Miller v. Hernandez

Decision Date24 May 1994
Docket NumberNo. 18523,18523
PartiesJoyce M. MILLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Anthony HERNANDEZ, Defendant and Appellee. . Considered on Briefs
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Mark V. Meierhenry of Danforth, Meierhenry & Meierhenry, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellant.

James L. Hoy of Hoy and Hoy, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellee.

GILBERTSON, Circuit Judge.

ISSUES PRESENTED

I.

DOES THE FAILURE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT TO USE A JURY VERDICT FORM ITEMIZING EACH CLAIMED ELEMENT OF DAMAGE VIOLATE SDCL 15-6-49(a) AND DENY THE PLAINTIFF HER RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY JURY?

II.

BASED ON THE EVIDENCE, MUST THE JURY VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF BE SET ASIDE AS AN INADEQUATE AWARD OF DAMAGES?

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

On May 28, 1988 Joyce Miller (hereinafter Plaintiff) and Lynn Miller were injured in an automobile accident when struck by another vehicle driven by the Defendant. This action for personal injuries was instituted in May of 1991.

Prior to trial, a motion to sever the claims of Lynn Miller from those of the Plaintiff was granted by the court. Thereafter trial proceeded. At the close of the Defendant's evidence, a motion by the Plaintiff for a directed verdict as to the liability of the Defendant was granted.

The circuit court properly instructed the jury on each element of damage claimed by the Plaintiff. During the settlement of final instructions, the Plaintiff requested an itemized verdict form to require the jury to make a numerical finding on each claimed element of damage: costs incurred for medical care, costs for medical services reasonably certain to occur in the future, pain and suffering to date, future pain and suffering, lost wages, future lost wages, lost home services, future lost home services, loss of enjoyment of life, future loss of enjoyment of life and permanent partial impairment, both past and future. The circuit court denied this request and used a general verdict form.

The jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiff in the amount of $11,656.02. The Plaintiff timely moved for a new trial pursuant to SDCL 15-6-59(a)(5) "inadequate damages" and (7) "error of law occurring at the trial," on the theory that the damages awarded were "inadequate." The circuit court denied this motion for a new trial on August 26, 1993. This appeal follows.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
1. This Court's Jurisdiction.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff failed to properly move for a new trial and, in reality, abandoned it by failing to file a brief in support of the motion and failing to set the motion for a hearing. This argument fails in two respects. First, under SDCL 15-6-59(c), the obligation to set a hearing falls upon the court, not the moving party. Second, under SDCL 15-6-59(f) "a motion for a new trial shall not be necessary as a prerequisite to obtain appellate review as to matters specified in 15-6-59(a) ... (7)." See also SDCL 15-26A-8. The Plaintiff, having properly offered her proposed special verdict form and having objected to the general verdict form prior to the close of instructions, has preserved the issues she presents to the Court in her brief for appellate review.

2. The Right to Use a Special Verdict Form.

General verdicts and special verdicts have been in existence in this jurisdiction since 1877. However, the original use of a special verdict limited the jury to "find the facts only, leaving the judgment to the court." Revised Codes of the Territory of Dakota, Code of Civil Procedure, Art. V, Sec. 260 at 557 (1877). A review of our reported decisions since that time establishes a use of general verdicts predominating over the use of special verdicts.

The use of special verdicts is now governed by SDCL 15-6-49(a) 1 and the use of special interrogatories with a general verdict is now governed by SDCL 15-6-49(b). 2 The issue of the interpretation of the current rule is a case of first impression in South Dakota.

There are three general views as to the use of special verdicts or their companions, special interrogatories with a general verdict. Some states, such as Texas, use them in many jury cases. 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2503 (1971). Most states which use this approach have done so by statute. 3 On the other hand, critics of this system have attacked it as unwarranted judicial meddling with the jury system. 4

The middle ground, which is in accord with the literal wording of 15-6-49(a), makes the use of special verdict forms a matter of judicial discretion. When Rule 49 was adopted by this Court in 1966, we assume that this Court at that time meant what it said and said what it meant. Cf. Appeal of AT & T Information Systems, 405 N.W.2d 24, 27 (S.D.1987).

