Miller v. Jon Doe

• Docket Number: AC 43845
• Decision Date: 26 July 2022
• Citation: 214 Conn.App. 35,279 A.3d 286
• Parties: Omar J. MILLER v. Jon DOE et al.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

214 Conn.App. 35

279 A.3d 286

Omar J. MILLER

v.Jon DOE et al.

AC 43845

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 9, 2022

Officially released July 26, 2022

Janelle R. Medeiros, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Clare Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellant (defendant Joshua Medina).

Omar J. Miller, self-represented, the appellee (plaintiff).

Bright, C.J., and Alvord and Norcott, Js.

BRIGHT, C.J.

The defendant Joshua Medina, a central transportation unit officer for the Department of Correction (department), appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment in the action brought by the self-represented plaintiff, Omar J. Miller, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution.¹ On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion for summary judgment because he is entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiff's claim.² We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record before the court, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, reveals the following facts and procedural history. At the time of the events underlying the present case, the plaintiff was an incarcerated inmate in the custody of the department at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution (MacDougall-Walker) in Suffield.³ On July 3, 2013, the plaintiff was transported by the defendant from MacDougall-Walker to the University of Connecticut's Jack Dempsey Hospital (hospital) in Farmington for a medical appointment. Prior to the trip, the defendant placed the plaintiff in full restraints, which included "handcuffs, leg irons, a belly chain, a tether chain, and a ‘black box.’ "⁴

After the defendant placed those restraints on the plaintiff, the defendant escorted him outside to a Ford Crown Victoria motor vehicle (vehicle), which had been assigned to the defendant for the plaintiff's transportation. The defendant did not choose that particular vehicle or have the authority or ability to obtain a different vehicle. The vehicle had been modified to include a metal barrier between the front and rear seats. Because of that barrier, there was not enough space for the plaintiff to sit upright in the rear seat. Upon seeing the vehicle's modified interior, the plaintiff informed the defendant that the vehicle was too small, but the defendant told him just to lie down on the rear seat instead of sitting upright. The plaintiff then asked the defendant if he could get a larger vehicle, to which the defendant responded, "No," and again told the plaintiff to lie down on the rear seat, which he did.

Once in the vehicle, the plaintiff was unable to put his seat belt on because of his restraints and how he was forced to lie on the rear seat. The defendant never checked to see if the plaintiff's seat belt was fastened or offered to fasten his seat belt, despite a department policy that requires inmates to be seat belted during transit. The plaintiff also never asked the defendant to secure his seat belt.

While traveling to the hospital, the defendant exceeded the speed limit, but he and the plaintiff reached the hospital without incident. After the plaintiff's appointment, he was placed in the same vehicle and again lay down on the rear seat. During the trip back to MacDougall-Walker, the defendant drove "erratically" by weaving in and out of traffic, making sharp turns, and, at one point, driving thirty miles per hour above the speed limit. The plaintiff never commented on the defendant's driving or asked him to slow down.

While traveling along Route 159 in Windsor Locks, the defendant noticed a car ahead at the traffic light that had stopped in both the left and right lanes and appeared to be attempting to make a left hand turn from the right lane. The defendant thought that there was enough room for him to continue straight in the right lane and slip past the stopped car. He was mistaken, however, and struck the right rear side of the stopped car. During the collision, the plaintiff was launched into the metal barrier and lost consciousness. After he regained consciousness, "his body was wedged between the [rear] seat and the metal barrier and his head was pinned between the metal barrier and the [vehicle] door."

Immediately after the crash, the defendant called emergency services and department personnel, who quickly responded to the scene of the accident. The defendant then checked on the driver of the other car⁵ and the plaintiff. According to the defendant's evaluation of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was not at risk of immediate harm. The plaintiff later was transported by ambulance to Hartford Hospital so that he could receive medical treatment for the injuries he had suffered in the crash. According to the plaintiff, the accident caused injuries and pain to his head, neck, back, knee, and shoulder.

Thereafter, on September 12, 2013, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant and Jon Doe; see footnote 1 of this opinion; alleging that the defendant had violated the plaintiff's civil rights under the eighth amendment to the United States constitution.⁶ Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant and Doe's failure to abide by reasonable safety standards while transporting him gave rise to a claim for deliberate indifference pursuant to § 1983.⁷ On January 23, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The defendant then filed a request for the plaintiff to revise his complaint, wherein he asked him to "[s]eparate [the] claims against each defendant into separate counts." On June 23, 2014, in accordance with that request to revise, the plaintiff filed the operative complaint,⁸ in which he alleged in relevant part that the defendant had acted with deliberate indifference to his safety while transporting him from the hospital to MacDougall-Walker (count two).⁹ That claim was brought against the defendant in his individual capacity.

The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiff's claim was "barred by qualified immunity" because the allegations in the operative complaint did not establish that the defendant had violated clearly established law, given that federal precedent does not require an inmate to be seat belted during transit. The plaintiff opposed the defendant's motion to dismiss, arguing that the defendant had violated his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when the defendant's "reckless behavior led to [the plaintiff] being subjected [to] physical harm when [the defendant] was ‘driving erratically and in excess of speed limits.’ " The plaintiff further argued that, because he had sued the defendant in his individual capacity, qualified immunity did not apply.

On May 5, 2017, by way of a memorandum of decision, the court, Elgo, J. , denied the defendant's motion to dismiss after finding that the plaintiff had "alleged sufficient facts to support the claim that it was not objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe his acts were lawful." The court specifically held: "[T]he plaintiff has ... meticulously and carefully alleged that the defendant was not only aware of the risk of harm to the plaintiff but then disregarded that risk by acting with deliberate indifference to his physical safety, specifically in his failure to abide by [department] administrative directives requiring [seat belts].... Given the allegations that the defendant knew that the plaintiff would be at serious risk of injury in the event of a collision, given that the defendant was alleged to be aware of the requirement that inmates must be seat belted, and given the allegations that the defendant drove erratically and unsafely while the plaintiff was not safely secured, this court concludes that the plaintiff's action is not barred by qualified immunity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

On May 25, 2017, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's denial of his motion to dismiss, reiterating his claim that he had not violated a clearly established right and was thus entitled to qualified immunity. In a memorandum of decision dated November 24, 2017, the court granted the defendant's motion for reconsideration but again denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.

In its memorandum of decision, the court specifically addressed the defendant's contention that he had not violated a clearly established constitutional right, stating: "Although there were no published decisions from the [United States Court of Appeals for the] Second Circuit addressing [the] specific factual situation [in the present case] at the time of the alleged conduct ... the absence of case law directly on point is not dispositive." The court then held, based largely on precedent from the Eighth Circuit, that the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged "a violation of a clearly established constitutional right—namely, that prison employees may not subject an inmate to a substantial risk of serious harm while transporting them in a vehicle. Given that the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant drove erratically and recklessly, notwithstanding the defendant's knowledge of regulations requiring seat belts as well as the plaintiff's expressed concern for his safety, the court concludes that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity."

Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, wherein he again argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity because he had not violated a clearly established constitutional right.¹⁰ The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, arguing that the defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity because (1) he was being sued in his personal capacity, not his official capacity, and (2) his failure to follow department policies when transporting the...