Miller v. Keenan

Decision Date22 August 2017
Docket NumberCase No. CV 17-2969 SJO (SS)
CourtUnited States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California
PartiesNORRIS DAJON MILLER, Plaintiff, v. LILY KEENAN, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
I.INTRODUCTION

On April 19, 2017, Norris Dajon Miller ("Plaintiff"), a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Complaint"). Plaintiff summarily alleges that Deputy District Attorney Lily Keenan is liable for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 6) (continuous pagination).

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\\ Congress mandates that district courts perform an initial screening of complaints in civil actions where a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). This Court may dismiss such a complaint, or any portion thereof, before service of process if the complaint (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1-2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). For the reasons stated below, the Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.1

II.ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

The only Defendant sued in this matter is Deputy District Attorney Keenan. (Complaint at 4). Keenan is sued in her individual capacity only. (Id. at 3).

Plaintiff was tried on six criminal charges in state court. (Id. at 10-13). The jury convicted Plaintiff of three counts of assault and one count of resisting an executive officer, but acquitted him of one count of attempted robbery of one of the assault victims and another count of resisting a different executive officer. (Id. at 10-11).

The Complaint summarily alleges that Keenan "falsely accused [Plaintiff] of crimes that [he] did not commit" in reference to the two counts that resulted in acquittals. (Id. at 3; see also id. at 4 ("See the attached proof and evidence underlined from my jury trial transcripts saying I was found not guilty on two counts.")). Plaintiff further claims that he was wrongfully held in jail pending trial on those two counts for four months and nineteen days. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff seeks $46,700,000 in monetary damages for the "emotional stress, heartache, pain and suffering, [and] false imprisonment" caused by being accused of the two crimes of which he was acquitted. (Id. at 5).

III.DISCUSSION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must dismiss the Complaint due to pleading defects. However, the Court must grant a pro se litigant leave to amend his defective complaint unless "it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment." Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons discussed below, it is not "absolutely clear" that at least some of the defects of Plaintiff's Complaint could not be cured by amendment. While it is far from certain that Plaintiff will be able to allege facts sufficient to support even one of his claims, due to his pro se status, the Court will DISMISS the Complaint with leave to amend.

A. The Complaint Fails To State A Claim For Malicious Prosecution

A claim of malicious prosecution is generally not cognizable under section 1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2012). California law recognizes the common law tort of malicious prosecution, although such claims are "disfavored." Zamos v. Stroud, 32 Cal. 4th 958, 966 (2004). To state a claim for malicious prosecution under California law, "a plaintiff must demonstrate that the prior action (1) was initiated by or at the direction of the defendant and legally terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (2) was brought without probable cause, and (3) was initiated with malice." Seibel v. Mittlesteadt, 41 Cal. 4th 735, 740 (2007); see also Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 32 Cal. 4th 336, 341 (2004) (standard applies to underlying prosecution of either a criminal or civil matter); Van Audenhove v. Perry, 11 Cal. App. 5th 915, 919 (2017) (quoting Casa Herrera). Malicious prosecution is also actionable under state law where the defendant "continu[es] to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause." Zamos, 32 Cal. 4th at 970. "If a plaintiff cannot establish any one of these three elements, its malicious prosecution action will fail." Staffpro, Inc. v. Elite Show Servs., Inc., 136 Cal. App. 4th 1392, 1398 (2006).

Although malicious prosecution is fundamentally a state law tort, the Ninth Circuit has determined that a civil rights plaintiff may bring a claim for malicious prosecution under section 1983 when certain conditions are met. To state a federal claimfor malicious prosecution, in addition to alleging the elements of a state law claim, a plaintiff must establish that the prosecution was conducted "for the purpose of denying [the accused] equal protection or another specific constitutional right.'" Lacey, 693 F.3d at 919 (quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)). In such instances, malicious prosecution actions "are not limited to suits against prosecutors but may [also] be brought . . . against other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed." Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).

The "favorable termination" element of a malicious prosecution claim requires that the termination of the underlying action "reflect the merits of the action and the plaintiff's innocence of the misconduct alleged in the lawsuit." Staffpro, 13 6 Cal. App. 4th at 1399 (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Termination of the prior proceeding is not necessarily favorable simply because the party prevailed in the prior proceeding; the termination must relate to the merits of the action by reflecting either on the innocence of or lack of responsibility for the misconduct alleged against him." Sagonowsky v. More, 64 Cal. App. 4th 122, 128 (1998). "If the resolution of the underlying litigation 'leaves some doubt as to the defendant's innocence or liability[, it] is not a favorable termination, and bars that party from bringing a malicious prosecution action against the underlying plaintiff.'" Staffpro, 136 Cal. App. 4th at 1399-1400 (quoting Eells v. Rosenblum, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1848, 1855 (1995) (alteration and emphasis in original)); see also Womackv. Cnty. of Amador, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in malicious prosecution action where dismissal of underlying criminal charges "in the interest of justice" "left some doubt" about the suspect's factual innocence and thus did not constitute a "favorable termination"); Peinado v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 2014 WL 6693837, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2014) (same).

To determine whether there was a "favorable termination," California courts "look at the judgment as a whole in the prior action." Casa Herrera, 32 Cal. 4th at 341 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As one court explained,

[F]or purposes of determining favorable termination, "[t]he court in the action for malicious prosecution will not make a separate investigation and retry each separate allegation without reference to the result of the previous suit as a whole . . . ." [Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666, 684 (1994) (en banc).] Instead, consideration should be given to the judgment as a whole" as it is "the decree of judgment itself in the former action [that] is the criterion by which to determine who was the successful party in such proceeding." [Id. at 685].

Staffpro, 136 Cal. App. 4th at 1403. Accordingly, where a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action prevailed on only "some, but not all, of the causes of action asserted against it in the complaintin the underlying litigation," the plaintiff "cannot establish favorable termination and is consequently precluded from maintaining a subsequent malicious prosecution action." Id. at 1394. Several courts have emphasized that while the "probable cause" element of a malicious prosecution action may be met where only one of the claims in the underlying litigation lacked probable cause, the "favorable termination" element requires that "there must first be favorable termination of the entire action.'" Dalany v. American Pacific Holding Corp., 42 Cal. App. 4th 822, 829 (1996) (quoting Crowley, 8 Cal. 4th at 686 (emphasis in original)); see also Staffpro, 136 Cal. App. 4th at 1402-03 (the severability analysis applicable to the probable cause element "is inapplicable to the favorable termination element of the malicious prosecution tort").2

Courts in this circuit have generally adopted California's "whole judgment" rule when analyzing the favorable termination element of a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim. Forexample, in Whitmore v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2010 WL 11530651 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010), affirmed 473 Fed. App'x 575 (9th Cir. 2012), the malicious prosecution plaintiff had been charged in an underlying criminal action with attempted murder of a police officer, assault upon a peace officer, attempted firearm removal, taking a firearm or weapon while resisting a peace officer, and obstructing or resisting a peace officer. Id. at *8. At trial, plaintiff was acquitted on "the more serious charges," but was found guilty of "resisting arrest, a felony count of battery with injury to a peace officer, and leaving the scene of an accident." Id. The court concluded on summary judgment that the malicious prosecution claim failed because plaintiff's acquittal on certain counts did not necessarily show plaintiff's actual "innocence" of the crimes with which he was charged. Id. In particular, the court found that plaintiff's...

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