SDCL 15-6-49(a) and (b) are the equivalent to Rule 49(a) and (b) Fed.R.Civ.P. Mielitz v. Schmieg, 461 N.W.2d 763, 765 (S.D.1990). Rule 49 is used in the Federal Courts and in many state courts. Thus, decisions by the Federal Courts and other states with the Federal Rules provide analytical assistance in interpretation of our state rule. Mielitz, supra. The Federal Rules have become similar to a uniform law. SDCL 2-14-13 states that a uniform law is to be interpreted and construed "as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it."

In Orrison v. City of Rapid City, 76 S.D. 145, 74 N.W.2d 489 (1956), we were called upon to interpret the method of use of special verdicts under SDC 33.1330, "the Court may direct the jury to find a special verdict ...," the predecessor to SDCL 15-6-49(a) "the court may require a jury to return only a special verdict...." (emphasis added). In Orrison, we held that the decision of the trial court on whether to use a special verdict form was subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Id. 74 N.W.2d at 495. Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bartak v. Bell-Galyardt & Wells, Inc., 629 F.2d 523, 531 (8th Cir.1980), determined that both the current South Dakota rule, SDCL 15-6-49, and the identical Federal Rule 49, were based on an abuse of discretion standard.

The issue of the use of special verdicts and interrogatories is not analyzed in isolation. It has been held that when jury instructions comprehensively cover all material issues in a case, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the request for use of Rule 49. Wheeler v. John Deere, 935 F.2d 1090, 1101 (10th Cir.1991).

For the above reasons, we interpret SDCL 15-6-49(a) to allow the determination to use a special verdict form and its contents, if used, to be within the sound discretion of the circuit court. Abuse of discretion refers to "a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence." Kanta v. Kanta, 479 N.W.2d 505, 507 (S.D.1991).

An abuse of discretion will be measured by an objective reasonableness standard ... 'We are not to determine whether the judges of this court would have made an original like ruling, but rather whether we think a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances of the particular case, could reasonably have reached such a conclusion.' Stated another way, a trial court's findings of fact and the subsequent application of discretion shall not be disturbed unless there is clearly no basis in reason or evidence to support that finding.

Matter of Estate of Donahue, 464 N.W.2d 393, 394-95 (S.D.1990) (citations omitted.) 5

Wright and Miller state that there is little specific criteria as to how a trial court should exercise its discretion in using or not using Rule 49. Supra, at Sec. 2505. However, a review of case law and other recognized authorities establishes some helpful guidelines in this area.

Special verdicts are not favored in single issue or single party cases. Conversely, they can be helpful in cases concerning complex causes of action or multiple parties. Wright and Miller, supra; Bartak, 629 F.2d at 531. 6 Special verdicts are also of assistance in cases where the law is unsettled or is evolving. A special verdict makes it clear that the novel theory may have had no effect, or what effect it had on the jury's ultimate determination. This possibly allows corrective action by the trial court or an appellate court without the time and expense of another trial. Wright and Miller, supra.

Special verdicts are not justified for the "mere purpose of cross-examination of the jury to create error for the record." Wright and Miller, supra. If used, it should be for ultimate issues and not something akin to a Court's findings of fact in a court trial. Wright and Miller, supra. The text of Rule 49(a) states that questions should be drafted to be answered by the jury in a numerical figure or short answer rather than lengthy dissertations which may confuse the jury and unduly lengthen its deliberations. This Court has struggled with the issue of interpretation of inconsistent answers by a jury. Mielitz, 461 N.W.2d 763.

Special verdicts may also be helpful if it is necessary for the jury to determine if an award is tied to a date certain such as a statute of limitations, Schoenrock v. Tappe, 419 N.W.2d 197, 205 (S.D.1988) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (citing McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Hanskutt, 29 S.D. 535, 137 N.W. 286 (1912)), or the identity of the actual tortfeasor. Martinez v. Union Pacific R. Co., 714 F.2d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir.1983). Lastly, special verdicts are appropriate where suggested or mandated by statute. An example is the matter of prejudgment interest where it is allowed on some types of damages and not allowed on others. Cert. of Question from U.S. Dist. Court (Meyer v. Dixon Bros.), 369 N.W.2d 658, 659 (S.D.1985). Since Dixon, this distinction has been codified with the adoption of SDCL 21-1-13.1 which specifically points to such a procedure in the determination of prejudgment interest. 7

This case is an auto accident resulting in personal injuries to the Plaintiff....

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