No. 51.) Plaintiffs opposed on September 24, 2021. (ECF No. 57.) Defendant replied on October 14, 2021. (ECF No. 59.) Additionally, Defendant filed a motion to stay discovery on September 21, 2021. (ECF No. 56.) Plaintiffs opposed on October 14, 2021 (ECF No. 58), and Defendant replied on October 21, 2021 (ECF No. 62).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege “‘specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted).
Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355, F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters (Associated Gen. Contractors), 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. This plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted).
If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.'” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (). Although a district court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court's discretion to deny such leave is ‘particularly broad' where the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint[.]” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Defendant moves to dismiss all 51 of Plaintiffs' claims. (See ECF No. 51-1.) The Court will first address the express warranty claims, followed by the implied warranty claims, then turn to the fraud-based claims, and conclude with the nationwide class claims.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims on the bases that: (1) Plaintiffs' claims occurred outside the warranty's timeframe; (2) successful in-warranty repairs were completed; (3) some Plaintiffs brought their vehicle to independent mechanics; (4) Plaintiffs pleaded insufficient allegations to support a breach of express warranty claim; and (5) certain states impose specific bars on Plaintiffs' claims. (ECF No. 51-1 at 17-21.) The Court will address each argument in turn.
Defendant argues the express warranty claims of Hoffer (FL), Butcher (GA), the Morfords (KS), the Manfras (MD), Coppock (MI), Simonds (MN), Schiavi (NJ), and Techlin (WI) fail because the allegations establish they sought a repair after the warranty period expired.[4] (ECF No. 51-1 at 17.) In opposition, Plaintiffs do not dispute such vehicles were out-of-warranty but contend Defendant's warranty is unconscionable. (ECF No. 57 at 16-17.)
Here, as it is undisputed the above Plaintiffs sought repair after the express warranty period expired, their express warranty claims fail unless the warranty is unconscionable.
a) Unconscionability
“Unconscionability is ultimately a question of law for the court.” See Am. Software, Inc. v. Ali, 46 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1391 (1996). “Unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive element.” See Aron v. U-Haul Co. of Cal., 143 Cal.App.4th 796, 808 (2006). “Both elements must be present for a court to invalidate a contract or clause[.]” Id. “The procedural element of unconscionability focuses on two factors: oppression and surprise.” Id. at 808.
“Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Surprise involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). “The substantive element of unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether they create overly harsh or one-sided results that shock the conscience.” See id. (internal quotations and...
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