Miller v. Jeffery

• Decision Date: 02 July 1929
• Parties: MILLER ET AL. v. JEFFERY ET AL.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

278 P. 946

129 Or. 674

MILLER ET AL. v. JEFFERY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Oregon

July 2, 1929

Department 1.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; Robert Tucker, Judge.

Suit by Caroline E. Miller and others against Florence Jeffery and husband. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Wm. C. Ralston, of Portland (Chester A. Sheppard, of Portland, on the brief), for appellants.

J. B Ofner, of Portland (Geo. D. La Roche and J. J. Fitzgerald both of Portland, on the brief), for respondents.

RAND, J.

On March 20, 1925, Edna C. Dalton, who was then 90 years of age executed a deed conveying to the defendants jointly lot 1 of block 160 in east Portland, now in the city of Portland. Mrs Dalton died on January 15, 1926. The plaintiffs Caroline E Miller and William L. Dalton are children of said grantor, and the other plaintiff, Walter E. Linnett, is a nephew. The defendants are husband and wife, and Florence Jeffery is also a daughter of the grantor.

Plaintiffs brought this suit seeking to have the deed set aside on the ground that it was procured by undue influence of the defendants and because of the grantor's lack of sufficient mental capacity to make a deed. Upon consideration of the evidence offered on the trial, the learned trial court entered a decree setting aside the deed, and, from that decree, defendants have appealed.

While this suit involves but one transaction, there were other transactions between Mrs. Dalton and the defendants, which were established upon the trial and are material because explaining the motives which seem to have actuated the defendants in their dealings with Mrs. Dalton.

The evidence shows that Edna C. Dalton, at the time of these transactions, was a widow, her husband having predeceased her many years before her death. Upon his death she became vested with the title to all of said block 160 except lot 7, which belonged to her son William, and another lot, which belonged to Herbert, another son who died in 1919. Upon Herbert's death, the title to the last-mentioned lot vested in his mother as his sole heir at law. Upon the property in controversy is a brick garage which rents for $100 or more per month. On lots 5 and 6 there is a large and pretentious dwelling house in which Mrs. Dalton made her home for many years prior to her death. On the remainder of the block owned by Mrs. Dalton there were several houses which had been rented for an aggregate rental of about $100 per month. William Dalton resides upon his lot, which adjoined his mother's home. Herbert lived with his mother until his death. The other children were then all married and had homes of their own.

Shortly after Herbert's death, an arrangement was entered into between Mrs. Dalton and Mrs. Jeffery whereby Mrs. Jeffery and her husband should live with Mrs. Dalton at her home and each pay one-half of the household expenses, and, after a conference with her children, Mrs. Dalton, on November 14, 1919, made a will in which she bequeathed to each child a part of her household goods and personal effects and devised to Mrs. Jeffery lots 5 and 6, the home property, to Mrs. Miller lots 3 and 4, and to William Dalton lots 2 and 8, and lot 1, the property in controversy here, to her three children and her said nephew, and William was to be appointed as executor of the will to serve without bonds. All of the testimony shows that in 1919, when the will was made, Mrs. Dalton was in good health, of sound mind, and thoroughly understood what disposition she wished to make of her property.

Pursuant to such arrangement, Mrs. Jeffery and her husband commenced living with Mrs. Dalton at her home and remained with her until her death, except for a period of about six weeks during each summer when they went to the beach and Mrs. Miller stayed with Mrs. Dalton at her home, except for an occasional night when either William or the nephew stayed there.

There is no evidence in the case that the disposition of the property which was made by the will was not entirely satisfactory to any of the children. It seems to have been a very equitable division of the property and fair to all parties. The evidence shows that the two lots which were devised by the will to Mrs. Jeffery, together with the dwelling house thereon, was worth about fifteen or sixteen thousand dollars. This was the most valuable of all of the devises. The garage property, which is in controversy here and which by the terms of the will was to be divided among the four devisees named, was worth about the same amount, but was subject to a mortgage of $4,500. The properties devised to the others were of considerable less value than that devised to Mrs. Jeffery.

However, in 1922, Mrs. Dalton, for some reason not disclosed by the evidence, wished to make a slight change in the will. She sent for her attorney, who up to that time, the evidence shows, had represented her in legal matters, and had him prepare a codicil which she executed. By this codicil lot 2, which, under the will, was to be devised to William, was devised to her nephew, and lot 1, the property in controversy, which had been devised to the three children and the nephew, was devised in equal shares to William Dalton and Mrs. Miller. Except as thus changed, the will was to be in full force and effect. This codicil was prepared and executed during the absence of the Jefferys at the beach. The evidence shows that this change in the terms of the will was made wholly at the request and under the direction of Mrs. Dalton. Up to this time, the evidence shows that, except for such business matters as Mrs. Dalton herself attended to, William had transacted his mother's business. After the Jefferys had returned and learned of the change made by the codicil, Mrs. Jefferey testified to the following conversation with Mrs. Dalton:

"I had a conversation with my husband in this matter. So then he said to Mother, he said, 'Well, what have you been doing while we have been gone?' 'Oh,' she says, 'Nothing much.' And he says, 'Well, what is that much?' And she said, 'Oh, nothing much.' And so he says, 'Well, I hear you have had the lawyer over here.' 'Yes,' she said she had; and then she told him that she had taken my share of this brick building away and given it to my sister. And he said to her, 'Well,' he says, 'Mother, do you think that is any way to treat Florence when she is not here?' She didn't say anything. 'Well,' he says, 'I think the best thing you ought to do is to put that back, give Florence her share back again.' He says 'I don't think that is any way to do.'

"And I don't know that he ever said anything more to her about it. Finally one day she said to me--we were talking about it and she said--I said to her, 'Mother,' I said, 'I think the best thing for you to do is to put that back where it belonged, where it was before.' I said, 'I think it will save trouble.' 'Well,' she says, 'if you think that,' she says, 'go and tell Mr. Heilig to do it.' * * *"

After these conversations were had between the defendants and Mrs. Dalton, a second codicil was made and executed revoking the first codicil and reinstating the will according to all of its original terms. This circumstance, in connection with those hereinafter referred to, leads us to the conclusion that the deed in question was not the voluntary act of Mrs. Dalton, and that it was procured by the defendants through the exercise of undue influence. It is not disputed by any witness that Mrs. Dalton's mind, after 1919, became very much enfeebled through old age or disease and that along toward the end of her life she became wholly incapacitated for transacting any business although there is evidence tending to show that, when requested by Mrs. Jeffery, she signed checks which had been prepared for her, almost up to the time of her death. The whole evidence shows that she became very hard of hearing, so that it became extremely difficult to converse with her; that she lost her eyesight, so that she could not read even with a magnifying glass; that she lost her memory, so that upon one occasion, upon Mrs. Jeffery's return from the beach, as testified to by Mrs. Jeffery herself, her mother at first did not know her; that her memory became so defective that she did not know that her son Herbert had died and often thought while talking with William that he was Herbert; that she had forgotten all of the incidents of her earlier life and remembered none of them; that when any of her old-time friends, with whom she had been intimate, called upon her she did not know them and they could not make themselves known to her; that she did not know her daughter Caroline when she called on her mother, nor her granddaughter with whom she had been on terms of intimacy. The evidence also shows that she was suffering from arteriosclerosis, and that she was very much enfeebled physically as well as mentally during the last years of her life.

In the fall of 1922, when this conversation between Mr. Jeffery and Mrs. Dalton took place as testified to by Mrs. Jeffery, Mrs Dalton was an old woman 87 or 88 years of age, in feeble health, and with a weak mind, and, because of this fact, it seems to us that the demand made upon her was not a request, but a command which a woman in her weakened condition and under the circumstances disclosed would feel bound to obey. In her conversations with Mrs. Miller and Mr. Dalton, they each testified that Mrs. Dalton often complained to them that the Jefferys were all of the time trying to get more and more of her...